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This dissertation is a collection of three papers in which I apply underappreciated resources to solve  
puzzles at the interface between semantics and pragmatics. 
The first paper defends an unpopular semantics for quotation: the Proper Name Theory (PNT).  
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “...the unanimous consensus is that [the PNT] fails 
miserably.” I defend the PNT by supplementing it with a  metasemantic  account of quotation formation. 
While semantics is the study of how lexical items are associated with meanings, metasemantics is the study of 
how lexical  items  come to be associated with meanings.  I  articulate  the Quotation Convention (QC),  a 
metasemantic convention for introducing quotations into the lexicon. None of the standard objections apply  
to the PNT as supplemented by the QC. Furthermore, the PNT is the only available theory that accounts for  
both markless quotation and quotations of non-linguistic material.
The second paper investigates metonymy—where a nominal's denotation seems to shift to a saliently 
related entity. I argue that metonymy is highly conventional. Metonymy is constrained and interacts directly 
with the inflections of verbs. I incorporate metonymy into a semantic rule system by making use of optional  
semantic rules. Though theorists have avoided optionality in semantic rule systems, I argue that optionality is  
necessary for a satisfying semantic account of metonymy.
The third paper looks at commonly used verbs such as 'make' and 'open'. Most contextualists assume 
underspecification  for  these  verbs—that  impoverished  lexical  knowledge  must  be  supplemented  by  non-
linguistic cognition. I argue for an alternative account, overspecification, in which the role of non-linguistic 
cognition is to select pieces of rich and specific lexical knowledge that are relevant to the utterance situation. 
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Chapter 1 -  In Defense of the Proper Name Theory of Quotation
1.1. The Proper Name Theory of Quotation 
The Proper Name Theory of Quotation (PNT) gets a lot of bad press these days. The PNT 
holds that, like proper names, quotations are syntactically and semantically simple—they have no 
semantic or syntactic constituents. According to Paul Saka, the PNT is “an utter failure.”(Saka 1998) 
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore claim that, “It is 
almost a tradition in the literature on quotation to include a brief dismissive discussion of the Proper  
Name Theory.  It no longer is defended by anyone and there is even some debate about whether 
Quine  and Tarski  ever  held  the  view.  ...  Today  the  view gets  discussed primarily  for  heuristic 
purposes.” Cappelen and Lepore present “some of the reasons why the unanimous consensus is that  
[the PNT] fails miserably.” (Cappelen and Lepore 2012). In this paper I challenge that consensus. I 
claim that the arguments against the PNT are far weaker than they have been taken to be. The 
standard objections to the PNT point to facts that the PNT is incapable of explaining. I claim that  
the PNT qua semantic theory does not need to explain these facts.1 Instead, we can supplement the 
PNT with  a  natural  metasemantic account  of  how quotation-expressions  are  introduced into  a 
language, a metasemantic account that can easily explain the requisite facts. With this metasemantic 
supplement  the  PNT is  a  compelling  account  of  quotation—the  only  available  approach  that 
accounts  for  both the special  syntactic  properties  of  quotations and quotations  that  lack special 
graphic or phonological markings, i.e.  markless quotations. 
1 I'm assuming a fairly “thin” notion of explanation.  In order for a theory to explain a fact or phenomenon, it is 
enough for the fact or phenomenon to be derivable from the theory.  In using this thin notion of explanation, I take 
myself to be following standard practice in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics and in particular I 
take  myself  to be  following a  standard practice  in the  literature on quotation. In  the SEP entry on quotation  
(Cappelen and Lepore 2012), for example, Cappelen and Lepore identify features of quotation such as “BQ1.  In 
quotation you cannot substitute co-referential or synonymous terms salva veritate.”  of which they say, “[n]o theory 
of quotation is adequate unless it explains this feature...” They also note “BQ2. It is not possible to quantify into  
quotation.” of which they say “[a]n adequate theory of quotation must explain why not.”
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Quotation is one way of using linguistic expressions to denote linguistic expressions. 2 It is 
not the only means of doing so. In sentences such as (1) a definite description, 'the first word in the 
dictionary,' denotes a word.
(1) John uttered the first word in the dictionary.
Unlike the above example, in cases of quotation the denoting expression is interestingly similar to  
the  denoted  expression.  In  written  English  the  only  orthographic  difference  is  usually  a  set  of 
quotation marks. In oral English there is generally no phonological difference between the denoting 
expression and the denoted expression. 
For the sake of  clarity  let us  call  the denoting expression 'the quotation-expression'.  For 
example in (2) “ 'kittens' ” is the quotation-expression.3  We can call the denoted expression 'the 
denotation-expression'. In (2) 'kittens' is the denotation-expression.
(2) John uttered 'kittens'.
The PNT is  a  theory  of  how quotation-expressions  are  related to their  denotations.4 As 
2 There is controversy over what exactly the denotations of quotation-expressions may be. Are they linguistic types, 
linguistic  tokens or both?  (Garcia-Carpintero 1994),  for example,  claims that  quotation is  flexible  in that  that 
quotation expressions can denote either types or tokens depending upon the context. Can a quotation denote a 
phonological structure, or must there always be a related orthography, and vice versa? In some of the cases I discuss  
below  we  have  quotations  of  nonsense  expressions.  Cappelen  and  Lepore  have  argued  that  we  can  also  have 
quotations involving non-linguistic symbols, as in (i) from (Cappelen and Lepore 2007 23)
(i) 'J' will be stamped on the forehead of every semantic minimalist
Identifying exactly what quotations denote is a difficult task, but it isn't necessary for my purposes here. My view is 
compatible  with any of the many reasonable answers to these questions.  I will  continue saying that  quotations 
denote  linguistic  expressions;  but  I  use  'linguistic  expression'  in  an  extremely  loose  way,  to  potentially  cover  
nonsense utterances and certain non-linguistic symbols. I use 'well-formed linguistic expression' when I want to  
restrict myself to grammatical sentences or well-formed subsentential expressions.
3 There is an interesting question about what we should identify as the quotation-expression. Davidson in (Davidson  
1979) claimed that the denoting-expression is just the quotation marks, and that the material enclosed in the marks 
is not actually a part of the sentence. (Washington 1993) holds that the quotation-expression is  just the enclosed 
material and that the marks are a mere orthographic convention that do not correspond to any natural language  
constituent. I discuss the status of quotation marks in more detail below.
4 There are difficulties with characterizing what exactly counts as quotation.  There may very well be different kinds of  
quotation that require very different treatment.  For example, I argue below that so-called hybrid quotations will  
require a different kind of treatment from the examples I primarily discuss. The lines are blurred even further if we  
consider other phenomena such as role-shifting in sign languages and indirect discourse. For my purposes, I will 
follow much of the philosophical literature on quotation in discussing the phenomenon characterized in the main 
text, for which I believe I can provide a unified treatment. Still, I recognize that there are a variety of connected,  
similar phenomena that might require different approaches.
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mentioned above, according to the PNT quotation-expressions are semantically and syntactically  
simple: quotation-expressions do not have any meaningful constituents that need to be combined. A  
single  denotation is assigned to each whole quotation-expression.  Furthermore, according to the  
PNT, a semantic theory will  contain a rule  that  directly  assigns a  denotation to the quotation-
expression.  Assigning  a  denotation  to  a  quotation-expression  does  not  require  any  appeal  to  
contextual  parameters.  The  quotation-expression  is  essentially  a  proper  name  that  names  the 
denotation-expression. This point is illustrated in (3):
(3) 'Cats are cute' is a sentence. 
Though the quotation-expression in (3) might appear to be made up of multiple words, according to 
the PNT  “ 'Cats are cute' ” is an atomic expression whose denotation, the sentence 'Cats are cute', is  
assigned directly from the lexicon.5
Though the PNT is often attacked, even its detractors recognize that the PNT has several  
obvious benefits. We can neither quantify into quotation-expressions, nor can we substitute proper 
parts of quotation-expressions with co-referential terms while preserving truth value. For example we 
cannot infer (4b) from (4a).
(4a) 'Fluffy est mignon' is a sentence of French.
(4b) ∃x.'x est mignon' is a sentence of French.
'Fluffy est mignon' is a sentence of French, but 'x' is not a lexical item in French. So, (4a) is true but 
(4b) is false and hence the inference from (4a) to (4b) is invalid.
Similarly (5a) and (5b) do not entail (5c).
5 In discussions of the PNT, we should be wary of putting too much weight into the moniker 'Proper Name Theory'.  
The standard use of this moniker is based on the assumption that proper names are semantically simple expressions  
that serve as simple labels for their denotations. One could in principle reject this view of how actual proper names  
function while still holding that quotation-expressions are semantically and syntactically simple. Despite the fact that  
' the Quotations are Semantically Simple Theory' might be a better moniker, I will abide by the standard use and  
refer to the theory as 'the Proper Name Theory'.
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(5a) John said 'Fluffy is cute.'
(5b) Fluffy is Sam's cat.
(5c) John said 'Sam's cat is cute.'
If quotation-expressions are semantically and syntactically simple we have a clear explanation for why 
we  cannot  quantify  into  them  or  intersubstitute  their  putative  constituents  with  co-referential  
expressions  salva  veritate.  We  can  only  perform  these  operations  on  constituents  of  complex 
expressions. We cannot, for instance, quantify into a simple expression, nor can we substitute a part 
of  a  simple  expression with a  co-referential  expression.  Neither (6b)  nor  (6c)  follow from (6a), 
though if we could quantify into simple expressions, or substitute parts with co-referential terms, 
they ought to follow from (6a).
(6a) John sails a catamaran.
(6b) ∃x.John sails a xamaran.
(6c) John sails a felineamaran.
Though the preceding arguments provide us with interesting data, they do not by themselves 
militate in favour of taking quotation-expressions to be semantically and syntactically simple. 6 There 
are other linguistic constructions, such as modal constructions and propositional attitude ascriptions, 
that are also arguably referentially opaque—that do not allow quantifying in or the intersubstitution  
of co-referential terms salva veritate. However, two properties of quotations distinguish them from 
other  opaque  constructions  and  make  a  PNT  approach  particularly  compelling.  Firstly,  the  
6 One might wonder whether proper names themselves are syntactically simple. Isn't 'Barack Obama' a syntactically  
complex name made up of two simpler names 'Barack' and 'Obama'? However such complex proper name are still  
generally composed of  simpler names.  Some apparently structured names actually seem to be simple.  “The United 
Nations” for examples doesn't admit of adjectival modification in the way we would expect if it were syntactically 
complex.
?(ii) The Great United Nations met yesterday in New York.
Regardless, the important point for my purposes is just that quotations appear to be syntactically simple for the  
reasons explored above.  
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quotation-expression always  seems to play  the  syntactic  role  of  a  noun phrase  regardless  of  the  
syntactic properties of the denotation-expression.7 Secondly, we can use quotation in cases in which 
the quoted material  is  not itself  a well-formed linguistic expression.  The complements of modal  
operators and propositional attitude verbs do not have these properties. Let us look at them in more  
detail. 
Quotation-expressions, at least those I am currently discussing, have the syntactic properties  
of nominals (nouns) regardless of the part of speech to which the denotation-expression belongs.  
Even though 'jumped' is a verb, in (7) “ 'jumped' ” is functioning as a nominal.
(7) 'Jumped' is a linguistic expression.
The  PNT  can  provide  a  quick  explanation  for  why  quotation-expressions  behave  as  nominals 
regardless of the syntactic properties of the quoted material—quotation-expressions are syntactically  
simple nominals,  which is a feature of proper names generally. Propositional attitude verbs (and  
modal operators) have complements that are full clauses and that can engage in syntactic behaviour  
that requires structure.
(8a) Willa believed that Ted hit the ball.
7 Francois  Recanati  has  claimed that  we should distinguish two kinds of quotation: closed quotation, where the  
quotation-expression appears to be a singular term, and open quotation, where the quotation-expression does not  
appear to be a singular term. For instance see (iii) from (Recanati 2010 231)
(iii) Stop that John! 'Nobody likes me', 'I am miserable' … Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?
Recanati  claims that  in (iii)  the quotation-expressions “  'Nobody likes me'  ” and “ 'I  am miserable'  ”  are  not  
functioning as singular terms, and hence are open quotations. I think Recanati is right to focus attention on cases of  
quotation where the quotation-expression might not be a singular term, but his project is compatible, in broad  
terms, with my project  here, which is specifically to help explain what is going on  when  quotation-expressions 
function as singular terms. I discuss this issue in more detail when I discuss hybrid quotation below. That said, I'm a 
bit suspicious of examples like (iii). We can construct examples parallel to (iii) that use paradigmatic singular terms. 
(iv) Stop that John! Bubbles. Mr. Fins. Goldilocks. Don't you think you need to stop killing your 
goldfish?
Interestingly, such constructions are far more awkward if we try to use predicates rather than nominals.
?(v) Stop that John! Ran. Back-flipped. Jumped. Don't you think you've proven you're a good 
athlete?
?(vi) Stop that John! Happy. Sad. Angry. Don't you think you need some emotional stability?
(I use '?' to mark odd sentences that are somewhere between obviously acceptable and obviously unacceptable.) The 
hybrid quotation cases I discuss below seem more clearly to be cases where the quotation is not primarily playing the 
role of a singular term.
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(8b) What did Willa believe that Ted hit?
Standard syntactic theories take (8a) and (8b) to both be derived from a single underlying form, but 
this requires that “that Ted hit the ball” is a whole clause with internal structure and not a simple 
nominal.
We cannot form analogous questions from sentences with direct quotations, which suggests 
that  quotation-expressions lack the  syntactic  structure had by the complements  of  propositional  
attitude verbs. Attempting to perform a parallel extraction leads to a deviant sentence.
(9a) Willa said “Ted hit the ball.”
*(9b) What did Willa say “Ted hit?”
We can also form quotation-expressions that denote ill-formed sentences or nonsense words 
that themselves are not well-formed linguistic expressions.
(10a) 'Be the going to smell of apples moldy' was what the strange man uttered.
(10b) 'gleerg' doesn't appear in any dictionary.
(10c) John exclaimed, 'glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg.'
If  quotations  are  complex  well-formed  linguistic  expressions,  the  constituents  of  quotations  
presumably  must  also  be  well-formed  linguistic  expressions.  However,  'gleerg'  and 
'glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg'  are  not  themselves  well-formed  linguistic  expressions  as  they  are  not 
contained in the lexicon. While “be the going to smell of apples moldy” might be made up of well-
formed linguistic expressions, the sentence formation rules given by syntactic theories will not be  
able to generate this particular complex expression; hence the complex expression will fail to be a  
well-formed linguistic expression. The fact that we can quote nonsense also distinguishes quotation 
from  other  referentially  opaque  constructions.  We  cannot  include  nonsense  terms  in  modal 
constructions or propositional attitude ascriptions.
6
*(11a) It is necessary that glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg.
*(11b) John believes that glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg.
*(11c) John believes glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg.
It is hard to see how complex expressions with non-linguistic constituents could be generated 
by standard syntactic theories. Syntactic theories describe operations that combine constituents to 
form complex linguistic expressions in virtue of the syntactic properties of the constituents. Since 
symbols like 'glhhhhhhhhhhhhhrrrg' are not in the lexicon, they don't have any syntactic properties.  
They don't belong to syntactic categories (like 'noun' or 'verb') and they do not have agreement  
features (like person or number). Since such symbols don't have syntactic properties, they cannot be  
used  by  rules  that  require  syntactic  properties.  Standard  syntactic  theories  do  not  include  any 
operations that act upon non-linguistic symbols, and it is not clear how syntactic theories could be  
extended to do so.8 According to the PNT, 'be the going to smell of apples moldy' is a syntactically  
and semantically simple proper name. Given the PNT, we don't  need to posit  any syntactic  or  
semantic  operations  that  act  on  non  well-formed  linguistic  expressions,  since  the  quotation-
8 There are several reasons why we should be wary of thinking we can extend syntactic theories to accommodate such 
non-lexical constituents.
The first reason is that qua philosophers we should be wary of proposing major modifications to syntactic 
theories.  Just as philosophers of biology should hesitate before proposing substantive modifications of first-order 
biological theories and philosophers of physics should hesitate before proposing substantive modifications of theories 
in physics, philosophers of language should be humble about proposing modifications to syntactic theories. Syntax is  
a rich and complex domain of study in it's own right, and we should be wary of declaring syntacticians to be  
systematically wrong about their own field.
The second reason stems from the fact that on contemporary approaches to syntax such as the Principles  
and  Parameters  approach  or  the  Minimalist  Program,  there  has  been  a  shift  away  from  explaining  sentence 
formation in terms of phrase structure rules (like “S  NP VP” roughly the rule that a sentence is made from a→  
noun phrase and a verb phrase) and instead relying on lexical properties of constituents to constrain directly how the 
constituents  can  combine  with  other  constituents  to  form  complex  expressions.  Since  putative  non-linguistic 
constituents are not in the lexicon, such constituents don't have any lexical properties and hence there is no way to  
combine them with other constituents.
One might respond that we could still allow non-linguistic constituents into the language: perhaps they 
should be assigned default lexical properties. To anticipate a concern that will be arising shortly, however, such a  
move could make it hard to see how syntax is used to generate an infinite number of sentences from a finite number  
of atoms.  This motivation: explaining how beings with finite cognitive capacities can be competent with infinitely  
many distinct sentences, is a key motivation behind generative grammar. Allowing non-linguistic items directly into 
syntax,  however,  introduces  infinitely  many  atoms to  the  language,  and  hence  makes  a  mess  of  this  standard 
motivation for generative grammar. 
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expression does not have any constituents.9
The final  benefit  of  the PNT is  that  it  is  simple and straightforward.  This  is  why even 
theorists who reject the PNT outright feel obligated to discuss it. It is treated as the naïve default  
position whose flaws show us how to develop a more sophisticated approach.10 If those flaws fail to 
materialize, however, there is something to be said for the simple, obvious approach.
1.2. Objections to the PNT
So why has the PNT been so thoroughly rejected? There are five main objections I will 
address:  the  objection  from  infinitude,  the  objection  from  novel  uses,  the  objection  from 
disquotation, the objection from the special relationship, and the objection from hybrid quotation.
 The objection from infinitude: It is a standard assumption that all natural languages contain 
an infinite number of complex linguistic expressions. This infinitude poses a prima facie problem for 
accounts of linguistic competence. How can a being with finite cognitive capacities fully grasp a 
language with infinitely many complex expressions? Given that humans have finite capacity in their 
memories, humans are only capable of directly encoding the meaning of finitely many expressions in 
a lexicon. The standard answer to this puzzle is that each complex expression can be constructed 
using a finite number of rules applied to a finite number of lexical atoms. A speaker must only be  
competent with the finite rules and the finite atomic expressions in order to be capable of using any  
of the infinitely many complex expressions. 
Any one of those infinitely many complex expressions can be used as the basis for forming a 
quotation-expression. As a result there will be an infinite number of distinct quotation-expressions in 
9 This kind of puzzle is used by Paul Postal to argue that we should abandon standard approaches to generative  
grammar. (Postal 2004 Ch. 6). He argues that standard generative grammar, with its assumption of a fixed lexicon  
cannot accommodate syntactic operations on alexical items (symbols not in the lexicon). I agree with Postal that we 
should  be  wary  of  assuming  a  static  lexicon,  but  given  the  PNT,  together  with  the  metasemantic  quotation 
convention I describe below, we do not have to posit any syntactic operations on alexical items.
10 The PNT's failure “reveals something about how to go about constructing an acceptable theory of quotation.” 
(Cappelen and Lepore 2012)
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any given language. However, according to the PNT, quotation-expressions are semantically and 
syntactically  simple.  That  is  to  say,  the  set  of  quotation-expressions  is  a  subset  of  the  atomic  
expressions of the language. Therefore, the PNT in conjunction with the claim that there are an 
infinite number of quotation-expressions entails that the language contains an infinite number of  
atomic expressions. But this seems to make it impossible for a being with finite cognitive capacities  
to grasp the language. The explanatory burden of the PNT is to explain how we could be competent  
with infinitely many quotation-expressions if they are syntactically and semantically simple.
The objection from novel uses: We are capable of quoting nonsense and perhaps even non-
linguistic symbols.11 Speakers of a language are capable of understanding novel nonsense quotations. 
Take the following as an example:
(12) Samantha looked up at her computer screen and saw 
'aslfdjalksjfahsgqheghghggg.' She must have fallen asleep on her keyboard.
Most speakers have never before encountered the string 'aslfdjalksjfahsgqheghghggg' nor have they 
encountered the quotation-expression “ 'aslfdjalksjfahsgqheghghggg' ”.  Still,  a  competent speaker 
will  immediately fully comprehend (12) and know what the quotation-expression denotes. With 
most  proper  names,  we  cannot  automatically  glean  the  referent  of  the  name  by  observing  an 
occurrence of the name. In cases of quotations, however, we automatically seem to know what the 
quotation-expression  denotes.  The  PNT  seems  to  have  no  explanation  for  the  ease  of  
comprehending sentences involving novel quotation-expressions.12
The objection from disquotation: The disquotational schema is often thought to be a truism.
11 (Cappelen and Lepore 2007) present a number of such examples. See ft. 2.
12 As Saka puts the problem “Of course the Name Theory is an utter failure, since the quote mark is a systematically  
productive device that can be applied to expressions that we have not ever heard quoted before. This argument is so 
obvious that one wonders whether Tarski and Quine could have seriously meant that quotations in natural language  
function just like proper names. (Richard 1986) and (Bennett 1988) think that they used "name" in the sense of a  
denoting phrase or singular term, and I would too if it were not for the fact that Tarski and Quine are both so clear  
about denying that quotations contain meaningful structure.” (Saka 1998)
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(DS) Φ is true iff .Φ 13
From the disquotational schema, we can derive particular instances of disquotation:
(13a) 'Grass is green' is true iff grass is green.
(13b) 'Fluffy is cute' is true iff Fluffy is cute.
Presumably  the  explanation  for  why  every  instance  of  the  disquotational  schema  is  true  has 
something to do with the nature of quotation. But given the PNT, or so the argument goes, there is  
no such explanation forthcoming.14 Since quotation-expressions that denote sentences are just taken 
to be unstructured proper names, there is no obvious explanation for why disquoting should preserve 
truth. 
The  objection  from  the  special  relationship:  There  is  a  special  relationship  between 
quotation-expressions and their denotations, one that can be seen most clearly in cases of iterated 
quotation. 
Take the expressions “  'fruit-bat' ” and 'fruit-bat'. In some sense, “ 'fruit-bat' ” seems to 
contain 'fruit-bat'.  However this containment relation does not merely hold in this one case—it  
holds generally for all cases of iterated quotations. Not only do all actual iterated quotations appear  
to contain the denoted expression, but it seems any possible iterated quotation must do so as well. 
The linguistic form 'fruit-bat' does not denote fruit-bats in every possible world. There are possible  
worlds where a language is spoken that is broadly like English, but where the linguistic form ' fruit-
bat'  denotes  lawn  chairs.  Still  there  is,  according  to  the  objection,  no  possible  world  where  a  
language broadly like English is spoken but where the linguistic form of “ 'fruit-bat ' ” is used to  
denote the expression 'lawn chair'. But the connections between proper names and their denotations  
13 ' 'Φ  is being used here as a schematic letter for which we can substitute any sentence. The quotation marks in (DS) 
should be  understood as  corner  quotes.  When we instance  a  formula containing corner  quotes,  after  we have 
substituted appropriate expressions for occurrences of schematic letters, such as ' ', we replace the corner quotesΦ  
with normal quotation marks. 
14 This argument is raised as the first objection to the PNT in (Cappelen and Lepore 2007 101)
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are  supposed  to  be  arbitrary.  The  PNT  has  no  explanation  for  this  non-arbitrary,  systematic 
connection between quotation-expressions and their denotations.15
The objection from hybrid quotation:  So far, I have focused all of my attention on cases 
where the quotation-expression's  function is  to denote a  linguistic  expression or related symbol. 
There are many cases of quotation, however, where the quotation-expression seems to be playing two 
distinct roles in the interpretation of a sentence.
(14a) John said that he never wanted to 'jump from a plane like a crazy person' again.
(14b) John said that he never wanted to see 'that sniveling idiot' again.
In (14a) the quotation-expression is not just denoting a linguistic expression: it also seems to denote  
a class of skydiving events of which John said he never wants to partake in again. In using (14a) a 
speaker is drawing attention to the specific linguistic expressions that were used by John in order to  
convey  that  content.  Treating  hybrid  quotation-expressions  as  singular  terms  leads  to  serious 
difficulties. For instance, in cases of hybrid quotation we cannot substitute a co-referential term for  
the quotation-expression. The result would not be a well formed sentence. We cannot substitute  
'that phrase' for “ 'jump from a plane like a crazy person' ” in (14a), even though both expressions 
have the same denotation. The result of attempting this substitution, (14c), is not a grammatical 
sentence of English.
*(14c) John said that he never wanted to that phrase again.
The PNT supposedly holds that the quotation-expressions in (14a) and (14b) are proper names of 
linguistic expressions, but the quotation-expressions in (14a) and (14b) do not seem to have the 
syntactic properties of proper names. The syntactic role of the quotation-expression in (14a) is that 
15 Donald Davidson raises a form of this objection. “If quotations are structureless singular terms, then there is no 
more significance to the category of quotation-mark names than to the category of names that begin and end with  
the letter ‘a’ (“Atlanta’, ‘Alabama’, ‘Alta’, ‘Athena’, etc.). On this view, there is no relation, beyond an accident of  
spelling, between an expression and the quotation-mark name of that expression.” (Davidson 1979)
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of a verb phrase, and not a noun phrase.
Having  laid  out  this  battery  of  objections,  it  is  important  to  note  that  they  share  an 
underlying property: all are arguments from explanatory inadequacy. They all point to a fact about 
quotation and then claim that the PNT has no grounds for explaining that fact.
The facts are as follows:
(F1) A being with finite capacities can be a competent user of a language with 
infinitely many atomic quotation-expressions.16 
(F2) We easily understand novel quotation-expressions.
(F3) The disquotational schema holds.
(F4) There is a special non-arbitrary relationship between quotation-expressions and 
their denotations.
(F5) There are occurrences of hybrid quotation.
One problem with arguments  from explanatory inadequacy  is  that  they require  that  the 
relevant explanatory burdens actually fall to the theory under discussion. I grant that the PNT alone  
is not capable of explaining (F1)-(F5), but I claim that it is not the responsibility of the PNT to do 
so in the first place. The PNT is a theory of the semantics of quotation-expressions. We can accept 
the PNT as a semantic theory and then provide a supplementary explanation for (F1)-(F5). There is 
a natural metasemantic account of quotation-expressions that answers all of the explanatory burdens.
1.3. Metasemantic Conventions
Semantics is the study of how linguistic expressions are associated with meanings. It includes 
16 There is also a more radical interpretation of the objection from infinitude that goes beyond claiming the PNT lacks  
a way of explaining how natural languages users can be competent. The more radical interpretation holds that the  
PNT is logically incompatible with natural language users being competent. While versions of the objection from 
infinitude might be put in this way, the more radical version of the objection relies implicitly on a stronger version 
of F1. It requires not just that the PNT fails to provide the relevant explanation, but that there is no way to provide  
that explanation. I will argue below that we can provide such an explanation. If my response to the weaker version of 
the argument holds, then, it will also undermine the more radical version.
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studying how simple linguistic expressions are assigned simple meanings, as well as how meanings 
can combine to form complex meanings in accordance with syntactic structures. Taking a page from 
(Kaplan 1989b), we can say that metasemantics is the study of how linguistic expressions come to be  
associated with their meanings. For an example, let us turn to Fluffy the cat. On the one hand, a  
semantic theory will tell us what semantic value is associated with the name 'Fluffy.' The semantic 
theory will contain a clause such as:
(15) 'Fluffy' denotes Fluffy. 
A metasemantic theory, on the other hand, will explain how that particular cat ended up being  
associated with the name 'Fluffy.' A metasemantic theory might model the reasoning behind Fluffy's 
original  baptism as  well  as  the  mechanisms  whereby  the  name  'Fluffy'  became  fixed  and  was 
transmitted to other language users.17 These two kinds of theories, semantic and metasemantic, are 
distinct  though they  may  at  times  influence  each  other.  For  the  most  part  we  can  proceed  in  
articulating and testing particular semantic theories without worrying about how the associations  
modeled by the  semantic theories  have  developed.  This  relative  autonomy is  important because  
metasemantics is often thought to involve messy sociological and psychological questions.18 We are 
17 Kaplan makes this distinction clearly in (Kaplan 1989b 573-576). 
“The fact that a word or phrase has a certain meaning clearly belongs to semantics. On the other hand, a 
claim about the basis [emphasis throughout is Kaplan's] for ascribing a certain meaning to a word or phrase does not 
belong to semantics. … [T]he fact that 'nauseous' used to mean nauseating but is coming to mean nauseated is a 
historical, semantic fact about contemporary American English. But neither the reason why the change in semantic 
value has taken place nor the theory that gives the basis for claiming that there has been a change in meaning belongs 
to semantics. For present purposes let us settle on metasemantics.” (Kaplan 1989b 573-574)
Kaplan is clear that metasemantic facts ought not to be represented within the semantic theory itself.
“Where within the formal theory do I take account of the locus of creation of character, the assignment of 
meanings that is presupposed in the notion of an interpreted language? Where within the formal theory do I take  
account of such metasemantical matters as constraints on the kinds of dubbings allowed? I do not.” (Kaplan 1989b  
613-614) 
18 As  Michael  Glanzberg  puts  it:  “Metasemantics,  especially  the  metasemantics  of  contextual  parameters,  is  a 
notoriously messy subject, about which we understand relatively little. This is no failure of any given semantic  
analysis. For instance, though it falls on the simple side of metasemantics, it is already a very messy issue just how  
demonstrated objects are identified. However messy this may be, it is no reason to reject the semantics which says a  
demonstrative picks out a demonstrated object. Difficulties in the metasemantics here do not make us doubt the 
semantics itself.” (Glanzberg 2007 23)
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far  from  having  a  full  understanding  of  what  metasemantics  amounts  to  or  from  having  any  
complete metasemantic theories.
Still,  metasemantics is  not  always  too messy to be worth discussing. Even in the case of 
proper names for people there are defeasible conventions about how people may be named. For 
instance, by convention, the name 'Gary' is generally given to males and the name 'Katerina' is  
generally given to females. These conventions are defeasible—some accepted names won't abide by 
them—but they are genuine social conventions. If one hears a sentence such as (16), one can make a 
reasonable inference about Gary's gender.
(16) I'd like to introduce you to my friend Gary.
'Gary' as used in (16) carries (defeasible) information about gender, but one needn't claim 
that this information about gender is carried by the semantic content of 'Gary'. Instead the gender-
information is available to us because of our knowledge of  the metasemantic conventions under 
which the name 'Gary' came to be associated with Gary. We know that there is a convention that  
'Gary' is  generally reserved for males and we also know that Gary was likely named under that  
convention. It is this knowledge that justifies our inference that Gary is likely male. The gender  
information is carried by the name because of the metasemantic process that went into the creation 
of the association between Gary and 'Gary' and not because of “Gary”'s semantic content. 
In the 'Gary' case there is no guarantee that 'Gary' denotes a male, which is exactly what we 
would  expect  given  the  relative  weakness  of  the  conventions  that  dictate  first-name-giving  in 
contemporary Western culture. While 'Gary' is normally reserved for male children, this convention 
can be ignored or flouted. That said, it is not difficult to imagine groups of language users who 
adhere strictly to stringent metasemantic conventions on naming. Knowing that a name was coined 
by such a group, together with knowledge of the relevant naming conventions, can allow agents to  
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reliably infer a great deal of information about the name's denotation without any need for that  
information to be semantically encoded. 
Imagine a culture, the Orderists, who have a strict policy of naming children by the order in  
which they were born in a given year. The first child to be born in a year is named '1', the second '2'  
and so on. These can be genuine names: the fact that Orderists will only socially sanction names that 
satisfy this convention does not entail that semantically the names are less than directly referential.  
We can use standard tests to argue that Orderist names are genuine proper names. Orderists could  
utter sentences such as the following:
(17) If 1 had been born a week later, 1 would have been born after 2.
(17) suggests that '1' and '2' designate rigidly. To make sense of (17) we must assume that '1' refers 
to 1 relative to a world in which 1 was not the first child born in that year. 
 Knowing that a name is an Orderist name, together with knowing the Orderist naming 
convention,  allows  one  to  reasonably  infer  information  about  the  name's  denotation.  The 
information about birth-order is conveyed by our knowledge of the metasemantic convention and 
not by the semantic content of the expression. 
Though  the  Orderists  are  an  invention,  many  actual  cultures  engage  in  fairly  stringent 
naming  practices.  Jewish  people  are  traditionally  given  Hebrew  surnames,  used  in  religious  
ceremonies, that follow certain set rules: a child's surname is determined by gender and the name of 
the father or mother. A male child is given the surname 'son of [father's name]' and a female child is  
given the surname 'daughter of [mother's name.]' For example, if Tsvi is the son of Reuben, he will  
be given the surname 'ben Reuben'.  We can accept that  these  are  genuine proper names while  
invoking our knowledge of the naming convention to explain how we infer information about an 
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individual's ancestry.19 20
The importance of metasemantic naming conventions becomes even clearer if we consider  
generating  names  for  entities  other  than  humans.  A  laboratory  might  settle  on  a  productive 
convention for naming test subjects. These conventions might lead to names like 'Yellow 17' or  
'Blue 123123'. Here we have productive metasemantic systems. There are an infinite number of 
possible names that can be created through the use of these conventions; the fact that the name was 
created under that convention can be used to convey information about name's denotation and the  
denotation's role in the corresponding experiments.21 Similar to the lab example, software engineers 
often put a  great  deal  of  effort  into creating productive naming conventions for the naming of 
programming tools such as classes and libraries of functions. Naming conventions make it easier for 
programmers to understand how a given library might fit  into a  broader architecture.  Still,  the  
information conveyed by these programming naming conventions is not semantically encoded in the 
19 Similar patronymic and matronymic conventions are historically extremely widespread. Many Scandinavian and 
Slavic countries had versions of these conventions. Such conventions are also the seed of the 'Mac' or 'Mc' in many  
Irish and Scottish names, as well as being the source of common English names like 'Johnson' and 'Peterson,' to 
name just a few of the many examples.
In fact, contemporary Western practices include a strict convention about the giving of surnames.  Until  
relatively recently, a child was virtually always given their father's surname.  The convention has expanded to allow 
children to receive their mother's surname (in cases where it differs from the father's) or a surname constructed from 
both the father and the mother's surnames.  However, it is rare for a child to not be given a surname that stems from  
their parents.  
20 One might suspect that Orderist names are rigidified definite descriptions rather than genuine proper names.  In ft. 
25 below I address some further considerations that suggest Orderist names are genuine proper names.  However, we 
should note that the kind of objections Scott Soames raises to treating proper names as having their meanings fixed 
by rigidified descriptions (Soames 2002) would also apply to Orderist names. Consider the following sentences,  
spoken about a non-actual subject 'Jim'.
(vii) Jim believes that 1 was the first person born this year.
According to a Soames-style argument, if the referent of '1' is fixed by a rigidified definite description in ( vii), then 
Jim must have beliefs about the actual world.  Jim need not have any beliefs about the actual world, therefore '1' 
cannot have its referent fixed by a rigidified definite description.
21 We might think of systems such as our names for geographic coordinates, times, or dates as arising from similar  
metasemantic systems. We can competently use infinitely many GPS coordinate-names without an infinitely large 
lexicon. So long as we understand the convention by which GPS coordinates-names are created, we can use our  
knowledge of the convention to glean the necessary information from any new example of such a coordinate. These  
systems presumably generate genuine names because, like in the Orderist case, we might still want to say that time-
names  and geographic  coordinate-names designate  rigidly.  There  are  circumstances  (like  daylight  savings  time) 
where we might want the denotations to come apart from the standard conventions: i.e. where '12:01 AM, doesn't  
come two minutes after 11:59 PM'. Anyone who wasn't aware of the complex exceptions to the standard time 
naming conventions would be confused. Still, the semantic values of the time-names might still be simple. 
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names: there are many cases of sloppy programmers coming up with misleading names and having 
them stick despite  the fact  that  the information they convey is  not actually  associated with the  
named object.
College classes are often named using similar productive conventions. Students quickly learn 
the  difference  between  course  numbers  in  the  100s,  the  200s  and  the  300s.  The  information 
encoded by a name such as 'Philosophy 103' doesn't semantically entail that it denotes an 'entry 
level' class. A cruel and mischievous professor might offer a section of Philosophy 103 that is more 
advanced and difficult then a graduate seminar. The name's semantic content is given by the class it  
refers  to  but  the  metasemantic  convention behind the  name allows  us  to  encode  non-semantic 
information that is often communicated when we use the name. 
I want to defend the PNT by supplementing it with the claim that quotation-expressions are  
generated by a similar metasemantic convention—a convention that allows us to create names for 
linguistic expressions and related symbols. According to what I will call the 'quotation convention,'  
we can always introduce a name to denote a symbol such that the phonological form of the new 
quotation-expression  is  identical  to  the  phonological  form of  the  original  symbol  and  that  the  
orthographic form of the quotation-expression is  either identical  to the symbol  or generated by 
concatenating  quote  marks  to the  beginning and end of  the  orthographic  form of  the  denoted 
symbol.
(QC) For any symbol, we can always add to the lexicon a new expression that 
(a) is a nominal
(b) denotes that symbol
(c) is pronounced identically to the symbol (if it has a phonological form)
(d) is spelled either identically to the symbol, or by concatenating quotation 
marks before and after the spelling of the symbol (if it has an orthographic 
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form) 22 23 
This simple and intuitive supplement allows the PNT to avoid the entire battery of objections.
Some might balk at the idea that quotation formation could be guided by a convention.  
Conventions are changeable and culture-dependent. The very naming conventions I relied upon to 
elucidate  the  notion  of  a  metasemantic  convention  differ  radically  from one  cultural  group  to 
another. This is all true, but it need not impugn the plausibility of a quotation-forming convention.  
The ability to form and use quotations is extremely useful. Without something like quotation, many  
important locutions would be far more difficult to communicate. When there is a universal problem, 
it is hardly surprising if conventions arise everywhere in order to solve that problem. Driving on one  
side of  the road is a classic example of  a convention; and while there  is  minor variation in the  
convention—in some places people drive on the right and in some places people drive on the left—
the space of variation is limited as is required for the convention to play its functional role. At least  
one  convention  to  that  effect  is  in  place  virtually  everywhere  roads  exist.  Given  the  utility  of  
quotation it  is  hardly surprising that  quotation conventions  would be ubiquitous.  Furthermore,  
there  is  a degree of  variation amongst  quotation conventions,  at  least  orthographically speaking.  
Some groups use single quotes, some double quotes, some use carrots, some italics, and some might  
not even have explicit markings. In some groups verbal quotations may be marked prosodically by 
pauses, by air-quotes, or other forms of emphasis. The fact that there is variation in the form of  
22  The quotation convention can be seen as a metasemantic form of Cappelen and Lepore's quotation schema—the 
basis for the Minimal Theory presented in (Cappelen and Lepore 2007). The quotation schema provides us with the  
clause in a semantic theory that is used to assign meaning to quotation marks. I discuss it in more detail when 
discussing the Minimal Theory below.
23 I won't say precisely what counts as an acceptable symbol, but I will note that in practice we seem able to make the  
relevant distinction.
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quotation-expressions can allay the worry.24 25
1.4. Response to Objections
Let us turn to see exactly how a metasemantic quotation convention could help with the five  
objections laid out earlier. 
The objection from infinitude:  On my view, quotation appears to be a productive system 
24 I  do  not  want  to  hang  to  much  on  the  word  'convention'.  For  my  purposes  it  would  do  if  rather  than  a  
metasemantic convention, we had an innate psychologically fixed rule that contributed to the formation of the  
lexicon that was equivalent to the quotation convention noted above. For my purposes here, the ontology of the rule 
matters less than the fact that some such rule exists. 
25 One might also worry that conventions can be in error in a way that quotations cannot. For example, imagine a  
mischievous Orderist has a child just before midnight on December 31st. This Orderist sneakily adjusted all of the  
clocks in the pediatric wing of the hospital so that the doctors all believe that the child was born just after midnight. 
As a result, the child is named '1' even though she is not in actuality the first child born that year. The parents keep  
their mouths shut, the stratagem is never discovered and the name sticks.
There might not seem to be any analogous cases of quotation: cases where due to error or manipulation we 
introduce a quotation-expression that actually denotes an expression other than the expression that was intended to  
be  quoted.  There  are  two  crucial  differences  between  the  Orderist  convention  and  the  QC that  explain  this  
difference.  Firstly,  the  condition  that  must  be  satisfied  by  the  Orderist  convention  is  more  opaque  than  the  
condition that must be satisfied by the QC. Secondly, Orderist names would have more inertia than quotation-
expressions. 
Both conventions assign names based on particular properties of the denotation. For the Orderists the  
condition has to do with birth-order. As the above example shows, it is not always immediately obvious what an 
individual's place in the birth order might be. Through subterfuge or simple error, we may make consistent mistakes 
about  what  is  an  individual's  place  in  the  birth  order.  With the  QC, on the  other  hand,  the  properties  that  
determine the orthography and phonology of the quotation-expression are the orthography and phonology of the 
denotation-expression. It is far harder to be in error when it comes to such properties. Being a competent user of an  
expression (either in speech or writing) guarantees that you have knowledge of the properties of expressions that 
drive the quotation convention. That said there may be cases,  especially with orthography, where an individual 
might make a mistake. In those cases the second property becomes relevant.
Conventions that name human beings have a great deal of inertia. If it turns out that someone's name 
shouldn't have been licensed by the convention, but that it, as a matter of fact was, it takes a lot of social and 
bureaucratic work to change the name to bring it in line with the convention. Imagine for instance, that years later, 
the sneaky Orderist parent's subterfuge came to light. Imagine that the Orderists wanted to change the names to 
make things right. It would take a great deal of work to solve the problem. Every individual born the year after 1  
would also have to change their name. It would take a great amount of social, cultural and bureaucratic effort to  
bring the names in line with the convention, so it is hardly surprising that the names would probably stick, even 
though people realized that they shouldn't have been given as they were.
With quotation-expressions,  however,  there is  no such inertia.  Introducing and eliminating quotation-
expressions is cheap. As soon as it is realized that an error was made, there is no difficulty in removing the offending  
lexical item, and introducing a new one. So since the properties on which the QC is based are transparent to those in 
a position to use the QC, and because any mistakes can easily be fixed with no serious cost, it is hardly surprising 
that quotation-expressions that violate the QC aren't in circulation.
That  said,  there  are  examples  of  transient  quotation-expressions  that  are  in  error.   When  a  reader  
encounters a word that she has never heard pronounced, she will sometimes assume that it has a phonological form 
that diverges from its actual phonology.  For instance one who has never heard 'Socrates' pronounced might not be  
aware that the final 'e' is a long vowel.  She might accidentally pronounce 'Socrates' in a way that rhymes with  
'crates'. Due to her misconception about the phonology of 'Socrates', such a speaker might accidentally introduce a  
quotation-expression  that  denotes  'Socrates'  but  is  pronounced  with  the  deviant  phonology.   While  such  a  
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because the quotation convention can be applied to any linguistic expression to generate a novel  
linguistic expression. Such a convention will be capable of generating an infinite number of atomic 
quotation-expressions. Note that the same could be said about the Orderist naming convention. If 
the Orderists could reproduce quickly enough and in large enough numbers, for any natural number  
n the Orderists could have n children in a given year. As a result any natural number n could be an 
Orderist name. Since the cardinality of the set of all natural numbers is infinite, the cardinality of the 
set of all potential Orderist names is infinite as well. The Orderist naming convention could allow us  
to have an infinite number of atomic names in a language. Just as this productivity is no challenge to  
a proper name theory of Orderist names, it is no challenge to a proper name theory of quotation. 
If the lexicon had to contain every possible quotation-expression, then it would be impossible 
for  an  agent  with  finite  cognitive  capacities  to  grasp  the  entire  lexicon  at  any  particular  time. 
However, for all practical purposes, an agent who understood the quotation convention and was  
competent with all of the non-quotation-expressions of a language would be capable of introducing  
any  novel  quotation-expression  whenever  it  became  relevant.  Such  an  agent  would  be  able  to 
competently use any quotation-expression that arose by modifying her lexicon, though she would 
not be capable of encoding all potential quotation-expressions at once. If the quotation-expression is  
rare and it is doubtful that it will arise again any time soon, she can let if fall from her lexicon as  
well.  So long as  we see lexicons as changeable, as they surely are, the quotation convention can 
explain (F1).26
quotation-expression will likely suffer social sanction, and fail to take hold permanently, there is no reason to think 
that speakers fail  to refer to 'Socrates'  using their deviant quotation-expression.  Similarly,  we could imagine a  
mischievous teacher misleading her students about the phonology of 'Socrates' and thereby purposefully inducing 
them to coin deviant quotation-expressions. 
26 The lexicon is often treated as static for the sake of doing linguistic theory. Still, a static lexicon is recognized to be  
an idealization, useful for some purposes. Given that it is clear that actual lexicons do change, there is no harm in 
dropping that idealization when necessary. Note that allowing changes to the lexicon in no way undermines the 
computational properties of grammars based on such a lexicon. At any particular moment, the lexicon will be fixed,  
and the grammar will function based on that fixed lexicon.
Peter Ludlow has recently argued that we should accept a dynamic lexicon: a lexicon that is constantly  
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The objection from novel uses: As I have argued, names generated through a metasemantic 
convention can convey information in virtue of knowledge about how the name was coined. This  
information can serve to allay the second challenge: the objection from novel uses. That challenge 
queried how we could come to understand novel quotations if they were proper names. My reply is  
that knowledge of the convention whereby the quotation-expression was created suffices to convey 
the information required for understanding what the quotation-expression denotes. The quotation-
forming convention tells us that for any expression we can create a name denoting that expression 
that takes a certain form. Knowing this convention, when we see a name of that form we can infer  
what it was intended to denote.27 Recognizing that this information is conveyed suffices to explain 
(F2). 
The objection from disquotation:  The Quotation Convention can also explain (F3)—the 
plausibility of the disquotational schema. The quotation convention tells us that for any expression 
 we can form a new expression by embedding  in quotation marks and that this new expressionΦ Φ  
denotes .  From the quotation convention, together with plausible general principles about theΦ  
predicate 'is true' and the nature of sentences, we can easily derive each instance of the DS.
(Principle 1): Every constituent of a sentence is an expression.
(Principle 2): If (Ψ is an expression and Φ is a sentence) and  (Ψ denotes Φ) 
then (Ψ is true iff ) Φ
(Principle 3): If Φ is an expression, by the QC we can introduce an expression 
Φ that denotes Φ.
(Principle 4): There is no other way to introduce quotation-expressions.
adjusting and shifting to fit conversational needs. (Ludlow 2006 and 2007) My account of quotation-expressions 
would obviously fit neatly with such a view, but it doesn't require the constant changing of most lexical items. My 
account only requires the ability to easily introduce and remove quotation-expressions.
27 There are exceptions. In cases where two different expressions share the same phonology and/or orthography: say the 
two English expressions 'bank' and 'bank', the quotation-expression “ 'bank' ” itself fails to provide the information  
required to distinguish which expression was used to construct the quote-expression.
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(1)  Φ is a sentence    (Assumption) 
(2) If Φ is true iff Φ is a sentence then Φ is an expression. (by Principle 1)
(3) If  Φ is an expression, then Φ denotes Φ.  (by Principles 3 and 4)
(4) If Φ denotes Φ then (Φ is true iff )     (by Principle 2 and (1))Φ
(5) If Φ is true iff Φ is a sentence then Φ is true iff . (Chaining (2), (3) and Φ
(4))
Since ' ' is a schematic letter, this argument applies to any sentence that we can substitute for ' ' Φ Φ
(making the assumption, (1), true).28 We can thereby derive something that amounts to the 
disquotational schema from Principles (1 – 4). There is an obvious wrinkle: one might worry that 
(5) is weaker than the disquotational schema. (5) makes disquotation conditional on the requirement 
that Φ is true iff Φ is a sentence. Given that on my view quotation-expressions are added to the 
lexicon as they are needed, there will be expressions whose quotations have never been considered. 
For such expressions, if the quotation-expression is not introduced into the language, we will not 
have a true instance of the disquotational schema—not because the putative instance will be false, 
but because the putative instance will fail to be a sentence of the language. That said, given the ease 
of introducing quotation-expressions, this theoretical possibility doesn't seem to be much of a worry. 
Any time we need to consider an instance of the disquotational schema, we can easily introduce the 
needed quotation-expressions.29 On my metasemantic account of the formation of quotation-
28 I'm bracketing issues that might arise out of the Liar Paradox. The Liar clearly shows that the principles I rely on  
would need to be restricted in some way. However the Liar doesn't seem to depend in any way on issues with  
quotation, so I don't see that the Liar poses any specific problems for my proposal.
29 Further difficulties might arise for those who want to use the DS itself as a way of defining the truth predicate. A  
defender of such an account might accuse me of begging the question: after all I invoke the functioning of the truth  
predicate in my derivation of the DS. Putting that issue aside, however, the more serious worry would be that 
defining the truth predicate in terms of the DS would be problematic if we do not already have all of the quotation-
expressions in our language. I have two responses to this worry. The first is that we might try and move to a more  
generous notion of what it is for an expression to be in a language. Rather than saying that an expression must be  
contained in the lexicon, we might say that the expression has to be contained in the closure of the lexicon under 
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expressions we have a clear explanation for why the disquotational schema holds.
The objection from the  special  relationship:  The objection from the  special  relationship 
holds that the connection between the quotation-expression and the denotation-expression is not  
arbitrary. Most words bear an arbitrary connection to their denotations.  We could have used the  
word 'cat'  to denote dogs or the word 'smell'  to denote televisions.  It  is  thought to be a mere 
accident of history that one particular phonological and orthographic structure gets connected to a  
particular denotation. But the connection between quotation expressions and their denotations is  
not arbitrary in the same way.  “ 'cat' ” seems to bear a special relation to 'cat', the former seems to 
contain the latter.  But this is far from surprising if quotation-expressions are formed via a particular  
convention  like  the  QC.  The  special  relationship  between  the  quotation-expression  and  the 
denotation-expression  exists  because  of  the  metasemantic  convention  rather  than  any  semantic  
relationship between the quotation- and denotation-expressions. Just as there is a systematic, non-
arbitrary connection between Orderist births and Orderist names, there is a systematic, non-arbitrary 
connection between quotation-expressions and their denotations. However, the strongest form of the 
argument  from the  special  relationship  didn't  just  say  that  the  connection  between  quotation-
expressions and denotations was non-arbitrary. Instead, it held that there was a necessary connection 
between second-order quotations and the first-order quotations they denote. 
This  necessary  connection  is  a  prima  facie difference  between  the  QC  and  the  other 
metasemantic  conventions  I  have  discussed.  Though  Orderist  names  designate  rigidly,  we  can 
particular metasemantic operations. Such an approach would need spelling out, but there is no reason to think it  
impossible. Second, my account is not alone in having trouble with such a position. The versions of the Use Theory 
defended  by  Washington  and  Saka,  for  instance,  would  be  problematic  as  they  would  deny  that  quotation-
expressions are parts of sentences, an instead claim that quotation-expressions are parts of utterances. So instances of  
the DS would have to be utterances to be true. On Davidson's Demonstrative Theory of quotation, similarly, we  
cannot make ready sense of possible instances of the DS involving expressions never actually considered, since the 
material within the quotation marks is treated as being outside of the sentence, and potentially outside the language.  
Instances of the disquotational schema would fail to be true independent of the completion of the demonstrative 
with the non-sentential material. The real lesson here is that the details of some deflationary accounts of truth rely 
heavily upon technicalities concerning the workings of quotation. 
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imagine two possible worlds with Orderists where each group uses the same naming convention, but 
where  the  Orderist  language  in  the  first  world  has  an  expression  '1'  that  denotes  1,  while  the 
language spoken in the second world has an Orderist expression '1' that denotes 2. If the QC is a  
metasemantic convention, why is it that the connection between ' fruit-bat ' and “ 'fruit-bat' ” seems  
to exist in every language that contains both expressions (and quotation?) How can the QC explain 
(F4), the special relationship?
The metasemantic conventions I have canvased so far restrict the assignment of a putative  
name to an entity that satisfies a condition. The Orderists will only assign the name '1' to individuals 
who satisfy a given condition: the first born in a given year. The conditions associated with most 
metasemantic naming conventions do not involve essential  properties of the thing being named. 
Being born first in a year is presumably not an essential property of any individual. So in worlds with  
different birth-orders a single Orderist convention will give rise to different languages—different 
assignments of denotations to similar linguistic forms. With other naming conventions, however, the  
condition  whose  satisfaction  is  required  for  a  successful  use  of  a  convention  might  describe  a 
necessary property of the entity. Take the Jewish patronymic/matronymic naming convention, as an 
example. If we assume essentiality of origins, the property of being the son or daughter of a given  
person is an essential property of the child. Therefore, a person named 'Tsvi ben Reuben' (Tsvi son 
of Reuben) will have the property of being a son of Reuben in every world where he exists.30 In any 
world where the son is named under the Jewish naming convention (and where his father is named  
'Reuben') the same linguistic form will be used for his name. 
How might this  help with quotation? We might reasonably assume that  facts  about the 
phonological and orthographic structure of a word are essential properties of linguistic expressions. It  
30 Assuming, of course, that the convention is applied correctly. See ft 23.
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is  not  possible  for  'fish'  to  have  been  spelled  and  pronounced  as  'platypus'  is  spelled  and  
pronounced. Any expression spelled and pronounced identically to 'platypus' would be a distinct 
expression from 'fish,' even if it shared a meaning with 'fish.' The quotation convention tells us how  
to build a new quotation-expression on the basis of the phonological and orthographic properties of  
the old expressions. The phonological and orthographic properties invoked in the construction of  
the new expression are presumably necessary properties of the original expression. So it can follow 
that in any world where the QC is operative use of the QC will construct quotation-expressions that  
mirror the orthographic and phonological properties of the original expression. The QC can serve  
perfectly well to explain why there is a special connection between quotation-expressions and their  
denotations, and why in any world where there is a language including an expression “ 'fruit-bat' ”  
formed by the quotation convention, that expression will denote an expression 'fruit-bat'.
The objection from hybrid quotation:  The final objection is trickier. I recognize that the 
PNT even  with  the  QC  cannot  explain  hybrid  quotation,  but  I  don't  take  this  admission  to 
undermine the plausibility  of  the PNT. It  seems like no purely semantic theory will  be able  to  
explain hybrid quotation. In hybrid quotations an expression seems to be used in two distinct ways 
at once. However, only one of the uses seems to have the potential for a semantic explanation. Recall  
the examples above:
(14a) John never wants to 'jump from a plane like a crazy person' again.
The two pieces of information being communicated by (14a) can be glossed31 as:
(14d) John never wants to go skydiving again.
(14e) John used the expression 'jump from a plane like a crazy person' to describe 
skydiving.
31 I'm not worried about providing accurate glosses here, instead my goal is just to illustrate a more general point.
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On a view where the occurrence of 'jump from a plane like a crazy person' in (14a) denotes going 
skydiving, whether due to a metasemantic, semantic, or even pragmatic process, it is clear how (14d) 
could be compositionally generated from the resulting sentence. It is harder, however, to see how 
(14e) could be compositionally generated. The predicate 'used the expression' isn't obviously part of  
the sentence being uttered. 
Even accepting that hybrid quotation will require a pragmatic explanation, that doesn't speak 
against a purely semantic account of non-hybrid quotation. Hybrid and non-hybrid quotation differ 
in  fundamental  ways  that  make it  likely  they  will  require  different  treatments.  One of  the  key  
features of non-hybrid quotation, that I mention above, is that non-hybrid quotation-expressions are 
nominals regardless of the symbol being quoted. This is a striking fact that demands explanation. 
Hybrid quotation involves no similar syntactic strangeness and for that reason alone we might seek 
different treatments of the two phenomena. As I argue below, there are reasons to be suspicious of  
pragmatic accounts of non-hybrid quotation. If a pragmatic account of hybrid quotation is needed, 
and  a  pragmatic  account  of  non-hybrid  quotation  is  implausible,  we  shouldn't  seek  a  single  
treatment of both phenomenon, and the fact that the PNT can't explain hybrid quotation by itself  
shouldn't be a mark against it.
Furthermore, a pragmatic account of hybrid quotation can benefit from the existence of a  
semantic treatment of non-hybrid quotation. The pragmatic explanation of hybrid quotation can 
make use of the fact that semantically a quotation-expression denotes a denotation-expression as part  
of an explanation for why hybrid quotations seem to give rise  to multiple propositions.  Hybrid 
quotation is interesting and complex, but it doesn't pose any direct challenge to the PNT as an  
account of non-hybrid quotation.
Metasemantic Conventions are Too Broad A Strategy: One final worry about my view is that 
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the explanatory power of positing metasemantic conventions may appear to be too strong. It is clear 
that there are some metasemantic conventions, e.g. the naming conventions I describe above. Still,  
how do we know that we are positing an adequately constrained explanation, rather than simply  
invoking  a  vague  catch-all  explanation?  While  I  want  to  leave  open  the  possibility  that  other 
phenomena could receive metasemantic explanations,32 there are unique features of quotation—the 
same  features  that  distinguish  direct  quotations  from  other  opaque  contexts—that  make  it  
particularly amenable to metasemantic explanation. Quotation-expressions appear to be syntactically 
simple nominals and the apparent constituents of quotation-expressions—the quoted material—are 
not necessarily well-formed linguistic expressions. As a result, we need an account of quotation that  
can form syntactically simple linguistic expressions from material that may not constitute a well-
formed linguistic expression—something more easily done in an operation that modifies the lexicon 
rather than an operation that takes its inputs from a preexisting lexicon. As quotation formation 
functions independently of the semantic and syntactic properties of the quoted material, there is  
reason to believe that it occurs prior to any linguistic operations on the quoted material. Hence,  
quotation is particularly amenable to a metasemantic treatment.
1.5. Comparing the PNT to Alternatives
Up to this point I have argued for the PNT by claiming that none of the standard objections 
hold once the PNT has been supplemented with a metasemantic account of quotation formation. In 
32 I think that there is some potential for a metasemantic explanation of metonymy, for example, though in the end I  
prefer an explanation of metonymy that  posits  optional  semantic rules.  (See Ch. 2 – Metonymy and Semantic 
Theory). As mentioned above, Peter Ludlow has written a series of papers arguing in favour of explaining context  
sensitivity in terms of a radically shifting lexicon. (Ludlow 2006, 2007) It seems that on such an account there  
would be a great deal of work for metasemantic rules to do. Metasemantic conventions are also interesting in their  
own right for their ability to convey information in ways not normally recognized in linguistics and philosophy of  
language. They can be a vehicle for transmitting information that is not semantic, but that also does not require the  
kind  of  inferential  pattern  that  underwrites  Gricean  implicature.  Metasemantic  conventions  can  explain  the 
communication of non-semantic information in the absence of specific intentions on behalf of the speaker to suggest 
that information. As a result, metasemantic conventions could help us understand ways in which information is  
communicated in the absence of a derivation of Gricean implicatures.
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this section, I go beyond merely defending the PNT against these objections—I argue that the PNT 
is the only available approach that captures two crucial facts about quotation: (I) the special syntactic 
properties of quotation, and (II) the possibility of markless quotation-expressions. In the current  
literature there are three dominant approaches to quotation: the Use Theory,33 the Demonstrative 
Theory34 and the Minimal Theory35. 
I will briefly characterize the three views.
The Use Theory: According to the Use Theory, quotation is a way that we can use normal 
expressions. Any sentence can be used in multiple ways. Take a simple declarative sentence such as 
(18). 
(18) Fluffy is a cat.
(18) can be used in many different situations to communicate very different things. It may be used 
to communicate the fact that Fluffy is a cat. If (18) is uttered with a particular intonation, where the 
pitch of the expression rises as the sentences comes to a close, (18) might be used to ask a question. 
In a context where a director is casting parts for a play (18) might be used to assign a role, the role of 
a cat, to Fluffy. It is relatively uncontroversial that we can perform these different speech acts with a 
single sentence—that a single sentence can be used in a number of different ways.
Some theorists, such as Washington and Saka, go beyond saying that sentences have different 
uses, claiming that subsentential expressions can also be used to denote non-standard denotations.  
Such a theorist might argue that phenomena such as metonymy, metaphor and irony involve using  
33 The Use Theory is defended in (Washington 1992) and (Saka 1998, 2011.) Recanati is often labeled as a Use 
theorist as well, (i.e. by Cappelen and Lepore) but I believe his position is harder to classify. While Recanati argues 
that  hybrid  quotation  is  caused  by  pragmatic  processes,  he  also  recognizes  that  quotation-expressions  have  a 
demonstrative-like semantics that applies in many contexts. Part of the problem is trying to classify entire 'theories of 
quotation'. This can confuse semantic aspects of quotation (such as the semantics described by the PNT), with 
metasemantic aspects of quotation (captured by the QC) and pragmatic aspects of quotation that are likely necessary 
for explaining hybrid quotation.
34 The major statement of the Demonstrative Theory is in (Davidson 1979), though versions were defended earlier by  
Barbara Partee (Partee 1973), and later by many theorists.
35 The Minimal Theory is articulated and defended in (Cappelen and Lepore 2007)
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subsentential expressions with denotations that differ from the expression's standard denotation. 36 
On such a view of metaphor, for example, in an utterance of “Juliet is the sun”, 'the sun' is not used  
with its standard denotation, but is instead used to denote a person who has sun-like properties. 
Similarly, quotation is supposed to occur when a language producer uses an expression to denote the 
expression itself, rather than the expression's standard denotation. 
Different ways of elucidating the meaning of 'used to denote' give rise to different versions of 
the Use Theory. Saka claims that all expressions are ambiguous—they are associated both with their  
normal denotations and their quotation denotations. A quotational use, for Saka, is just a particular 
disambiguation of the expression.37 Quotation marks, on his view, are simply a device for aiding in 
disambiguation. Another version of the Use Theory holds that expressions have a single denotation, 
but that there exist pragmatic rules that somehow shift the expression's denotation from its canonical 
denotation to the expression itself.38 While a full discussion of the Use Theory would require clearly 
articulating the different versions of the theory, my goal here is to argue against any version of the 
Use Theory. The issues I raise below should apply regardless of how we end up understanding 'use'.
The Demonstrative Theory: Much of the contemporary work on quotation was motivated 
by Davidson's seminal “Quotation” (Davidson 1979), in which he rejected the PNT in favour of a  
Demonstrative Theory. Cappelen and Lepore began as defenders of the Demonstrative Theory, and 
36 I argue against this approach to metonymy in Chapter 2 claiming we shouldn't treat metonymy as a distinct use of 
expressions, but instead see it as arising out of semantic theory.
37 “I shall suggest that every expression token … ambiguously or indeterminately refers to itself and to various items 
associated with it. Quote marks … help to disambiguate the intended reference, although they are usually neither 
necessary nor sufficient for doing so.” (Saka 1998 113)
38 Pragmatic meaning transfer functions are posited by Nunberg in (Nunberg 1978, 1979) for cases of metonymy. (Sag 
1981)  shows  how pragmatic  shifting  functions  can be  included in  a  formal  theory.  It  isn't  obvious  that  such 
functions can be  applied in the  case  of  quotation. In cases  of  metonymy,  the functions can be  understood as 
functions from denotations to denotations. But this means that a given pragmatic function will always have the same 
output when applied to different denotations regardless of the expression that has the original denotation. In other 
words, the pragmatic function will generate the same output when composed with different expressions that have 
the  same  denotation.  Quotation clearly  does  not  work  like  this;  two distinct  co-referential  expressions  will  be  
denoted to by distinct quotation-expressions. Still,  I suspect that something like the pragmatic function view is  
sometimes supposed by Use theorists. 
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only developed their Minimal Theory later, in response to perceived flaws in the Demonstrative  
Theory.
According to the Demonstrative Theory, we are to understand quotation marks as a kind of 
demonstrative. The material within the quotation marks, on this account, is not part of the sentence 
itself. The quotation marks demonstrate the material within them, just as an act of pointing might 
demonstrate an object. According to Davidson, we can paraphrase (19a) as (19b)
(19a) 'Kittens' is a word.
(19b) Kittens. That is a word. 
The Demonstrative Theory embodies an important insight in that it provides a succinct explanation  
for the special syntactic properties of quotations. Recall that one initial reason for taking quotations  
to  be  semantically  and  syntactically  simple  was  that  the  putative  constituents  of  a  quotation-
expression need not themselves be linguistic entities. By claiming that the quoted material is not  
actually  a  constituent  of  the  sentence,  but  rather  something  external  being  demonstrated,  the  
Demonstrative theorist can explain why the quoted material  needn't be a well-formed linguistic  
expression. 
The Minimal Theory:  While Cappelen and Lepore began by defending the Demonstrative 
Theory, they eventually found themselves seriously worried that some of the standard objections to 
the PNT apply equally to the Demonstrative Theory. In particular, the Demonstrative Theory itself  
doesn't seem to explain the special relationship between quotation-expressions and their denotations. 
Demonstratives do not have any special relationship to their denotations, aside from the fact that the  
denotation is demonstrated. There are also problem cases where there are other potential candidates  
to  be  the  demonstratum,  say  a  particularly  salient  sentence  written  largely  in  neon  colours  on 
another piece of paper. If the quotation marks are just demonstratives, other competing potential  
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demonstrata should sometimes win out and become the content demonstrated by the quotation  
marks.
Cappelen and Lepore sought to develop an account of quotation that can explain what is  
special about quotation. In the end, however, they believe that what is special about quotation can  
actually be summed up in a relatively simple schema: the Quotation Schema.
(QS)  Φ  quotes Φ39
Here 'Φ' is understood as a schematic letter that can be replaced by any  quotable expression—a 
category made up of well formed linguistic expressions as well as non-linguistic symbols that can be  
quoted. (QS) is to be understood as a semantic rule that provides meaning to quotation marks. In  
order to parse sentences including “ 'Fluffy' ”, we need a semantic theory with a clause such as:
(20) 'Fluffy' denotes Fluffy.
This clause is what allows us to use 'Fluffy' meaningfully. Just as (20) is the rule that governs the 
meaning of 'Fluffy', for the Minimal theorist, (QS) is a rule that governs the meaning of quotation  
marks.  Furthermore,  (QS) is,  according to the Minimal  Theory,  all  there  is  to providing a  full  
account of quotation, one that explains all the requisite facts.
Two Points  of  Disagreement:  Putting aside the issue of  hybrid quotation,  there  are  two 
crucial points of disagreement between these three theories. The first pertains to the role played by 
the special syntactic properties of quotation-expressions while the second pertains to the role played 
by quotation marks.
As I have emphasized, no matter what syntactic category the quoted material belongs to, 
non-hybrid quotation-expressions are syntactically nominals.  A theory of quotation must explain 
39 Cappelen and Lepore formulate (QS) as follow:
(QS') ' 'e' ' quotes 'e'   (Cappelen and Lepore 2007)
I've reformulated (QS) to be consistent with the notation I use throughout the rest of the paper.
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why a quotation-expression seemingly formed from a verb phrase or adjectival phrase (let alone a  
string of nonsense words) is a nominal. Furthermore, any plausible theory of quotation must show 
how we can construct quotations out of non-linguistic entities. The Demonstrative and Minimal  
theories  gain plausibility  by explaining these  facts.  According to the Demonstrative  Theory,  the  
quoted material isn't part of the sentence. The quoted material is outside of the sentence and is  
demonstrated  by  the  quotation  marks.   Compare  standard  demonstratives.  Imagine  that  while  
pointing to a jack-o-lantern one utters:
(21) That is scary.
The jack-o-lantern itself isn't part of the sentence (21).  Instead it is something outside the sentence 
being denoted by a constituent of the sentence, the demonstrative 'that'.  For the Demonstrative 
Theory,  the  quoted  material  is  analogous  to  the  jack-o-lantern  and  the  quotation  marks  are  
analogous  to  'that'.  According  to  the  Minimal  Theory,  the  QS  provides  a  semantic  rule  for 
interpreting quotation marks that can allow us to use quotation marks to construct nominals out of  
other types of symbols. 
The Use Theory struggles with explaining these syntactic properties of quotations. It isn't 
clear how Saka's ambiguity claim, for instance, could hold for expressions that are not well-formed 
linguistic expressions and hence are not in the lexicon. Since such symbols are not in the lexicon in  
the first place, surely they cannot be lexically ambiguous. The 'pragmatic rule' approach has a related  
problem. Standard syntactic theories articulate rules that mathematically generate phrase structures 
from admissible combinations of lexical items. Since, as I argued above, standard syntactic theories 
cannot easily accommodate rules that act on putative non-linguistic constituents, standard syntactic 
theories cannot generate the input to the pragmatic rules, as the input includes a constituent that  
isn't a lexical item.  Even if syntactic theories could generate the input, however, it would be a  
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radical move to claim that the syntactic categories of expressions are determined by pragmatic rules. 
Such a claim goes against the substance and methodology of our best syntactic theories which take 
fundamental syntactic properties, such as the syntactic category of a lexical item, to be independent 
of pragmatic concerns.
The Use Theory struggles with explaining the syntactic properties of quotation-expressions 
that can be easily explained by the Demonstrative and Minimal theories.  It is important to note, 
however, that just as the Demonstrative Theory provides a semantic analysis of  quotation marks, 
(QS) is, for the Minimal theorist, a rule that primarily assigns meaning to quotation marks. As such, 
both require that every occurrence of quotation involves an explicit or implicit syntactic constituent  
that can play the role of quotation marks. One key motivation for the Use Theory is a denial that  
any such marks need to be present in cases of quotation. The use of quotation marks, the Use  
theorists  say,  is  often  a  mere  orthographic  convention,  like  the  use  of  capital  letters.  At  best  
quotation marks help us disambiguate, but they are not required for quotation. Outside of written  
language, it is argued by Saka and Washington, most quotations do not require any explicit marking
—most quotations are markless. When we utter sentences like (19a), we do not mark the quotation 
phonologically.
(19a) 'Kittens' is a word. 
The Use theorists have taken this argument even further, claiming that many cases of written 
language  omit  quotation  marks,  especially  those  quotation-expressions  that  are  used  for  
metalinguistic talk such as:
(22a) 'Hello' begins with an 'h'.
While writing teachers work hard to drill proper use of quotation marks into their students, much 
informal writing proceeds without using explicit quotation marks. Even very bright students with a  
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strong background in philosophy can struggle to get the use-mention distinction right, and to use  
quotation marks where (and only where) they are appropriate. It is entirely unsurprising to see:
(22b) Hello begins with an h.
There is reason, then, to think that quotation marks are a notational aid but fail to correspond to an  
element in syntactic structure. At the very least, the Demonstrative or Minimal theorists owe us  
some evidence that there is an always implicit quotation-mark-like device in syntax, even in cases of  
apparent markless quotation. 
Cappelen and Lepore provide two responses to this line of argumentation. First they argue 
that  even if  cases  of  markless  quotation  exist,  markless  quotations  don't  challenge  the  Minimal 
Theory.  Even if  sentences  like (22b) are  true,  Cappelen and Lepore  ask,  “does it  follow that  a 
semantics  for  quotation  that  applies  only  to  sentences  containing  quotation  marks  (or  their 
equivalents) is somehow incomplete?” (Cappelen and Lepore 2007 37) They answer in the negative, 
holding that a semantics for quotation is not meant to explain every way we use language to talk  
about language. Surely we can say:
(23) That expression is a word.
Yet no theory of quotation needs to explain such cases. Sentences like (22b) would simply present a 
further kind of metalinguistic discourse. 
I  find  this  first  response  deeply  unsatisfying.  As  there  are  virtually  never  marks  in  oral 
quotation, the Minimal Theory would only provide a semantics for written language, and a distinct  
semantics  would  be  needed  for  spoken  language.  However,  aside  from  the  fact  that  written  
quotations are written, and oral quotations are spoken, they seem extremely similar. They both occur 
in the same kinds of constructions and they have similar semantic properties. When we write down 
oral language we add quotation marks, and when we read written language we do not have to orally  
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express the written quotation marks.  Written and oral quotations seem to be in complementary  
distribution. These properties strongly suggest that oral and written quotations are expressions of the  
same  phenomenon  in  different  modalities.  In  linguistics  two  phenomena  in  complementary 
distribution are often assumed to be different manifestations of an underlying principle, and the  
same should hold for quotation. These facts strongly suggest that oral and written quotations are of a 
kind and should be provided a unified treatment.40 Since, as I claim, the PNT provides a unified 
treatment of marked and markless quotation, we would have strong reason to adopt the PNT over 
an account that could only explain written quotations. 
Cappelen and Lepore's second response holds that sentences like (22b) cannot be true. They 
claim that there must be elided quotation marks, because otherwise the resulting sentences would be 
ungrammatical.  While  I  think that  Cappelen and Lepore are  correct  that  there  is  evidence that 
quotation-expressions  have  syntactic  properties  that  are  distinct  from the  quoted  material,  that 
observation does not, by itself, provide evidence for the existence of an implicit syntactic operator.  
There is another alternative that can explain the special syntactic properties of quotation-expressions  
without positing massive numbers of elided quotation marks: the PNT. Given my metasemantic 
story, we can explain how new expressions that are phonological identical to verbs, adjectives or 
instances of other parts of speech can be syntactically nominals.  Once we see the PNT is a live  
option,  we  lose  the  need  to  posit  elided  quotation  marks.  Cappelen  and Lepore  are  making  a 
substantive claim about  syntax.   The burden is  on them to marshal  syntactic  evidence that  the 
40 Compare the relation between irony and negation. One might present the following parody of my objection to 
Cappelen and Lepore: we have at least two ways of expressing negation: the lexical item 'not' and using irony. 
However one cannot object to a semantics for 'not' that it doesn't accommodate irony! Though both 'not' and irony 
might express negation, there is no reason to think that an account of 'not' should immediately explain irony. 
The relationship between written  and oral  quotation is,  however,  radically  different  from the  relation 
between 'not' and irony. When reading sentences that include 'not' we never remove the 'not' while using an ironic  
tone of voice. Similarly when writing down an ironic utterance, we do not insert 'not' to make up for the lack of  
irony indicators. 'Not' occurs regularly in oral speech, and irony can be communicated in written texts. Irony and 
'not' are not in complementary distribution in the way that marked and markless quotation seem to be. 
35
putative phonologically null syntactic operators actually exist.
If we were restricted to the currently popular approaches to quotation, we would be in a 
bind. The Use Theory can explain markless quotation, but struggles with the syntactic properties of 
quotation-expressions. The Demonstrative and Minimal theories have effective explanations for the  
syntactic  properties  of  quotation-expressions,  but  cannot  accommodate  markless  quotation.  The 
solution to this bind, I believe, is to adopt the PNT along with my metasemantic supplement. This 
package can explain the syntactic properties of quotation-expressions: according to the PNT/QC 
package  quotation-expressions  are  syntactically  simple  nominals.  The  package  can  also  explain  
markless quotation: since quotation formation happens in the lexicon, there is no need to include  
any syntactic quotation operator in the sentence itself.  The PNT is, as far as I know, the only extant  
theory that allows us to simultaneously capture both of these insights.
There is a broader lesson here as well. My metasemantic account of quotation formation, the  
Minimal Theory and the pragmatic rule version of the Use Theory all involve positing rules with  
similar content. They all  say that there is a linguistic rule that allows us to go from symbols to  
quotation-expressions that denote that symbol. The primary difference between the three accounts is  
where they locate  the rule.  I  claim that  the rule  is  metasemantic—it affects  what  goes  into the 
lexicon, Cappelen and Lepore take the rule to provide a semantic interpretation for quotation marks,  
and the Use theorist takes the rule to be a part of pragmatics. Though debates over semantics and  
pragmatics are sometimes derided as being merely terminological, we have here an example where 
substantive matters—whether there is markless quotation and how to explain the syntactic properties 
of  quotation-expressions—depend crucially  on  where  we  locate  the  rule  for  forming  quotation.  
Determining whether quotation formation is a metasemantic, semantic or pragmatic process is key 
in providing a substantively correct explanation of the phenomenon.  
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In the end, the PNT is innocent of all the charges leveled at it. The damning objections are 
all  answerable  if  we supplement the PNT with a metasemantic account of quotation-formation.  
Furthermore, only the PNT is capable of explaining both the syntactic properties of quotations and 
the possibility of  markless  quotation.  The PNT needs to regain its rightful place as  the leading 
approach to quotation.
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Chapter 2 - Metonymy and Semantic Theory
A semantic theory for a language L describes a system of formal rules that associates the syntactic 
structures of L with meanings relative to contexts. One common though rarely articulated 
assumption among linguists and philosophers is that semantic rule systems do not allow optionality. 
I will explain optionality in more detail below, but roughly, a semantic rule system allows substantive 
optionality if it contains rules whose applications are neither mandatory nor disallowed. If we 
understand the association of syntactic structures with meanings (relative to formal contexts) as a set 
of rules for deriving meanings from syntactic structures (relative to formal contexts), without 
substantive optionality there can only be one meaning derived from each syntactic structure In 
semantic rule systems that allow optionality there can be multiple meanings derived from a 
particular syntactic structure relative to a single formal context. My primary goal in this paper is to 
make use of optionality to describe a way of incorporating metonymy into a semantic rule system. 
Metonymy occurs when an expression's denotation seems to shift from it's lexically assigned 
denotation to some other entity that bears a salient relation to the lexically assigned denotation. For 
example:
(1a) The ham sandwich at table five is getting antsy.
(1b) JFK is beside Marilyn Monroe at Madame Tussaud’s.
(1c) I've been reading lots of Kaplan lately.
In (1a) 'the ham-sandwich' can be used to denote a restaurant patron. In (1b) 'JFK' and 
'Marilyn Monroe' can be used to denote wax models, and in (1c) 'Kaplan' can be used to denote 
Kaplan's  philosophical  writings.  Many  theorists  hold that  semantic  rule  systems  don't  have  the 
resources to derive shifted meanings for sentences like (1a-c). I argue that not only do semantic rule 
systems  have  all  the  necessary  resources  for  incorporating  metonymy,  but  that  incorporating 
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metonymy into a semantic rule system provides us with the best available account of metonymy.
In 2.1.1. I provide a more detailed account of semantic rule systems. In 2.1.2. I describe 
what it is for a semantic rule system to allow optionality. In 2.1.3. I respond to one major objection  
to semantic rule systems that allow optionality. That objection holds that substantive optionality 
undermines  semantic  theory's  explanation  for  how  speakers  form  intuitions  about  the  truth-
conditions  of  utterances.  In  2.1.4.  I  explicitly  distinguish  substantive  optionality  from context-
sensitivity. In 2.1.5. I discuss the way in which optionality in syntactic rule systems has been invoked 
in debates over context-sensitivity. In the second part of the paper I provide a case study of how 
accepting optionality in semantic rules systems can help us in constructing semantic theories. In  
2.2.1. I say more about metonymy. In 2.2.2. I present a semantic theory for a hypothetical language,  
Metonenglish, as a precursor towards developing my own account of metonymy in English. In 2.2.3. 
I describe my account of metonymy and respond to several objections. In the third part of the paper  
I go beyond treating my account of metonymy as a mere example of the utility of optionality and 
argue that my semantic approach to metonymy is the best on the market. In 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. I 
highlight  facts  about  metonymy that  have  not  been  adequately  appreciated,  but  that  are  easily  
explicable on my account. In 2.3.3.-2.3.6. I argue that my account of metonymy is better than any  
of the plausible alternatives. I aim to show that embracing optionality is theoretically sound and can  
lead to a superior approach to metonymy.
2.1. Semantic Theory and Optionality
2.1.1. What is Semantic Theory?
At its most general, semantic theory is the study of how bits of language, in particular certain  
syntactic  structures,  are  associated with meanings.  This  obviously  rough characterization  can  be 
precisified by  explicating  its  three  main  constituents:  What  are  the  bits  of  language?  What  are  
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meanings? And how are they associated?
I have relatively little to say about the first two questions. According to standard practice the 
bits of language with which semantics is concerned are so-called 'logical forms'. I will follow the 
standard Chomskyan approach to syntax. On this approach, language users have a cognitive system,  
called 'syntactic competence', that is constituted by knowledge of a system of rules of syntax.1 For 
each phrase in a language this system of syntactic rules mathematically generates a structure called a  
'logical form' that provides a structural description of that phrase.2 For each logical form, we can 
construct a derivation using the syntactic rules that results in that logical form. A logical form for a  
phrase  P describes each syntactic constituent of  P as well  as describing the semantically relevant 
structural relations between  the constituents of  P.  I will follow standard practice and take logical 
forms to be the bits of language with which semantic theories associate meanings.3 
As for the second question, I will be assuming that the meanings semantic theories associate  
with the logical forms of sentences are truth-conditions: ways the world must be in order to make 
the  sentence  true.  There  are  many  plausible  candidates  for  the  job  I  am  assigning  to  truth-
1 Chomskyan syntax has moved away from saying that having a syntactic competence is constituted by knowledge of 
rules.  According  to  the  Principles  and  Parameters  approach  and  the  Minimalist  Program,  having  a  syntactic  
competence is actually constituted by knowledge of a set of general principles which include parameters that can be 
set in different ways by different languages. Syntactic rules are derived from the general principles together with a  
lexicon. For expository purposes, it is easier to present material in terms of a system of rules, rather than a system of  
principles with set parameters from which rules can be derived. I'll therefore present material in the former way,  
though nothing substantive should hang on this.
2 On  the  Chomskyan  account,  syntactic  competence  is  a  store  of  knowledge  that  associates  two  different  
representations of a linguistic expression: a phonological  form which captures all  of  the phonologically relevant  
properties of the expression and a logical form which captures all of the structural properties relevant to semantic  
interpretation.  Some accounts of syntax posit intermediate levels of description: such as deep structures or surface  
structure.   These  additional  levels  are  relevant  to  the  generative  rule  system  used  to  generate  the  parings  of  
phonological forms and logical forms. In assuming that syntax generates logical forms, I am thereby going along 
with the standard division of labour in contemporary syntax.
3 'Logical Form' is a vexed term used in a number of different ways. Some authors use 'LF' rather than 'logical form'  
as a way of avoiding these difficulties. Suffice it to say, I'm going along with one strand of the literature in which a  
logical form is a representation of a sentence that describes all of the phrase's constituents and semantically relevant 
structural properties. Logical forms, in this sense, do not necessarily make explicit all of the  logical structure of a 
sentence, nor do they make explicit all of the information required for understanding what valid inferences we can  
make using that sentence.
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conditions. Other plausible candidates include structured propositions, truth values (assigned relative  
to a context), dynamic update conditions and sets of possible worlds. I am officially neutral about  
which of these is the best candidate for being associated with the logical forms of sentences and my 
discussion could easily be adjusted to accommodate different candidates. For the sake of simplicity 
and concreteness,  however,  I  will  write  as  if  the  relevant  meanings  are  truth-conditions.  When 
describing semantic theories formally, I will represent truth-conditions as functions from worlds to  
truth values, such that the function returns true if the truth-condition is satisfied at that world. I will  
also use 'semantic value' as a neutral  term for whatever a semantic rule system associates with a 
logical form of a sentence, a logical form of a non-sentential phrase 4 or an atomic constituent of a 
logical form. 
The everyday notion of meaning goes far beyond the associations made by semantic theories. 
We use language in many ways: we suggest, we imply, we hint, we are sarcastic and so on... Given 
the different ways that language is used, it is important to distinguish between the semantic rule 
system for a language—the rules that associate the logical forms of sentences of the language with 
truth-conditions—and the ways in which people can use the language. Semantics is the study of the  
former, while pragmatics is the study of the latter. Gricean implicature, for example, is a major topic  
of research in pragmatics. The mechanisms that give rise to Gricean implicatures are one method 
whereby  speakers  can  communicate  meanings  that  may  go  far  beyond  the  truth-conditions 
semantically associated with the sentences they utter. Pragmatic inquiry does not have a homogenous 
domain—under the rubric of 'pragmatics' one can study any aspect of linguistic meaning that is not 
explained by the semantic rule system.5
4 I won't be discussing the semantic values associated with the logical forms of non-sentential phrases in any detail. In 
general, when I speak of a logical form I will be speaking of logical forms that describe the structure of sentences. 
5 There is debate over whether any semantic rule system can associate logical forms with truth-conditions relative to a 
context. Theorists such as Kent Bach (Bach 1994) and Francois Recanati (Recanati 2004, 2010) argue that semantic 
rules systems associate logical forms with semantic values that fall short of being truth-conditions. These theorists  
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The main questions I  will  be  asking about  semantic  rule  systems concern the  rules  that 
associate logical forms with truth-conditions. The rules that are used to associate logical forms with 
truth-conditions can be divided into two classes: lexical rules and compositional rules. Lexical rules  
assign semantic values to atomic constituents of logical forms.6 The totality of lexical rules for a 
language  is  the  semantic  component  of  the  lexicon  for  that  language.7 A  lexicon  can  be 
conceptualized as a giant dictionary that includes each atomic constituent and contains an entry that  
points to that constituent's semantic value (as well as its non-semantic properties). We can also think  
of the lexicon as a function that takes atomic constituents as inputs and outputs semantic values. 
Compositional rules combine semantic values to form more complex semantic values in light of the 
structure of the relevant logical form.
We construct a semantic theory for a language L by articulating a lexicon and a set of 
compositional rules for L. The semantic theory for L specifies the semantic rule system that 
determines how the logical forms of sentences of L may be associated with truth-conditions. For 
example, consider a simple language containing only two atomic constituents—the noun phrase 
'Eunice' and the verb phrase 'is sleeping'. 
The sole sentence of our simple language has the logical form (LF).
(LF) [[Eunice]np, [is sleeping]vp]s
posit pragmatic processes. Pragmatic processes are cognitive processes that take the semantic values associated with a 
logical form by the semantic rule system as input. The pragmatic processes then output the truth-condition relevant  
for an utterance of the sentence. These processes are pragmatic because they are not contained within the semantic  
rules system. Pragmatic processes make use of cognitive resources such as non-linguistic beliefs and topic neutral 
reasoning abilities that are not part of the semantic rule system. If one is sympathetic to such views, one will want to  
substitute something like 'propositional radicals' for occurrences of 'truth-conditions' in the rest of this paper.
6 While most lexical rules assign content directly to the constituent, for indexical expressions lexical rules only assign a 
denotation relative  to  a  formal  context.  A formal  context  is  a  tuple  of  indices  that  model  relevant  features  of  
utterance situations. Logical forms containing indexicals will  only be associated with truth-conditions relative to 
formal contexts. In general, when I write 'associated with truth-conditions' that should be treated as including an  
elided 'relative to a formal context'. For the sake of brevity I will leave off this relativization to a context unless it is  
relevant to the discussion at hand.
7 The lexicon will also associate syntactic and phonological properties with lexical items. For my purposes, though, I 
will only be concerned with the semantic values associated with lexical items. In general when I write 'lexicon' unless 
I specify otherwise, I will be restricting my attention to the semantic component of the lexicon.
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We can construct a toy semantic theory for this simple language. We construct the semantic theory  
by  articulating  the  lexical  and  compositional  rules  that  constitute  the  language's  semantic  rule 
system. I will assume the language has a domain consisting of one entity: eunice.8
Lexical Rules:9
(LX1) [Eunice]np  eunice→
(LX2) [is sleeping]vp  → λxw.x is sleeping in w
The only compositional rule for our toy language is function application:
(FA) [c, λx.Fx]s  Fc→
We can apply the lexical and compositional rules to derive a truth-condition from (LF).10
(D1) [[Eunice]np, [is sleeping]vp]s            (LF)
(D2) [eunice, [is sleeping]vp]s                (by LX1)
(D3) [eunice, λxw.x is sleeping in w]s          (by LX2)
(D4) λw.eunice is sleeping in w               (by FA)
Given this semantic rule system there are no other semantic values that can be associated with (LF).  
The derivation could have been constructed in a slightly different way. There is  nothing in the  
semantic rule system, as I have described it, that would disallow a derivation that applied (LX2)  
before (LX1). Reversing the orders of (LX2) and (LX1) in the above derivation has no effect on the 
result of the derivation. 
2.1.2. Optionality in Semantic Rule Systems
Optionality is a property of rule systems that can be used to construct derivations of outputs  
8 I use lowercase for 'eunice' to follow the convention that the entities in a language's domain should be named by  
terms that begin with lowercase letters.
9 These rules state that if we have a line of a derivation with the left hand side of a rule as a constituent, we can write a  
new line for the derivation replacing the left hand side of the rule with the right hand side.
10 Though the derivation could be made shorter by applying more than one rule at a time, I go through the derivation  
step by step to be completely explicit. Going step by step will also help in my exposition of optionality.
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from inputs. We can formulate optionality as follows.
Rule Systems That Do Not Allow Optionality: Rule systems according to which 
there is at most one derivation from any input.
Rule Systems That Allow Trivial Optionality: Rule systems according to which there 
is more than one derivation for at least one input, but there is at most one output 
derivable from each input.
Rule Systems That Allow Substantive Optionality: Rule systems according to which 
at least two distinct outputs can be derived from at least one input.
 We can apply these formulations to semantic rule systems by replacing 'input' with 'logical form' 
and 'output' with 'truth-condition'. 
Semantic Rule Systems That Do Not Allow Optionality: Semantic rule systems 
according to which there is at most one derivation from each logical form.
Semantic Rule Systems That Allow Trivial Optionality: Semantic rule systems 
according to which there is more than one derivation for at least one logical form, 
but there is at most one truth condition that can be derived from each logical form.
Semantic Rule Systems That Allow Substantive Optionality: Semantic rule systems 
according to which more than one truth condition can be derived from at least one 
logical form.
My primary goal in this paper is to argue for semantic rule systems that allow substantive 
optionality and to show to construct a semantic rule system that uses substantive optionality to  
account for metonymy. There  is,  however,  a  dialectical  problem to overcome.  Theorists,  to  my 
knowledge, have not proposed semantic rules systems which allow substantive optionality, but there 
has been no explicit discussion of why. I suspect that many theorists believe positing a semantic rule  
system that allows substantive optionality would lack explanatory power. In particular, such theorists 
hold that  semantic  rule  systems play  a  specific  role  in  explaining how interpreters  assign truth-
conditions  to  utterances  of  sentences.  A  semantic  rule  system with  substantive  optionality,  the 
objection goes,  would fail  in  that  explanatory role.  Jason Stanley presents  such an argument  in 
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“Semantics in Context.”11 I will use Stanley's position as a foil for the sake of defending substantive 
optionality. Following my discussion of Stanley, I will explicitly contrast optionality with context-
sensitivity and say more about how syntactic optionality has been used in theorizing about context-
sensitivity.
2.1.3. Semantic Theory and The Generation of Intuitions
In “Semantics  in Context”  Stanley assigns a key explanatory burden to semantic theory. 
Stanley begins by noting that agents often have intuitions about the conditions under which the 
utterance of a sentence is true.
 “In  other  words,  competent  English  speakers  have  clear  intuitions  about  the 
conditions under which what is said by an utterance of [“Some philosophers are  
from New York”] is true or false.” (Stanley 2005 1) 
He  claims  that  the  source  of  these  intuitions  is  an  English  speaker's  semantic  competence:  her 
knowledge  of  the  meanings  of  individual  words  of  English,  and  her  knowledge  of  how  those  
meanings may be combined.12 
“The apparent source [the emphasis is Stanley's] of such intuitions is not difficult to 
locate. Competent English speakers know the meaning of the words in the sentence 
… They also know how to combine  the  meanings of  each of  the  words  in  this  
sentence  to  arrive  at  what  is  said by  the  utterance  of  the  sentence  … It  is  that  
linguistic competence that seems to be the source of their ability to report correctly  
about  the  truth  of  what  is  said  by  that  sentence  relative  to  different  possible 
circumstances...” (Stanley 2005 1) 
Stanley emphasizes this point:
“So, the explanation for our ability to report about the truth and falsity of what is 
said by an utterance of “Some philosophers are from New York” in various possible 
11 (Stanley 2005)
12 Stanley's  use of 'competence' follows the Chomskyan tradition in linguistics. In that tradition, a competence is  
understood as the tacit knowledge of linguistic rules. Syntactic competence is normally taken to be constituted by 
knowledge of the rules that generate logical forms and phonological forms. Semantic competence for a language  
would be knowledge of all of the lexical and compositional rules for that language. This account of competence  
leaves open the exact connection between having a competence and being able to actually speak or understand a 
language. While having a competence will clearly be part of the explanation of our linguistic abilities, the discussion 
in the next section investigates the extent to which we need to supplement a competence to arrive at an explanation 
for linguistic abilities.
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situations is as follows. Competent English speakers know the meanings of the words 
used, and understand how they are combined. Their grasp of the truth-conditions of 
the utterance of that sentence is due to their ability to combine the meanings of the  
words, relative to the context of utterance.” (Stanley 2005 1)
The rules that make up the semantic rule system of English are known by any competent speaker of  
English. Knowledge of these rules, for Stanley, suffices to explain a language user's ability to associate 
truth-conditions with an utterance of an English sentence.13 Some theorists,  called 'pragmatists', 
challenge the claim that knowledge of lexical and compositional rules suffices to explain a language  
user's  ability  to  associate  truth-conditions  with  an  utterance  of  a  sentence.  The  pragmatists, 
according to Stanley, believe that the truth-conditions associated with utterances of a sentence are 
not derived from the sentence's logical form using the semantic rule system. Pragmatic processes also  
play a role in explaining how a speaker associates truth-conditions with an utterance of a sentence.  
Pragmatic processes are cognitive processes that take as input the semantic values associated with a 
logical form by the semantic rule system. The pragmatic processes then output the truth-condition  
associated with an utterance of the sentence. These processes are pragmatic because they make use of  
cognitive resources such as non-linguistic beliefs and topic-neutral reasoning abilities that are not 
part of the semantic rule system. One of Stanley's examples is similar to (1a) 
(2) The ham sandwich is getting annoyed.14 
For many utterances of (2) 'the ham sandwich' is used to refer to a restaurant patron who ordered a 
ham sandwich. The truth-conditions that language users associate with utterances of (2) are about 
restaurant patrons and not ham sandwiches. But, the lexical rule for 'ham sandwich' 15 associates the 
13 In both passages quoted above Stanley equivocates  between whether he is  seeking to explain the source of the 
intuitions themselves or whether he is seeking to explain a speaker's ability to generate the intuitions. Compare the 
difference between explaining the  source of Juliette's walking to the store and explaining the source of Juliette's  
ability to walk to the store. I will be assuming that Stanley is defending the weaker position: that he is seeking to  
explain the ability to associate truth-conditions with utterances.
14 (2) is an abbreviated version of Stanley's (9) from (Stanley 2005 4)
15 For the sake of simplicity I'm assuming that 'ham sandwich' is an atomic expression, though in reality it is composed 
from 'ham' and 'sandwich'.
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expression 'ham sandwich' with a sandwich and not a person. Furthermore, Stanley claims that 
composing the semantic values assigned to the constituents of (2)'s logical form does not result in a 
truth-condition that is about a patron. The pragmatists believe that the truth-conditions associated 
with an utterance of (2) are fixed by a pragmatic process. Stanley is worried that the pragmatists' 
accounts:  “invariably  involve appeal to unconstrained and non-explanatory notions or processes.” 
(Stanley 2005 3) For Stanley, to posit a pragmatic process to explain the intuitive truth conditions of  
utterances is to “abandon the clear and elegant explanation of the source of our truth-conditional 
intuitions...” (Stanley 2005 2). Stanley's goal in (Stanley 2005) is to defend what he calls the 'clear 
and elegant explanation'—that our knowledge of lexical and compositional rules suffices to explain 
our abilities to associate truth-conditions with utterances of sentences.
My concern here is not with defending pragmatic processes. However, positing substantive 
optionality  in  the  relevant  semantic  rule  system  also  threatens  Stanley's  'clear  and  elegant  
explanation'. Let us assume a semantic rule system R that allows substantive optionality. Therefore, 
for at least one sentence S with logical form L, we can derive multiple truth-conditions from L using 
R. Assume there are two such truth-conditions: T1 and T2. Speakers will presumably have intuitions 
about which of  T1  or  T2 is relevant for a particular utterance of  S. Therefore knowledge of the 
lexical  and  compositional  rules  in  R cannot  suffice  to  explain  a  speaker's  ability  to  associate  a 
particular truth-condition with an utterance of S. The explanation would be missing something: the 
resolution of the optionality. We would still need to determine whether the derivation of T1 or T2 is 
relevant for a particular utterance. If knowledge of lexical and compositional rules suffices to explain 
a language user's  ability to associate utterances with truth conditions,  it  appears that  we cannot  
accept semantic rule systems that include substantive optionality.16
16 “So, we have a predicament. If we look at certain sentences, there seems to be a clear and elegant explanation of why 
we have  the intuitions  we do about  the  truth  conditions of  utterances  of  those  sentences.  But  if  we  consider  
utterances of other sentences, the explanation appears to break down. The first response to this predicament is to 
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While I agree that substantive optionality throws a wrench into Stanley's 'clear and elegant 
explanation', I believe that we have no good reason to accept Stanley's explanation. Knowing a set of  
rules does not by itself suffice to explain our ability to apply those rules towards a particular purpose.  
As an example, imagine Lucinda, an above-average student in introductory logic. As she is a strong  
student we can imagine that Lucinda has an exemplary grasp of all the rules of the Fitch derivation  
system for first order logic. If  asked to apply any particular  rule in the Fitch derivation system,  
Lucinda is fully capable of applying the rule correctly. Being a competent user of the individual rules  
for constructing a Fitch style-derivation, however, does not suffice to explain Lucinda's ability to  
construct  a  particular  Fitch-style  derivation.  The  ability  to  construct  a  particular  Fitch-style  
derivation requires something over and above being able to apply each individual rule. Constructing  
a Fitch-style derivation also requires having the ability to select which rules ought to be used in  
particular circumstances. A person can be fully competent with applying each individual rule—can 
know each rule—for constructing a derivation while still having no ability to know when each rule 
ought to be applied in order to construct a derivation. While knowledge of the Fitch-style derivation  
rules will surely be a part of the explanation for Lucinda's ability to construct a derivation, that  
knowledge will need to be supplemented by what I call a mobilization system. A mobilization system 
for a rule system is an algorithm that determines when each rule in the rule system ought to be 
applied in order to produce an output.17 A rule system, as I understand it, will specify a class of well 
attempt to preserve the clear and elegant explanation in the face of apparently recalcitrant data. The second is to  
abandon the clear and elegant explanation of the source of our truth conditional intuitions in favor of a different 
one.” (Stanley 2005 2)
17 One might think that instead of being an algorithm that determines when to apply a given rule, a mobilization  
system is just  an algorithm that produces the output of the rule  system in such a way that it  can be correctly  
characterized as having been described by that rule system. Roughly, the mobilization system is an implementation  
of the rule system. On such a view, competent users of a rule system never apply individual rules. Instead, they apply  
a mobilization system that produces the correct output. The rule system is relevant, however, because being an  
implementation of that rule system is a property of the mobilization system. While I think this more sophisticated 
account of mobilization has much to recommend it, it also would require a more extensive discussion. For reasons of 
space I will be bracketing it.
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formed-derivations of outputs from inputs. The mobilization system will use the rules specified in  
the rule-system to form particular derivations that are relevant in a particular context. The Fitch-
style  rule system defines the class of well-formed Fitch derivations.  But the mobilization system 
describes the cognitive processing that goes into constructing particular derivations on particular 
occasions.  The mobilization  system itself  does  not  define  a  class  of  derivations,  it  describes  the 
process whereby particular derivations are constructed on particular occasions.
In suggesting that a mobilization system is an algorithm I'm following standard practice in 
cognitive science (following Marr 1982) that there is  a level of explanation where any cognitive 
process can be analyzed as an algorithm operating on symbolic representations.  One might worry  
that our linguistic abilities, be they part of production or comprehension, cannot be described by an  
algorithm.  These  processes,  the  objection  goes,  involve  probabilistic  transitions  or  even 
indeterminacy, and hence are not suitable for being represented as an algorithm. I appreciate that we  
might want to complexify our model of how we should represent cognitive processes, but for the  
sake of simplicity I'm going to go along with standard practice and assume that cognitive processes  
can be described as algorithms.
One might object that we don't always need a mobilization system to explain how we apply a 
system of rules. Returning to Lucinda, it might be argued that while we must posit a mobilization  
system to explain her ability to construct derivations, we don't need to posit a mobilization system to 
explain her ability to recognize whether or not a particular derivation counts as a well formed Fitch-
style derivation. Surely, goes the objection, knowledge of the Fitch rules suffices to explain her ability 
to recognize proper derivations even if it doesn't explain her ability to construct a derivation.
In response, I claim that positing a mobilization system is still required to explain Lucinda's  
ability  to  recognize  whether  or  not  a  particular  derivation  is  well  formed.  The  need  for  a 
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mobilization  system  is  less  obvious  in  the  case  of  derivation-recognition  because  the  required 
mobilization system can be easily  extracted from knowledge of  the rules of the Fitch derivation  
system. Given knowledge of the Fitch derivation system rules, we can easily describe an algorithm 
for applying them to determine whether a putative derivation is well-formed. Here is an example of  
such an algorithm:
A. The active line in the derivation is the first line.
B. Determine whether the active line was formed in accordance with one of the Fitch  
rules.
C. If the line was not formed in accordance with one of the rules, the derivation is ill-
formed.
D. If the line was formed in accordance with one of the rules proceed to E.
E. If the active line is the final line of the derivation, then the derivation is well-
formed.
F. If the active line is not the final line of the derivation, make the following line the 
active line and return to B.
A person's ability to recognize whether or not a particular sequence of lines is a Fitch derivation 
relies on her knowing some algorithm that allows her to apply the rules.18 Of course, the algorithms 
that an individual actually knows will  generally be far more complex then the simple example I 
provide  here,  but  if  Lucinda  didn't  know some algorithm that  determined  when  to  apply  the 
relevant rules, she would not have the ability to recognized well-formed derivations.  
As evidence, imagine that  Lucinda instead knew only an algorithm that is  similar to the 
18 I want to emphasize that an algorithm need not be simple. This is especially true as on some views the mobilization  
system will  take non-linguistic beliefs  as input.  On such views,  we could potentially need to know what  non-
linguistic beliefs a language user has in order to know what the algorithm would output in a particular utterance 
situation. Some theorists,  such as  Chomsky,  have  claimed that  the problems inherent in providing a  scientific  
explanation of such mobilization systems may be so great as to be insoluble. “At the conceptual-intentional interface 
the  problem are  even more  obscure,  and may well  fall  beyond human naturalistic  inquiry  in crucial  respects.”  
(Chomsky 2000 125). Even if we don't accept Chomsky's skepticism, however, we can still recognize that a lot will  
go into the algorithm that goes far beyond the rule system itself.
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above algorithm but that begins with A* rather than A.
A*. The active line in the derivation is the fourth line.
If Lucinda only knew the A* algorithm, she would not be able to consistently recognize whether a  
derivation was well-formed, despite being competent with each individual rule of the Fitch system. 
The algorithm she internalized would classify derivations whose initial three lines are ill-formed as 
being well-formed. This is because despite knowing each of the individual rules, she would not have  
a mobilization system that allows her to apply the rules correctly to perform the task she is aiming  
at.19 If  she had no mobilization system whatsoever,  there  would be nothing to explain why she 
proceeds in an A-like manner rather than an A* like manner. A mobilization system is still needed 
for recognition, however it is harder to see this need because the algorithm that can serve as the  
mobilization system can be easily  extracted from the rules  themselves.  Realistically,  anyone who 
understands  the  rules  will,  in  the  absence  of  a  serious  deficiency,  be  able  to  extract  the  above  
algorithm. In the case of derivation construction, however, there is no obvious way to extract the  
mobilization procedure directly from the rules themselves. Something further is needed: the ability  
to decide when to apply a specific rule.
To return to semantic rule systems, I claim that Stanley is wrong to think that knowledge of 
lexical and compositional rules suffices to explain the ability to associate utterances of sentences with  
truth conditions. At the very least, a mobilization system is also required that will tell a language user 
19 One might argue that knowing a rule is partially constituted by the ability to apply the rule correctly when the 
situation demands it;  however such a claim seems to go against how we normally conceive of knowing a rule.  
Imagine a chess player who believes he is allowed to move both the white pieces and the black pieces during a game.  
Imagine that he is playing a game as white, and continually tries to move the black knight. Every time he moves the  
black knight, he moves the black knight in the proper L-pattern. Surely we should say that the player knows how the  
knight moves, despite not being able to play a move correctly. There is a difference between being competent with 
how the knight moves (knowing the knight rule) and knowing when one can play a knight move. An analogous 
point seems to hold in the logic case. A student might understand all of the rules that constitute the Fitch-system 
while still struggling with constructing difficult derivations. The reason is that constructing a derivation is often a 
difficult task that requires insight and intuition that goes beyond understanding the rules of the Fitch system. We 
wouldn't tell such a student to spend more time learning the individual rules!
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when to apply particular rules. Stanley could reply that associating utterances with truth-conditions  
is more like derivation recognition then like derivation construction. Even if a mobilization system is  
required,  we  can  easily  extract  a  mobilization  system  from  knowledge  of  the  lexical  and 
compositional rules. If semantic competence—knowledge of the lexical and compositional rules—
allows the easy extraction of an algorithm for generating intuitions, then the competence from which 
the algorithm is extracted could be the sole source of the ability to generate those intuitions. If no 
algorithm can be easily extracted from the competence, any mobilization of the competence will  
require a mobilization system that will be constrained by the semantic competence but that will have 
to go beyond it. 
 If one thinks that semantic rules systems cannot have substantive or trivial optionality, it 
might appear that one could use the semantic rule system to construct an algorithm for assigning  
truth-conditions  to  logical  forms  as  follows.  On the  assumption  that  the  semantic  rule  system 
contains finitely many rules, at any particular step in any derivation there will only be one rule that 
can admissibly apply. The algorithm can sort through all the rules one by one to find the single rule  
that applies and then apply that rule. Proceeding in such a manner guarantees that we will get the  
desired derivation.
It is not much harder to extract a mobilization system from a finite semantic rule system with 
trivial optionality. At any stage in a derivation there might be multiple rules that could apply, but in  
the end, regardless of which rule is  selected, the procedure will  still  have the same output. The  
algorithm would need some way of  choosing  between multiple  rules,  i.e.  a  fixed linear priority 
ordering over the rules, but absolutely any such ordering would provide the same results. Given that  
there are only finitely many rules, it is trivial that there is a function that allows us to choose a rule.  
For instance, given a finite number of rules in the semantic system, the algorithm could proceed 
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through the rules asking for each rule if  it can be applied. If  the rule can be applied, then it  is  
applied, and the algorithm begins searching for the next rule that can apply.
It is not easy to extract a mobilization system for assigning a single truth-condition to each 
logical form form a system with substantive optionality.20 If we wanted to create such an algorithm, 
at some point in the functioning of the algorithm a “decision” must be made about which rule to  
apply out of a number of admissible rules. The algorithm would assign different truth-conditions to  
the sentence depending upon how that decision is made.
 To briefly  take stock:  Stanley claimed that  knowledge of  lexical  and compositional  rules  
sufficed to explain a language user's  ability  to associate  truth-conditions with utterances.  I  have 
argued that knowledge of rules doesn't suffice to explain the ability to apply those rules, but Stanley  
could reply that in the absence of substantial optionality we should be able to extract a mobilization  
system from the rules themselves.
I will proceed by arguing that we have no reason to expect that we can extract a mobilization  
system from a semantic  rule  system. I  will  argue  in two steps.  Firstly,  I  will  argue by  analogy:  
claiming that we cannot extract mobilization systems for other tasks in which semantic rule systems  
play an explanatory role and that we cannot extract mobilization systems for other kinds of linguistic  
rule systems. Secondly, I will argue that having multiple mobilization systems for a single task can be  
useful,  and  that  Stanley  cannot  accommodate  such  multiple  mobilization  systems  without 
abandoning his claim that lexical and compositional knowledge suffices to explain how language 
users associate truth-conditions with utterances. 
Other Linguistic  Tasks:  Stanley has  suggested one possible  explanatory role  for  semantic 
theory: to explain the source of our intuitions about the truth-conditions of utterances. Stanley, of  
20 We could easily construct a procedure that assigned a set of truth-conditions to each logical form, but that isn't what 
I'm after here.
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course,  never  claims  that  this  is  the  only  explanatory  role  for  semantic  theory.  Linguistic 
communication requires more than just interpreting utterances. At the very least, the production of 
utterances is also essential to linguistic communication. Presumably, semantic competence is also 
relevant  to  the  production  of  utterances.  A  semantic  competence  for  a  language  consists  in  a 
language  user's  knowledge  of  the  semantic  values  of  lexical  items  for  that  language  and  her 
knowledge of the ways of combining those semantic values. Presumably knowing the semantic values 
of lexical items will play an essential role in the production of sentences that include those lexical  
items.21 Even if  an intuition-generating algorithm can be extracted from a semantic rule  system 
without substantive optionality, such an algorithm does not play any obvious role in the production 
of utterances. Furthermore, it is hard to see how an algorithm for producing utterances could be  
extracted from a semantic rule system. We do not produce utterances by first constructing a syntactic 
structure and only then figuring out what truth-condition is to be associated with it. Nor do we  
produce  utterances  by  reversing  the  process  of  assigning  truth-conditions  to  sentences.  Many 
different logical forms can be used to express any particular truth-condition. 22 As a result, any system 
of rules that allows us to derive logical forms from truth-conditions would require a great deal of  
substantive optionality. Recall the general definition of substantive optionality.
Rule Systems That Allow Substantive Optionality: Rule systems according to which 
at least two distinct outputs can be derived from at least one input. 
21 For example, imagine that Gus, an English speaker who knows no French, utters 'I went to the store.' Why did Gus  
make that utterance rather than 'J'ai allé au magasin.' (French for 'I went to the store.') Presumably part of the  
answer  is  that  Gus'  lexical  knowledge  (among  other  things)  includes  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  English  
expressions but not knowledge of the meaning of French expressions.  
22 This claim isn't obvious. There are some ways of individuating truth-conditions that would lead to each truth-
condition being associated with a single logical form. However I suspect that most theorists would accept the claim 
that multiple logical forms can be associated with a single truth-condition. If there are any co-referential terms, for 
example, presumably two logical forms that only differ in co-referential terms (in non-opaque contexts) will express  
the same truth conditions. If 'Gus' and 'Mr. Gusterson' both denote the same individual, then the following two 
sentences will both have logical forms associated with the same truth-condition.
(i) Gus went to the store.
(ii) Mr. Gusterson went to the store. 
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If we take truth conditions to be the input to a rule system and logical forms to be the output, we  
have a system that has multiple outputs that can be derived from a single input and hence has  
substantive optionality. A rule system for deriving logical forms from truth-conditions will therefore 
not be amenable to the extraction of a mobilization system. 
Stanley thinks that knowledge of lexical and compositional rules should suffice to explain the 
association of truth-conditions with utterances. Presumably knowledge of lexical and compositional  
rules should be relevant to a variety of linguistic activities: utterance interpretation and utterance  
production at the very least. When it comes to linguistic activities other than the interpretation of  
utterances, we are clearly unable to extract an algorithm from the rule system that would suffice to 
explain the activities.23 
Other Kinds of Linguistic Competence: When it comes to other linguistic rule systems, we 
cannot, in general, easily extract a mobilization system for making use of the competence directly  
from the  linguistic  rule  systems.  In  particular  it  is  widely  accepted  that  we  cannot  extract  an 
algorithm for constructing a particular logical form, relevant in a particular utterance situation, from 
syntactic rule systems. For example, one essential task in linguistic consumption is the association of  
a logical form with a perceived phonological structure.  We might reasonably expect that an agent's  
syntactic  competence  would  contribute  to  the  assignment  of  a  logical  form to  a  phonological  
structure.  Still, in the Chomskyan tradition theorists don't hold that syntactic competence suffices  
to assign a  logical  form to a  phonological  structure.   Theories  of  syntactic  competence  do not 
describe rules that take phonological structures as an input and that output a logical form.  Instead 
the described rules that constitute a syntactic theory generates syntactic structures for all the phrases 
of a language. We could easily extract an algorithm from the syntactic rule system that would, given 
23 I use 'linguistic activity' in a broad sense. I intend to include both activities such as production and interpretation as  
well as different ways in which language might contribute to thinking or reasoning.
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infinite time, construct all the logical forms of a language. However, we cannot easily extract an 
algorithm  for  constructing  particular logical  forms  relevant  for  a  particular  activity  (like 
consumption) from the rules that constitute syntactic competence, even given a phonological form 
as an input.24 
In fact, if we articulate a version of optionality that applies to syntactic rule systems, we can 
see that syntactic rule systems necessarily allow substantive optionality. We can treat a syntactic rule 
system as a series of rules that take a set of lexical items as input and allow us to derive logical forms.  
We can the define substantive optionality for a syntactic rule system.
Syntactic Rule Systems That Allow Substantive Optionality: Syntactic rule systems 
according to which at least two distinct logical forms that can be derived from at least 
one set of lexical items.
All generative syntactic theories (for natural languages), by their very nature,  must describe 
syntactic rule systems with this kind of substantive optionality. Any series of finite rules designed to  
allow  the  derivation  of  an  infinite  number  of  outputs  from  finitely  many  inputs  must  allow 
substantive optionality. This can be demonstrated with a simple language:  A.  A includes a lexical 
item: 'a'. Sentences of A are formed by iterating that lexical item. Sentences of A include 'aaaa', 'a', 
and 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'.  For any natural number  n,  there is  a sentence of  A that  includes  n 
occurrences of 'a'. There is no way to provide a finite series of rules that describes the derivation of  
all the sentences of A unless we allow substantive optionality.25 With substantive optionality, we can 
easily describe a syntax for A with the following rewrite rules.
24 For any particular logical form an algorithm will exist for constructing that logical form. The fact that the logical  
form is constructed by applying a finite number of syntactic rules to a finite number of lexical atoms entails that the 
algorithm will exist. The algorithm will simply list which rules to apply when. Even though this algorithm will exist,  
it is not easily extractable from knowledge of the syntactic rules. The reason we need an algorithm is to tell us which  
rules to apply in which situations.  But extracting the algorithm from the competence seems to require that we 
already know which rules to apply in which situations.
25 Normally in speaking of syntax we speak of the derivation of logical forms from atomic constituents using syntactic  
rules. Since A is simply a toy language, and I haven't defined what logical forms would look like for A, I will keep 
things simple by talking about the derivation of sentences. Still this talk does not apply outside this one example.
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(S1) S  aP→
(S2) aP  a→
(S3) aP  aaP→
Since both (S2) and (S3) have the same left hand side, at any stage in the derivation in which we 
have an 'aP' on the current line, the system leaves open the option of applying either (S2) or (S3).  
Without worrying about optionality, we can extract from this rule system an algorithm which given  
infinite time could form every possible sentence of A. However, if we want an algorithm that would 
generate a particular sentence such as 'aaa' or 'aaaaaaa,' we must know how to resolve the optionality  
in the rule system.
Substantive optionality is required in syntax but syntactic optionality does not undermine 
the ability of syntactic competence to contribute to an explanation of syntactic intuitions. A key  
reason for focusing on  competence in the first place, is the recognition that competence does not 
describe  an  algorithm  for  producing  the  relevant  intuitions.  Any  full  explanation  of  intuition 
production would require explaining how a particular mobilization of the competence goes beyond  
the competence to resolve any optionality. Though Stanley claims that semantic competence can 
suffice for explaining a language user's ability to associate truth-conditions with utterances, no one 
claims that syntactic competence can suffice to explain a language user's ability to have intuitions  
about the grammaticality of sentences. Syntactic competence by its very nature as a system that  
allows  infinitely  many  logical  forms  to  be  derived  from  finite  atoms,  must  allow  substantive 
optionality.  We  cannot  extract  an  intuition-generating  algorithm  directly  from  syntactic 
competence. 
To  sum up  the  discussion  so  far.  Stanley  suggested  that  our  knowledge  of  lexical  and 
compositional  rules  suffices  for  explaining  our  abilities  to  associate  logical  forms  with  truth  
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conditions. In order for Stanley's explanation to hold, there cannot be substantive optionality in the  
semantic rule system. However I have argued that any semantic rule system which contributes to 
producing utterances will  allow substantive optionality. Furthermore, any plausible syntactic rule 
system will  allow  substantive  optionality.  There  is  no  analogue  of  Stanley's  “clear  and  elegant 
explanation” when it comes to the syntactic side of utterance production or the assignment of logical  
forms  to  perceived  phonological  structures.  In  both  cases,  we  recognize  that  mobilizing  the  
competence requires a mobilization system that will resolve substantive optionality. In general, then,  
ease of extraction of a mobilization system is not required of a competence. If Stanley thinks that the 
association of truth-conditions with utterances is somehow different from other linguistic activities 
and the use of other linguistic competences, he owes us an explanation of what makes the association  
of  truth conditions with utterances  using semantic competence so special.  Otherwise,  Stanley is  
simply holding semantic theories to a standard that no other linguistic theories are being held to.  
Substantive optionality is par for the course in utterance production and in syntactic competence; I  
see no reason why it should cause a special problem for the association of utterances with truth  
conditions via semantic competence. 
Multiple Mobilization Systems: Having multiple mobilization systems available can be useful 
for implementing a rule system. To see this we can look at how different algorithms can implement a 
single  function.  Take,  for  example  the  function  f(x)  =  x.  Imagine  that  we  have  two  distinct 
algorithms that can implement this function. The first algorithm A1 is extremely fast, but provides 
results that are only accurate to three decimal places. The second algorithm A2 is much slower, but 
provides results that are accurate to ten decimal places. Neither of these algorithms is objectively  
'better' than the other. Which algorithm is appropriate will depend upon the task to be performed.  
In  a  task  that  requires  little  precision  but  that  must  be  repeated  often  A1  will  provide  better 
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performance, while in a task that requires more precision with fewer square roots  A2 will provide 
better performance. A single cognitive system might even include both mobilization algorithms and 
determine, based on the task and resources at hand, which mobilization ought to be used. Having 
more than one implementation of the function allows us to efficiently use the function in a variety of 
circumstances.
Similarly, a given rule system can be paired with different mobilization systems in different 
circumstances  in  order  to  provide  better  performance.26 Just  as  a  single  system  might  include 
different  implementations  of  the  square  root  function,  an  individual's  cognitive  systems  might 
include different mobilization systems for a single competence that are used in performing different 
tasks.  Semantic  competence  could  have  one  mobilization  system  for  utterance  interpretation,  
another  for  utterance  production,  another  for  the  interpretation  of  written  language,  etc.  Each 
mobilization could resolve optionalities in different ways, based on what was suited to the task at  
hand.27
Stanley  is  not  able  to  make  use  of  multiple  mobilization  systems.  A  theorist  could  in 
principle  reject  substantive  optionality  and  still  claim  that  a  semantic  rule  system  could  be  
implemented in different ways that give rise to different activities. But that move is not available to  
Stanley. If we have different mobilizations that result in different activities, then even in the absence  
of  optionality  we  have  undermined  Stanley's  'clear  and  elegant  explanation'.  A  language  user's 
abilities will depend upon the ways in which their semantic rule system is mobilized, and hence 
knowledge of lexical and compositional rules will not suffice to explain the ability to associate truth-
26 Of course, a rule system isn't a function, but just as it can be useful to have different implementations of a function  
available, it can be useful to have different mobilizations of rule system.
27 One might object that we could have a system without optionality that still gets implemented in different ways.  
However, recall that the question is whether we should accept optionality. If a theorist rejects optionality because she 
wants the rule system itself to suffice as an explanation of a given linguistic ability, it isn't open to them to then  




Note  that  saying  a  semantic  rule  system can  be  implemented  by  different  mobilization 
systems  does  not  mean  that  the  actual  activities of  language  users  are  more  flexible  or 
underdetermined than a rule system implemented by a single mobilization system. What is flexible is 
the way that the rules are mobilized. Relative to a particular mobilization system, a semantic rule 
system with optionality might have a fully determinate and predictable output given a particular  
input. That predictability, however, comes from the way the rules are mobilized and not from the 
rule-system itself. 
To conclude this section, I see no reason why we should accept Stanley's contention that 
knowledge of lexical and compositional rules suffices to explain our ability to associate utterances 
with truth-conditions. In general, competences do not provide sufficient explanations of linguistic 
abilities,  and  Stanley  has  not  argued  that  there  is  something  special  about  the  association  of  
utterances  with  truth-conditions.  Furthermore,  if  we  reject  Stanley's  explanation  and  accept 
substantive optionality, we can plausibly allow for a single semantic competence to be mobilized in 
different ways for different linguistic activities.28
2.1.4. Substantive Optionality and Context-Sensitivity
28 Another objection is that substantive optionality violates the principle of compositionality: the principle that the  
semantic value of every complex lexical item is a function of the semantic values of its constituents. If multiple truth-
conditions can be derived from a single logical form, this principle is violated. While substantive optionality violates  
the letter of compositionality it does not violate the spirit of compositionality. There are two standard motivations  
for compositionality: productivity and systematicity. (Fodor and Lepore 2002).
Optionality does not undermine productivity. Systems with optionality can still provide an explanation for  
our ability to be competent with an infinite number of logical  forms on the basis  of  a finite number of rules.  
Similarly, substantive optionality does not make semantics less systematic. A semantic value assigned to a complex 
expression is generated by a rule-governed derivation that began with the lexical constituents and their mode of 
composition. Semantics is just not understood as a set of instructions for constructing any particular derivation.  
Someone who understands a lexical item in one context will be able to reapply it in any other context, using the  
same rules. 
We can even articulate  a weaker version of  compositionality that  allows for  optionality:  the set  of  all  
potential  semantic values for  any complex expression can be compositionally determined even if  the individual  
members of that set cannot.
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One objection that can be raised at this point is that for all intents and purposes substantive 
optionality is just context-sensitivity. After all, I'm suggesting that certain logical forms are associated 
with multiple truth-conditions, and that as a result different utterances of a single sentence can be  
associated  with  different  truth-conditions.  Context-sensitivity  occurs  when  the  truth-conditions 
associated with an uttered sentence depend upon features of the utterance situation. Am I not just 
embracing context-sensitivity? I don't think that I am. I will argue that substantive optionality is a  
claim about the structure of semantic-rule systems, while context-sensitivity is a claim about how the 
semantic values of uttered sentences relate to the circumstances in which the sentence is uttered.29 
When I say that a semantic rule system has substantive optionality I am making a claim 
about how truth-conditions can be derived from logical forms using the semantic rule system. I 
haven't  said  anything  whatsoever  about  how  truth-conditions  are  associated  with  utterances  of 
sentences. As I argue above, semantic competence does not suffice for explaining how a speaker  
associates  truth-conditions  with  utterances  of  a  sentence.  Semantic  competence  must  also  be  
mobilized by a mobilization system that tells a speaker when to use a given rule in the semantic rule  
system. A sentence is  context-sensitive if  different utterances of that sentence are associated with 
different truth-conditions. In principle a sentence can be context-sensitive even if the semantic rule  
system only allows the construction of a single derivation from the sentence's logical form. If the  
semantic rule system always associates a sentence with a particular  truth-condition,  but speakers 
associate different utterances of that sentence with different truth-conditions, the sentence would be 
context-sensitive, though the semantic rule system would only derive a single truth-condition from 
the sentence's logical form.
One might insist that even if there can be context-sensitivity without substantive optionality,  
29 If it  seems obvious to you from the previous presentation that  substantive optionality is distinct  from context-
sensitivity, so much the better for me! Still, I suspect that a number of readers will worry that substantive optionality  
is just context-sensitivity so I feel the need to explicitly explain why this isn't so. 
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there cannot be substantive optionality without context-sensitivity. Substantive optionality entails  
that multiple truth-conditions can be derived from a single logical form. Presumably some utterances 
of the sentence with the aforementioned logical form will be associated with one truth-condition,  
while other utterances of the sentence will be associated with a different truth-condition. Doesn't it  
follow that context determines which truth-condition the speaker associates with the utterance of the 
sentence?  Not  necessarily.  A  mobilization  system  determines  when  to  apply  optional  rules.  A 
mobilization system might use the context of utterance to determine when to apply optional rules 
(or which optional outputs to include) but appeals to context are only one way of determining when 
to apply optional rules. The resolution of substantive optionality could be fully determined by a  
mobilization system with no appeal to context of utterance. In such cases, a particular mobilization  
system might make a rule system look as if it allows no optionality. The optionality would only be 
visible if we compared distinct mobilization systems. 
I  suggested  above  that  different  kinds  of  linguistic  activities  could  result  from different  
mobilization  systems  mobilizing  a  single  rule  system.  Perhaps  utterance  interpretation  tasks  are  
performed  by  a  mobilizing  system  that  resolves  optionalities  by  using  extra-linguistic  context.  
Utterance production systems could mobilize the same competence while resolving optionalities in 
different ways: perhaps these optionalities are fully resolved by the speaker's intentions or some other  
feature of her psychology. There could exist distinct mobilization systems for interpreting spoken 
utterances and interpreting written texts that resolve optionality in different ways. We can allow 
optionality with no context-sensitivity. Or, we can allow optionality that is  resolved by context-
sensitivity in some mobilization systems but not others. Substantive optionality is a claim about the  
way a semantic rule system associates logical forms with truth-conditions, while context-sensitivity is 
a claim about how a speaker associates truth-conditions with utterances of sentences. The two claims 
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are about different things.
Due  to  the  variety  of  linguistic  activities  that  need  to  be  explained,  figuring  out  how 
particular optionalities are resolved in mobilization systems is a difficult empirical question, one that  
can be conceptually separated from the task of determining which semantic theories are correct.  
Empirical questions about the systems that mobilize competences are endemic in psycholinguistics.  
We need some psycholinguistic theory to explain how a mobilization system supplements syntactic  
competence in the generation of syntactic intuitions. There is nothing shocking about saying that  
parallel psycholinguistic questions arise for semantics as well. Substantive optionality doesn't make 
semantic rule systems unsystematic or unconstrained; in linguistic rule systems optionality is par for  
the course.
2.1.5. Syntactic Optionality
I have argued that despite Stanley's position, substantive optionality should be  acceptable 
and  expected  in  semantic  rule  systems.  To  explain  a  linguistic  activity,  a  competence  must  be 
supplemented with a mobilization system. This supplementation is a standard empirical problem in  
psycholinguistics and the need for supplementation shouldn't threaten semantic theories that posit  
rule systems with substantive optionality. So far I have only argued for the possibility of substantive  
optionality  in semantic rule  systems.  I  have not yet  provided a reason to think that  substantive  
optionality actually obtains. One reason to take semantic optionality seriously can be seen by looking 
at how some theorists have begun taking  syntactic optionality seriously in discussions of context-
sensitivity.  Many  theorists,  following  Stanley,30 want  to  restrict  context-sensitivity  to  cases  of 
indexicals or indexical-like constituents of logical forms. Such theorists claim that in all cases of  
context-sensitivity there must always be a constituent of the logical form that gets interpreted by a  
30 See for instance the papers in (Stanley 2007).
63
rule whose output differs from context to context. Josef Stern, for example, claims that metaphors 
involve an implicit demonstrative in logical form.31 Luisa Marti argues that in cases in which some 
theorists  would  posit  unarticulated  propositional  constituents,  cases  like  quantifier  domain 
restriction or implicit locations, we should posit hidden indexicals that are assigned content relative 
to formal contexts.32 For example, Marti is concerned with sentences such as:
(3a) It's raining.
It is sometimes said that (3a) expresses the proposition that it is raining in a particular place. 
Marti claims that the logical form of (3a) includes a phonologically null location variable—a variable 
we neither write nor pronounce. A contextual location parameter then assigns a value to the variable.  
Francois  Recanati  has  suggested  that  the  place  is  contributed  to  the  sentence's  content  by  a  
pragmatic process.  He argues that in some cases the location does not seem to be present in the  
content. He characterizes a case in which he claims there is no implicit location: (3b) which is taken 
from (Recanati 2002) and discussed in (Marti 2006).
(3b){Rain has become extremely rare and important, and rain detectors have been 
disposed all over the territory. Each detector triggers an alarm bell in the Monitoring 
Room when it detects rain. There is a single bell; the location of the triggering 
detector is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of 
total drought, the bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the 
weatherman on duty in the adjacent room shouts:} It's raining!
(3b)  supposedly shows that  in  some cases  Stanley style  variables  are  not  present,  for  the truth-
condition the sentence uttered in (3b) does not seem to involve any location.33 
Marti's response is to admit that the logical form of the sentence uttered in (3b) does not 
contain  any  phonologically  null  variables.  She  proposes  that  the  variables  in  question  are  
31 (Stern 2000, 2006, 2011)
32 (Marti 2006)
33 One might respond to (3b) by claiming that the variable undergoes existential closure.  Existential closure is already  
required for Davidsonian and NeoDavidsonian semantics for verbs. Recanati responds to this proposal in (Recanati 
2005), arguing that if there was an implicit location variable that underwent existential closure we would predict 
readings of “It is not raining” that we don't get.
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syntactically optional. The syntactic rules that generate logical forms for sentences like (3a) allow the 
inclusion of a syntactic location variable in sentences like (3a), but they do not  mandate it.34 The 
variable is a syntactic adjunct—an optional constituent. Recall that a syntactic rule system allows  
optionality if multiple logical forms can be derived from a single input.  I'll assume that the input to  
the syntactic rule system is a set of lexical items.35 Imagine that we are starting with a set of lexical 
items with the following three members: 'It', 'is raining', and 'in x'. Here, 'x' is a silent variable that 
has locations assigned to it. We can construct sentences using the following rules.
(M1) S  [NP, VP]s→
(M2) NP  [It]np→
(M3) VP  [is raining]vp→
(O) [is raining]vp  [[is raining]vp, [in x]pp]vp→
The (M1-3) are mandatory, while (O) is optional.  Using these syntactic rules we can derive  
two distinct logical forms from our set of lexical items: (LF1) and (LF2).
(LF1) [[It]np, [is raining]vp]s
(LF2) [[It]np, [[is raining]vp, [in x]pp]vp]s
In cases in which (3a) is being used with an implicit location, it has the logical form LF2. 
When, as in (3b), there appears to be no implicit location, (3a) has the logical form LF1. Marti 
explains the fact that the 'in x' constituent is sometimes present and sometimes absent by positing 
the same kind of syntactic rule that was used to construct sentences of  A.  Marti invokes accepted 
syntactic optionality as a way of explaining the occasional presence of the silent constituent.
34 This is not the only response. Another response would claim that in case like (3b) the silent variable is being bound 
by an implicit existential quantifier. I'm using Marti's view to explicate my view, however, so I'm not claiming that  
her approach is the optional response to Recanati's point.
35 This is not to say that the logical form is derived directly from the set of lexical items.  According to pre-Minimalist 
Chomskyan syntax, we will first derive a d-structure from the lexical items. We then derive an s-structure from the 
d-structure, and only then do we derive the logical form from the s-structure.
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Even  granting  that  syntactic  optionality  is  useful  for  explaining  some  cases  of  context-
sensitivity,  why  might  we  need  semantic  optionality?  I  am  skeptical  of  the  existence  of 
phonologically null syntactic structure but still think that different truth-conditions can sometimes 
be assigned to a single logical form.36 In some cases there is nothing about the structure of the logical 
form that anchors  the difference in truth-conditions.  Instead,  it  is  optionality in the way truth-
conditions are derived from logical forms that allows different truth-conditions to be assigned to a 
single logical form. In order to see how substantive optionality could work in a semantic theory we 
need to look at a phenomenon in which different truth-conditions seem assignable to a single logical  
form without there being a single structural  constituent of  the sentence that  plays the role  of  a 
context-sensitive  variable.  Metonymy  seems  to  be  an  example  of  just  such  a  phenomenon. 
Metonymy provides us with a case in which there is no lexical or structural ambiguity, but in which 
arguably different truth-conditions are associated with a single logical form37 
2.2. Metonymy
2.2.1. What is Metonymy?
Simple expressions have denotations assigned to them by the lexicon. Complex expressions 
have  their  semantic  values  determined  by  the  semantic  values  of  the  simple  expressions  that 
constitute them and their syntactic structure. In cases of metonymy, expressions seem to have non-
canonical semantic values—they appear to have semantic values that are not assigned by the lexicon 
or that are not derived directly from the semantic values of the constituent expressions and their  
structure.38 In cases of metonymy we can say that an expression shifts its denotation from its lexical 
36 In (Abrahams Unpublished) I argue against Stanley, Szabo and King's Binding Argument, a key piece of evidence 
intended to show the presence of phonologically null variables.
37 In section 2.3.6. I consider a Marti-style approach to metonymy, though I argue in the end my semantic approach is  
superior.
38 For the purposes of this paper, I will be restricting my discussion to nominal metonymy, where the expression that 
undergoes shifting is a noun phrase.  Nothing substantive hangs upon this restriction. I suspect that metonymy 
occurs with verbs and adjectives as well as nouns. My account could easily be extended to accommodate this. For the 
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denotation to a metonymic denotation.39 40 41 Let us see some examples.
Imagine that  Belinda is playing a video game. She presses a button and in response her 
onscreen avatar performs a jump over a virtual pit. One might report this event with (4).
(4) Belinda jumped over the pit. 
The speaker  seems to use  'Belinda'  to refer  to  Belinda's  onscreen avatar,  rather  than to 
Belinda herself. The lexical denotation of 'Belinda' is just Belinda. In a metonymic derivation for (4) 
the  denotation  of  'Belinda'  appears  to  shift  from  Belinda  to  Belinda's  avatar,  thereby  making  
sake of simplicity, however, it is easier to make my argument with a restricted class of cases.
39 I am using 'lexical denotation' broadly here, to include semantic values of complex expressions derived from the  
lexical denotations of their parts and composed in accordance with their syntactic structure. That is to say, I use  
'lexical  denotation'  to refer to semantic values  determined by the  lexicon. Some theorists  will  want to explain  
metonymy in terms of lexical ambiguity. For such theorists the metonymic denotation will also be lexical in a sense.  
In the final section of this paper I present arguments against the lexical ambiguity view.
There are two ways of characterizing metonymy. We can characterize metonymy as involving different  
ways of using a lexical item in utterances. On this characterization metonymy has nothing to do with the semantic  
rule system. Metonymy, on this characterization, occurs when we make use of the output of the semantic rule system 
while producing and interpreting utterances. If we have accepted an account of semantics that allows substantive 
optionality, then we can characterize metonymy by saying that the semantic system rule system allows different  
truth-conditions to be derived from a single logical form. In accordance with the former characterization, we can  
talk  about  metonymic  or  non-metonymic  uses.  In  accordance  with  the  latter  characterization  we  can  talk  of 
metonymic  or  non-metonymic  truth-conditions (or  derivations).  At  this  point  of  the  paper,  I  don't  want  to 
prejudice the question of which characterization is superior, though in the end I prefer the latter. Though I use  
'lexical  denotation'  and  'metonymic  denotation',  I  want  to  remain  neutral  over  whether  these  expressions  are 
describing different uses or different semantic values. 
40 In some cases that are occasionally classified as metonymy it is not obvious that there is a single lexical denotation.  
For example, the expression 'the newspaper' can denote a physical token, a type of that token, a company that  
produces those types and tokens, a building that houses the company, etc. Arguably, none of these denotations is  
privileged.  While  I  will  not  be  focusing  on  such  examples,  I  believe  my  account  of  metonymy  can  easily 
accommodate them. I sketch how this can happen in ft.  62. If you believe that one of the denotations must be 
privileged, then the account described in the main text should suffice for you.
41 There is a variety of different terminology used for these cases, and one might wonder why I chose 'metonymy'. 
These  cases  are  sometimes  called  cases  of  'polysemy'  as  in  Producer/Product  polysemy.  Polysemy  is  usually  
characterized as lexical ambiguity, and as we will see, metonymy occurs with complex expressions as well as atomic 
lexical items. Some cases, such as the 'ham-sandwich' cases are called cases of 'deferred reference'. While I think this  
label works for some cases,  it  isn't  general  enough. Though I'm focusing on metonymy in nominals,  a similar 
phenomenon can  occur  with  non-referring  terms.  James  Pustejovsky  calls  these  cases  'logical  metonymies'   in 
(Pustejovsky 1998) which is more in line with the way I think of them. 
'Metonymy' is usually used to denote a “figure of speech” where we use a word to refer to a saliently related  
entity. (It can be compared to synecdoche where we use a word that denotes a part to refer to a whole. This is the  
sense that I'm riffing off of. That said, early 20th century work in linguistics often used 'metonymy' to denote a 
diachronic process-a process whereby new lexical items were created overtime. Other theorists use metonymy in a  
sense closer to 'metaphor,' though as I see it, metonymy involves shifting from one denotation to another related  
denotation, while metaphor involves using one meaning to characterize a potentially unrelated thing. Metaphor 
tends to be freer—it doesn't require conventional relations in the way I argue that metonymy does.  
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Belinda's avatar the metonymic denotation. 
One  well-known  kind  of  metonymy  involves  language  spoken  by  restauranteurs  where 
expressions that denote meals shift to denote the customer that ordered the meal.42
(5a) The steak and eggs at table five is getting antsy.
(5b) The ham sandwich at table five is a great tipper.
There are also cases in which expressions that  lexically denote individuals metonymically denote  
depictions of those individuals.
(6a) In Madame Tussaud’s’ JFK is right beside Marilyn Monroe!
(6b) I walked into the National Portrait Gallery and immediately saw Virginia 
Woolf.
In  another  kind  of  metonymy,  expressions  that  lexically  denote  a  part  of  an  entity  can 
metonymically denote the entity as a whole.
(7) General Washington has finally arrived. (where 'General Washington' denotes 
the entire army)43
The  expressions  that  lexically  denote  geopolitical  entities  can  shift  to  metonymically  denote 
representatives of the geopolitical entities.
(8a) France is the best team at the World Cup.
(8b) After the game, France ate at McDonald’s while Spain ate at Burger King.
(8c) When France arrived at the general assembly everyone immediately went silent.
In some cases expressions that lexically denote sources of products can metonymically denote the  
products themselves.
(9a) I've been reading lots of Kaplan lately.
42 Geoffrey Nunberg introduced these cases in Nunberg (1978).
43 In this case, it is possible that two contents are expressed: one that pertains to the army and one that pertains to 
Washington himself. I suspect that in many cases of metonymy we do in fact express multiple contents, but I won't  
be discussing that aspect of metonymy here.
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(9b) I've been eating lots of McDonald's lately.
(9c) I've been eating lots of chicken.44
An arbitrary expression cannot shift to have just any denotation. The metonymic denotation  
must bear a salient relation to the lexical denotation.45 A full account of what counts as a 'salient 
relation' relative to a context of use would require a full typology of metonymy, which in turn would 
require going into many thorny details. Though interesting, those details are not crucial for my  
project of showing how a semantic rule system can accommodate metonymy. I do argue in 2.3.1. 
that mere salience is not enough to justify a metonymic shift—that only specific relations are able to  
license metonymy.46 47
44 (9c) is sometimes taken to be an example of 'grinding.' Grinding is a process whereby a term that has primarily  
count uses gains a mass use. It has been argued (i.e. in (Pelletier 1979)) that all count terms can be candidates for 
grinding. The most discussed cases involve using the names of animals or plants to denote products made from the  
animals or plants. I discuss countability in more detail in section 2.3.2.. Still, it important to see that even if every  
noun can be ground and given a mass use, it is not the case that grinding always involves the kinds of denotation  
shifts that I'm discussing. Take for example the nominal 'orange', denoting the fruit. Most occurrences of 'orange' 
are count occurrences in the sense that they require a determiner like 'a' or 'the'.
(iii) I ate an orange.
'Orange' can be ground to denote a stuff. After undergoing grinding, it no longer requires the determiner:
(iv) After the fruit truck exploded she had orange all over her.
Or it can be ground to denote a flavour:
(v) I taste orange in this wine!
But we cannot easily accept a mass occurrence that denotes a foodstuff.
?(vi) I've been eating lots of orange lately.
The lesson to draw here is that even if grinding can create mass occurrences for every nominal, it does not necessarily  
give rise to the same denotational shifts that we see in cases of metonymy.
45 In section 2.3.1. I argue explicitly that there are conventional constraints on what kinds of relations can license  
metonymic shifts.
46 I doubt that metonymy is a single unified phenomenon. Instead, I  suspect that  there are a variety of different  
phenomena which can roughly be classified as involving denotational shifting. If my suspicion is correct there will  
not be a single general formulation that encompasses all the cases I'm interested in. It is more productive to describe 
the phenomenon on the basis of examples, and to define metonymy by ostension—as whatever is going on in those 
kinds of cases.
47 One oft cited example of metonymy that I will not be discussing is (vii):
(vii) John and Mary are parked out back.
While it is sometimes said that in (vii) “John and Mary” shift to denote a car, Nunberg has suggested that in (vii) it 
is the predicate “are parked out back” that undergoes shifting. “John and Mary” doesn't appear to shift for other car-
related predicates.
?(viii) John and Mary are painted cherry red.
?(ix) I dented John and Mary.
?(x) I just put a great new bumper sticker on John and Mary.
Since the nominal doesn't shift in many car related cases, I think that we can conclude that what shifts  is the 
predicate. Since I'm restricting myself to nominal metonymy, I won't be discussing these kinds of cases.
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2.2.2. Metonenglish
Rather  than  introducing  my  view  directly,  I  want  to  begin  by  looking  at  a  thought 
experiment that will aid in the presentation of my view and that will be relevant when considering  
objections. 
In English  there  is  no syntactic  constituent that  forces  us  to derive  a  metonymic truth-
condition.  There  is  no  syntactically  present  operator  with  the  meaning  'use  metonymy  now!'  
However, we can imagine a language, similar to English, in which metonymy-like shifts result from 
the  presence  of  metonymy  operators.  This  imaginary  language,  called  'Metonenglish',  contains  
morphemes that attach to nominals that undergo metonymic shifting. Each morpheme is associated 
with a  different kind of  metonymy. When I  introduced metonymy above,  I  presented different  
examples in terms of the kind of relationship between the lexical denotation and the metonymic  
denotation. There was the Player/Avatar relation, the Meal/Orderer relation, the Producer/Product 
relation,  the  Entity/Depiction  relation,  the  Part/Whole  relation  and  so  on.  Such  a  typology  is  
obviously incomplete and would require much more evidence than what I have provided, but for 
now let us assume that we can define different kinds of metonymy in terms of the relation between 
the lexical and metonymic denotations. Metonenglish will contain a different morpheme for each 
type  of  metonymy.  For  instance,  Metonenglish  includes  a  morpheme  'av'  that  is  appended  to 
nominals.  When a nominal  has  'av'  appended to it,  the semantic rule  system for Metonenglish 
associates the complex expression with the contextually salient avatar of that nominal. There will be  
analogous morphemes for the other kinds of metonymy: 'ord', 'prod,' 'depic,' etc.
In English we have a single sentence (10a) with shifted and non-shifted truth-conditions. In 
Metonenglish, there are distinct orthographic and phonological forms (10a) and (10b) for expressing 




Similarly Metonenglish has a morpheme 'ord' that when appended to nominals makes the complex 
expression  denote  the  individual(s)  that  ordered  the  dish  lexically  denoted  by  the  nominal.  In 
English we have one sentence (11a). In Metonenglish we have both (11a) and (11b).
(11a) The ham sandwich is getting irate.
(11b) Ord-the-ham-sandwich is getting irate.
 We can provide a natural semantic theory for Metonenglish by relying on (Sag  1981)—a 
paper  that formalized  early  work by  Geoffrey  Nunberg.48 Their  idea  was  that  metonymy could 
represented in semantic theories by denotation shifting functions. 
For Sag, a pragmatic process inserts shifting functions into derivations from logical forms to  
truth-conditions. Some line of the derivation will include a term t that denotes the lexical denotation 
that will undergo metonymic shifting. The pragmatic process then enters a new line in the derivation 
that results from replacing t with a complex term S(t)  that embeds the original term t within S, a 
term  that  denotes  a  shifting  function.49 Sag  claims  that  the  denotation  shifting  functions  are 
introduced  by  a  pragmatic  process  for  two  reasons.  First,  he  claims  that  the  content  of  the 
denotation shifting function is determined by extra-linguistic context. Second, he claims that extra-
linguistic  context  determines  when to  insert  a  denotation  shifting  function.
For our Metonenglish semantic theory let us take each kind of metonymy to be associated 
with  a  particular  function.  For  Player/Avatar  metonymy,  there  is  an  Avatar  function  (call  it  
48 Nunberg's views developed into positing 'lexical licenses'  as I describe below. Here I am referring to his earlier 
position in (Nunberg 1978) and (Nunberg 1979).
49 One might have reservations about whether it makes sense for a pragmatic process to modify the derivation of truth-
conditions  from  logical  forms.  These  reservations  raise  interesting  questions  about  the  semantics/pragmatics 
interface, but I won't be addressing them here. Remember, I'm just using Sag's position as an expository tool, I'm 
not committed to its truth.
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'Av()')that takes individuals to their contextually salient video game avatars. Similarly, there is an 
Orderer function (call it 'Ord()') that takes dishes to the contextually salient people who ordered 
that dish, and so on for other types of metonymy.50 The semantics for Metonenglish lexically assigns 
each metonymy morpheme its corresponding denotation shifting function. 
To see how, let us look at a toy fragment of Metonenglish. It contains the following lexical 




The domain for our toy model  will  include two individuals:  belinda,  and mario (a  video game  
avatar).  We  can  then  define  lexical  rules  for  assigning  denotations  to  each  expression  in  the 
fragment.51
(LX1) [Belinda]np  belinda→
(LX2) [jumped]vp  → λxw. x jumped in w
(LX3) [av]dp  → λx.Av(x)
where Av() is defined as: {<belinda, mario>}
We have a single compositional rule:
(FA) [c, λx.Fx]z  Fc→ 52
Using these rules we can construct derivations of truth-conditions from both logical forms:
50 In the final section of this paper I argue contra Sag that metonymic shifting follows conventional patterns, and that  
as a result we can accept that for any particular language there are a set number of conventional metonymic shifting 
functions. Here I will just help myself to this conclusion. 
51 As mentioned earlier, these rules state that if we have a line of a derivation with the left hand side of a rule as a 
constituent, we can write a new line for the derivation replacing the left hand side of the rule with the right hand  
side.
52 The 'z' is a variable ranging over phrase-types. It is there so that a single compositional rule can be used to form any 
kind of phrase, be it an NP formed from a DP and NP, or an S formed from a NP and VP.
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(DA1) [[Belinda]np, [jumped]vp]s                (LF1)
(DA2) [belinda, [jumped]vp]s                       (by LX1)
(DA3) [belinda, λxw.x jumped in w]s           (by LX2)
(DA4) λw.belinda jumped in w                     (by FA)
(DB1)[[[Av]dp, [Belinda]np]np, [jumped]vp]s          (LF2)
(DB2) [[λx.Av(x), [Belinda]np]np, [jumped]vp]s      (by LX3)
(DB3) [[λx.Av(x), belinda]np, [jumped]vp]s             (by LX1)
(DB4) [[λx.Av(x), belinda]np, λyw.y jumped in w]s (by LX2)
(DB5) [Av(belinda), λyw.y jumped in w]s                (by FA)
(DB6) λw.Av(belinda),jumped in w                          (by FA)
(DB7) λw.mario jumped in w                                   (evaluating Av(belinda))
We could easily extend this fragment for other individuals, predicates and shifting functions. The 
semantics  itself  is  fairly  simple,  using  only  standard  logical  apparatus.  The  metonymic  shifting 
functions that are lexically assigned to Metonenglish's metonymy morphemes are formally analogous 
to functions from terms to terms that occur in formal languages such as FOL.
2.2.3. My Account
As the reader may anticipate, I think that contemplating Metonenglish can be helpful for 
understanding English. In fact, I don't think that English and Metonenglish are all that different. 
Metonenglish has lexical rules that assign denotation shifting functions to metonymy morphemes. 
English has, what I will call  optional interpretation rules. An optional interpretation rule is a rule 
that  inserts  a  metonymic  shifting  function  into  a  derivation,  even  though there  is  no  syntactic  
73
constituent to which the shifting function is assigned. An optional interpretation rule will say that if  
we have a derivation that ends with a line that includes an entity-denoting term we can introduce a  
new line into the derivation that replaces the entity-denoting term with the result of embedding the 
entity  denoting  term in the  inserted function.  Standard lexical  rules  are  not  optional—they are  
required to interpret constituents of the logical form. Optional interpretation rules, on the other  
hand are not required to interpret any constituent of the logical form. The application of an optional  
interpretation rule during a derivation is optional.
Metonenglish had a morpheme 'av' and a lexical rule such as the following:
(Lex) [av]dp  → λx.Av(x)
English on the other hand will have an optional interpretation rule that can insert Av() into a  
derivation.
(OPT AV INSERT) a  Av(a)→
Optional interpretation rules are are part of the semantic rule system, just as lexical rules are.  
While lexical rules assign a semantic value to a syntactic constituent, optional interpretation rules  
insert a semantic value—the denotation shifting function—directly into the derivation. Since the 
denotation  shifting  functions  do  not  correspond  to  anything  in  logical  form,  they  are  not 
represented in the structure of the sentence.  They only appear during the associations of complete 
syntactic structures with truth-conditions.
Though the application of an optional interpretation rule is not determined by the logical  
form, the  rule  inserts  what  is  essentially  a  semantic  value  into the  derivation.  We can think of 
belinda as the denotation of 'Belinda' because the lexical rule for 'Belinda' assigns belinda to that  
syntactic  constituent.  Similarly,  we  can  think  of  the  Av()  function  as  the  denotation  of  the  
Metonenglish morpheme 'av'. In English we can think of the Av() function as a denotation that is  
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not associated with any syntactic constituent. Rather than being introduced by a rule for interpreting 
a  syntactic  constituent,  in  English  the  Av()  function  is  introduced  directly  by  an  optional 
interpretation rule.53      
For example, take a fragment of English that includes 'Belinda' and 'jumped' as lexical items.  
The domain of entities for our purposes will include belinda and mario. The syntax of the fragment  
will generate a single logical form:
(LF) [[Belinda]np, [jumped]vp]s
Our semantic theory will include the following rules:
(LX1) [Belinda]np  belinda→
(LX2) [jumped]vp  → λxw. x jumped in w
(OPT AV INSERT) a  → Av(a)  
Again, we have a single compositional rule:
(FA) [c, λx.Fx]z  Fc→
Given this semantic theory, we can derive two distinct truth-conditions from (LF).
(CD1) [[Belinda]np, [jumped]vp]s          (LF)
(CD2) [belinda, [jumped]vp]s                 (by LX1)
(CD3) [belinda, λxw.x jumped in w]s     (by LX2)
(CD4) λw.belinda jumped in w              (by FA)
53 One might think that rather than positing optional rules that insert denotation shifting functions into derivations, I 
should be positing optional functions that directly shift denotations.  Rather than a rule like (OPT AV INSERT) we  
could just have (OPT AV SHIFT).
(OPT AV INSERT) a  Av(a)→
(OPT AV SHIFT) a  b (where b = Av(a))→
       I prefer (OPT AV INSERT) however.  We can always get the (OPT AV SHIFT) result using the (OP AV INSERT)  
rule if we simplify immediately after the (OP AV INSERT).  On the other hand, I claim in 3.5 that there are 
inferences we can capture correctly if we do not immediately simplify.  For that reason, I prefer to use (OPT AV 
INSERT).
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(DD1) [[Belinda]np, [jumped]vp]s              (LF)
(DD2) [belinda, [jumped]vp]s                     (by LX1)
(DD3) [belinda, λxw.x jumped in w]s         (by LX2)
(DD4) [Av(belinda), λxw.x jumped in w]s  (by OPT AV INSERT)
(DD5) λw.Av(belinda) jumped in w           (by FA)
(DD6) λw.mario jumped in w                    (Simplifying Av(belinda))
These two derivations are identical through the first three steps. In the second derivation, 
(DD4) invokes an optional rule, while in the first derivation the optional rule is never invoked. 
Lexical  rules  are  functions  that  assign  semantic  values  to  syntactic  constituents.  
Optional interpretation rules insert functions denoting terms into a derivation by replacing terms  
that denote a semantic values with the result of embedding that term in a term that denotes the  
shifting function. This distinction is important because there is evidence that metonymic shifting  
depends upon the lexical denotation but not on the lexical item that undergoes shifting.54 Most of 
the cases I have looked at have involved a simple nominal that undergoes metonymic shifting. In  
(10a), for example, 'Belinda' seems to undergo shifting. This might lead to the mistaken view that  
metonymy is somehow licensed by the lexical  item 'Belinda.'  This doesn't seem to be the case.  
Instead, a variety of complex nominals that denote Belinda can undergo shifting.
54 One might react to my view by asking what's the “cash-value” difference between my view and a Stanley or Marti  
style approach that posits phonologically null variables that then get assigned metonymic shifting functions. The  
primary difference is that for Stanley and Marti, even if the variables are phonologically null they are present in  
logical form. They are part of the syntactic structure of the phrase. When positing shifting functions inserted by  
optional interpretation rules, the shifting function does not have to correspond to anything in the syntactic structure  
of the sentence. The metonymic shifting functions are not tied to anything in the logical form. They are added as a  
sui generis part of constructing derivations from logical forms to truth values. 
I will bracket for now the question of why I think my approach is superior to one that posits phonologically 
null syntactic structure. I return to that question in 2.3.6. when arguing against alternatives to my view. For now I  
just want to be explicit about how my account differs from one that posits phonologically null elements.
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(12a) The girl next door jumped over the pit.
(12b) My cousin jumped over the pit.
(12c) Carlos' boss jumped over the pit.
This isn't only true of the Belinda cases. All the cases canvassed above allow shifting with complex  
nominals.
(13a) I've been reading a lot of that funny philosopher from UCLA.
(13b) I've been reading a lot of you lately.
(13c) I've been eating a lot of that clucking feathered animal.
(13d) I've been wearing a lot of your favourite designer.
In all these cases the metonymy is allowed because the complex nominal denotes something 
that a shifting function can act upon. I will argue below that this fact is relevant for ruling out  
alternative  approaches,  but  here  I  appeal  to  it  in  order  to  show why  we  might  want  optional  
interpretation rules that introduce denotation-shifting functions without interpreting any particular  
phonologically  present  atomic  constituent.  It  should  now  be  clear  how  my  account  relies  on 
accepting substantive optionality in semantic theories.55 
At this point, I can imagine some readers objecting that there is a crucial difference between 
Metonenglish and English. In Metonenglish, on the one hand, we always know when a shifting  
function applies. The application of shifting function in Metonenglish is determined by syntax. In 
55 One might wonder whether we could have a semantic account of metonymy that didn't involve optionality. On 
some accounts of the semantics/pragmatics interface, the view I examine in section 2.3.6. (which posits hidden  
indexicals) might count as such a view. But there is no obvious way to have a semantic approach that does not 
involve optionality or hidden indexicals. Sentences like (10a) are associated, on any semantic account of metonymy, 
with two different truth-conditions.
(10a) Belinda jumped.
If a theory wants to claim that there is more than one truth-condition that can be associated with this logical form, 
and that  there is  no hidden indexicals  in the logical  form, the  only  way for  there  to be  two truth-conditions  
associated with the logical form is for there to be two different derivations of truth-conditions from the logical form. 
Any  theory  that  allows  derivations  of  different  truth-conditions  from a  single  logical  form allows  substantive 
optionality.
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English the insertion of a shifting function is optional. Since, according to the objection, a rule 
system  with  substantive  optionality  is  less  systematic  than  a  rule  system  without  substantive  
optionality,  the  inclusion  of  optional  rules  legislates  against  my  approach  to  metonymy  This 
objection rests on the claim that a semantic rule system that allows substantive optionality is, in  
virtue  of  having  optionality,  less  systematic  than a  rule  system that  does  not  allow substantive 
optionality. The primary goal of the first section of this chapter was to refute that misconception.  
Once we recognize that knowing a rule system does not suffice to explain abilities that use that rule  
system,  we  recognize  that  a  rule  system  can  be  fully  systematic  while  still  having  substantive 
optionality. Syntactic  rule systems necessarily allow substantive optionality and yet syntactic  rule  
systems are not considered unsystematic.
I also want to emphasize that to say that denotation shifting functions are introduced by 
optional interpretation rules is not to say that denotation shifting rules are inserted by pragmatic  
processes. I'm not saying anything about pragmatics or about how the truth-conditions of utterances  
are determined by context. All I'm claiming is that we can describe a system of semantic rules that  
allows  us  to  derive  multiple  truth-conditions  from a  single  logical  form.  Nothing  immediately 
follows about the psycholinguistics of parsing or production. Any claim about how we resolve the 
substantive optionality that I'm discussing goes beyond the domain of theoretical semantics and into 
the domain of empirical psycholinguistics.56
56 One might suspect that if it is a psycholinguistic task to determine which truth-condition is being used with an 
utterance of a sentence, then we would see cases in which we associated both truth-conditions with the use of the  
sentence. We do in fact see this.
(xi) General Washington has arrived! 
(xii) France is bristling with excitement.
(xiii) Belinda jumped really high!
(xi) can be used to simultaneously communicate that General Washington the individual has arrived and that his  
army has arrived.  We might use (xii) to talk simultaneously about the country and the sports team.  And if Belinda  
is playing a video game using a motion control system such as the Microsoft Kinect, she might perform a real life  
jump in order to make her virtual avatar jump.  In those cases an utterance of (xiii) could be used to communicate 
both that the real Belinda jumped high and that her avatar jumped high.  In many cases it is harder to find cases in  
which both the metonymic and lexical denotations of the sentence obtain in one context, but in such a situation you  
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There  are  several  other  obvious  objections  to  my  view  that  are  based  on  crucial 
misconceptions.  I  want  to  canvas  several  of  these  objections,  using  Metonenglish  as  a  tool  for 
uncovering the misconceptions. The objections are: (1) the lack of clear definitions; (2) building too 
much into lexical meaning; (3) metonymy applies too broadly.
Lack of Clear Definitions: One worry holds that I am wrong in thinking that we can describe 
different 'types' of metonymy: metonymy is in fact far messier and harder to characterize than I have 
suggested.  According  to  this  objection,  while  I  can  point  at  examples  of  something  like 
Producer/Product metonymy, I cannot provide any accurate definition that allows us to precisely  
define Producer/Product metonymy.
In response, I claim that there is no burden on me to provide a precise definition of the  
Producer/Product shifting function or any other denotation shifting function. In fact, it would be 
surprising,  given my view, for  any such definition to exist.  Types  of  metonymy are  like lexical  
meanings, though they are not associated with any syntactic constituent. We can virtually never  
provide precise characterizations of the meanings of lexical items. Natural language expressions rarely  
have precise definitions. There is no precise and accurate definition for 'producer' or 'product,' so it's  
not  surprising  that  we  cannot  define  the  Producer/Product  shifting  function.  Were  we  able  to 
provide clear and accurate definitions for types of metonymy, that would be evidence against my 
view, since it  would be a strong disanalogy between denotation shifting functions and standard 
semantic values.  
What is required, on my view, is that we have a rough ability to classify metonymic shifting 
functions. This ability can break down in borderline cases, or other difficult circumstances. There is  
can generally get both meanings. Take the gruesome set of circumstances in which Armani decides that after his  
death his body is to be made into a final outfit.  This would be a rare (and frightening) case in which one could 
communicate both the metonymic and lexical truth-conditions.
(xiv) John is wearing Armani.
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reason to think that messier characterizations of denotation shifting functions are possible. Such  
characterizations have been seen in the literature,57 and we seem to have an intuitive ability to classify 
types  of  metonymy  in  rough  terms.  Furthermore,  I  will  argue  in  section  2.3.1.  that  there  are 
constraints and limits on metonymy. The existence of such constraints adds further heft to my claim 
that we can roughly characterize types of metonymy. The more constraints that we see on when 
metonymic shifts can occur, the more likely it is that we can come up with rough ways of classifying  
the denotation shifting functions.
Another way to put my response to the objection is in terms of Metonenglish. Would the 
objection apply to Metonenglish? Surely not! It does not matter that we cannot precisely define the  
'ord' morpheme or the 'prod' morpheme. The lexical meanings of other words, verbs and adjectives  
in particular, are complicated and difficult to characterize. The roughness of the definition of 'prod'  
is par for the course, when it comes to lexical meanings. But the only difference between English and  
Metonenglish, on my view, is  that  the English 'prod' shifting function isn't tied to a particular  
syntactic constituent—a difference which surely isn't relevant to whether the characterization of the  
shifting function is precise enough.
Building Too Much into Lexical Meanings:  Another objection holds that my account of 
metonymy requires building a lot of rich structured content into the lexicon. In section 2.3.1. I  
discuss cases in which there are constraints on metonymy. One constraint is that we can shift from 
an author to their work, although not from a translator to their work. 
(14a) I've been reading lots of Kaplan lately.
?(14b) I've been reading lots of Ackrill lately.
Why can 'Kaplan' undergo a shift while 'Ackrill' cannot undergo a parallel shift? The objector would 
57 See, for instance, (Nunberg1995 and 2002), (Pustejovsky 1995), and (Apresjan 1973).
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claim that we must look to differences in the lexical meaning of  'Kaplan' and 'Ackrill.' According to 
the objector, the only way to make sense of a semantic account of metonymy is to claim that the  
lexical entry for 'Kaplan' will include a marker for 'author', or something of that ilk. A semantic 
account of metonymy would, on that view, require major commitments about the nature of lexical  
content. Even more damning, it is far from obvious that markers like 'author' ought to play any role  
in linguistic representations. Whether or not we take Kaplan to be an author is arguably not matter  
of the meaning of the expression 'Kaplan'. The belief that Kaplan is an author, the objector claims, is 
part of our general information about the world and is not a specifically linguistic belief. As a result,  
the belief that Kaplan is an author should be irrelevant to the lexical entry for 'Kaplan.' A semantic  
account  of  metonymy,  according  to  this  objection,  can  be  criticized  for  building  too  much 
information about the world into the lexicon. 
The objection concerning building too much into lexical meanings clearly does not apply to 
Metonenglish, and Metonenglish is not different from English in a way relevant to the objection.  
The puzzles raised by this objection apply to interpreting compound expressions in general. They are  
in no way specific to metonymy. For example, we can look at (15a).
?(15a) AvBurger King jumped. 
Do we need to posit rich lexical structure in the meaning of 'Burger King' in order to have an  
effective  semantics  for  sentences  such as  (15a)?  The exact  same question could be asked of  the 
English sentence (15b):
(15b) Burger King's avatar jumped. 
We might explain the anomaly of (15b) in terms of lexically encoded restrictions on how “ 's avatar” 
can combine with other expressions.  Or we might  claim that  (15b) is  fully  meaningful  though 
obviously false and that since utterances of (15b) serve no communicative purpose, they are marked 
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as anomalous, or we might claim that (15b) is a case of a sentence whose nominal fails to refer. The 
characterization of restrictions on how words can combine with each other is a general puzzle in  
semantics. There is no special problem for Metonenglish. Similarly, any analysis of sentences like  
(15b) will require determining the extent to which we need to build beliefs about the world into  
lexical meanings. There is no puzzle specific to metonymy.
The key difference between English and Metonenglish—whether there are phonological and 
syntactic  representations of  shifting functions—is irrelevant to the question of  how we compose 
shifting functions with other semantic values. The difference between English and Metonenglish 
only pertains to the question of under what circumstances can we invoke metonymy. Since the same 
puzzles occur in Metonenglish and English, in cases of metonymy and in cases that have nothing to  
do with metonymy, there is no special problem for my account of English metonymy.
Metonymy Applies too Broadly: Stanley has argued that deferred reference (a subset of what 
I've called 'metonymy') isn't amenable to a semantic treatment.58 According to Stanley, we can use 
metonymy to shift virtually any expressions. Take Meal/Orderer metonymy as an example. Imagine 
a particularly creative restauranteur who serves cutting edge, avant-garde food. This restauranteur  
serves food that  imitates  lots of non- food entities:  lawn-mowers, electrons,  happiness,  extended  
simples... Theoretically such a restaurant could serve food that imitates anything. For virtually any 
nominal in the language, the restaurant could serve a meal legitimately denoted by that nominal. As  
a result, any nominal can potentially undergo Meal/Orderer metonymic shifting. Since any nominal  
can undergo Meal/Orderer shifting, Stanley holds that we should explain metonymy in terms of how 
we use our semantic rule system rather in terms of the semantic rule system itself.59
58 (Stanley 2005)
59 “A second consideration involves the scope of the phenomenon. One reason against taking metaphor to be semantic 
is that virtually any term can be used metaphorically. This suggests that metaphor has to do with the use of a term, 
rather  than  the  semantics  of  a  particular  expression.  Similarly,  virtually  any term can be  used with  a  deferred 
reference.” (Stanley 2005 229)
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There  is  no parallel  problem for  Metonenglish  morphemes.  'Ord',  when attached to an 
expression, denotes a function that takes meals denoted by that expression to the contextually salient  
individual who ordered that meal. Ord() can apply to virtually any entity in the language's domain.  
Still no one would suggest that the shifting triggered by 'ord' is a matter of how we use a semantic 
system, rather than the semantic system itself. Such an objection would be like claiming that the  
operator 'it is necessary that' is not a part of English since it can be applied to any sentence. The  
shifting function that 'ord' denotes is lexically assigned to a constituent of logical form, and hence  
semantic on anyone's account.60 61 
As in the above cases, the differences between Metonenglish and English are irrelevant to this 
response.  The  difference  between  English  and  Metonenglish  are  differences  in  whether  syntax  
mandates the insertion  of  a  shifting  function.  However,  the  breadth  of  application  of  the  
Metonenglish 'ord' morpheme is the same as the breadth of application of the English Optional Ord  
Insertion rule.  The fact  that  an expression has  a  given breadth of  application does  not  provide  
evidence that we should take the expression to be a matter of 'use' rather than part of a linguistic rule 
system. We expect standard lexical items to combine with a large variety of other expressions and 
this breadth would be equally expected of optional lexical items.
60 Stanley's objection might hold if a semantic approach had to explain metonymy in terms of the meaning of the 
shifted expression. Metonenglish avoids this pitfall, however, by explaining metonymy in terms of a novel class of  
expressions—the shifting morphemes.
61 In  (Stanley  2005),  Stanley  also  presses  another  objection.  He holds  the  semantic  content  must  be  adequately 
constrained by the lexicon. By 'adequately constrained' Stanley means that each the expression must be true of its 
denotation. So for instance, for an occurrence of 'ham-sandwich' to be adequately constrained by the lexicon, the  
expression 'ham-sandwich' must be true of its denotation. “At the very least, the semantic content of an expression,  
relative to a context, must be something of which that expression is true. If it is not, it is hard to see how the  
semantic content of that expression has been constrained by the conventional meaning of that expression.” (Stanley  
2005 10) In cases of metonymy, however, the expression is not true of the metonymic denotation. The predicate 'is  
a ham sandwich' is not true of the person who ordered the ham sandwich'. As a result, Stanley claims that shifted  
expressions are not constrained, and hence metonymy cannot be semantic. 
This objections poses no problem for Metonenglish. Metonenglish nominals are all constrained in Stanley's  
sense. 'Belinda' denotes belinda. It is only the composite term 'Av(belinda)' that is evaluated to mario. If Stanley's 
objection did work, we would all be in serious trouble: fragments of first-order logic that include functions from  
entities to entities would be ruled out as inadequately constrained.
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So  far  I  have  challenged  the  claim  that  semantic  rule  systems  must  avoid  substantive 
optionality and have shown how we can make use of optionality to construct a semantic theory that 
accounts for metonymy. In essence, I have tried to offer a demonstration of  how we might make 
good use of substantive optionality in semantic rule systems. Still, I imagine that many readers will  
be  unimpressed.  Sure  substantive  optionality  could allow us  to  develop  a  semantic  account  of 
metonymy, but why should we want to develop a semantic account of metonymy? Some might 
object that metonymy is obviously a pragmatic phenomenon or that what I call metonymy is really 
just a form of lexical ambiguity. The rest of this paper presents specific motivations for developing a 
semantic account of metonymy and arguments against some reasonable alternatives. In the end I 
hope to show not only that we can adopt a semantic account of metonymy, but that we should.62
2.3. Motivations for a Semantic Explanation of Metonymy
Why think that  a  semantic  theory should describe rules  that  associate  metonymic truth-
conditions with logical forms? My strategy is to begin by describing two aspects of metonymy that 
any theory must accommodate: (I) ways in which metonymy appears to be conventional, (II) shifts 
in agreement and countability properties that accompany the denotational shifts in metonymy. After  
investigating these considerations in detail I will argue that my semantic account of metonymy does  
best  at  explaining them, when comparing my account  to (A)  a  naïve  pragmatic  account;  (B)  a 
sophisticated pragmatic account; (C) a metasemantic account; and (D) accounts based on positing 
phonologically null syntactic structure.
62 In an earlier footnote I mentioned the possibility of metonymy-like phenomena where there is no one denotation  
that appears to be the sole denotation in the lexicon. I can now sketch how my account could accommodate such 
phenomena. In such cases, I would say that the semantic value assigned to the expression from the lexicon is not a  
denotation. Rather, a cluster of properties is semantically assigned to the expression by the lexicon.  In these cases, 
rather than having a function from entities to entities,  we would have functions from clusters  of  properties to 
denotations.  In  order  for  the  system to  assign  truth-conditions  to  logical  forms  that  describe  sentences  with 
polysemous lexical items, we are required to use optional lexical insertion to insert a function that would shift a 
cluster of properties to a composable denotation. In such cases of polysemy, shifting functions would be optional in  
a weaker way: while no particular shifting function is required, some shifting function must always be applied.
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2.3.1. Conventional Constraints
One might think that metonymic shifting is available whenever the lexical denotation is 
related to the putative metonymic denotation in some way made salient by the situation of 
utterance. On such a view, there are no context-independent rules about whether a metonymic shift 
is available for use. All that matters is that the relation between the lexical denotation and putative 
metonymic denotation has been made salient in a particular situation of utterance. Given the proper 
situation, any relation could be made salient.
In this section I argue against the view described in the preceding paragraph. Not just any 
relation can serve to make a metonymic shift available for use. As I will put it, metonymy is 
constrained—limited to particular kinds of relations between lexical and metonymic denotations. 
Furthermore, I will argue that these constraints are conventional. By this, I mean that whether or not 
a particular metonymic shifting function is available depends upon conventions associated with 
particular languages. Most discussions of metonymy focus on cases in which shifting is successful. 
There is also much to be learned by looking at potential shifts that are unacceptable. I will not be 
arguing that my account of metonymy is the only way of explaining constraints and conventionality. 
For now, I simply want to establish these claims about constraints and conventionality. I will argue 
later that my account does better than competing accounts at accommodating these claims.63 
I will proceed by first looking in detail at metonymic shifting in which the lexical denotation 
is an author and the metonymic denotation is their work. I will show how in similar cases—cases in 
which an entity is related to the provenance of a written work in some other way—shifting is not 
available. Furthermore, I will argue that we cannot simply appeal to the “salience” of the metonymic 
63 The constrainedness  and  conventionality  of  metonymy has  been  recognized  to  a  degree  in  the  literature.  For  
instance:  (Apresjan  1973),  (Nunberg  and  Zaenen  1992),  (Nunberg  1995)  and  (Nunberg  2002)  It  is  a  key 
motivation for Nunberg's move to a metasemantic account in (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992), as I discuss below. 
However, in general, the conventionality of much metonymy is far less acknowledged than it ought to be.
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relation to determine when shifting occurs and when it does not. After going through the initial test 
case, I will look at a number of examples of constraints on metonymy to demonstrate the ubiquity of 
the phenomenon though I won't discuss each example in the same detail. Finally, at the close of this 
section I will argue that not only is metonymy constrained, but that the constraints are conventional. 
(16a) is a standard example of metonymy. In it, the author-denoting expressions shift to 
denote an oeuvre.
(16a) I love reading Kaplan. I learn something new every time I read him.
In general we can shift from authors to the works that those authors have produced. I want to first  
demonstrate that (a) we cannot engage in parallel shifts to putative metonymic denotations that bear  
different (but still relevant) connections to a book's provenance. Secondly I will argue that (b) even 
in cases in which authorship is not particularly relevant shifting is still allowed. Since Author/Book 
metonymy is  allowed even when the author  relation isn't  salient and parallel  forms of  putative  
metonymy are not allowed even when they are salient, I conclude that there has to be a specific  
constraint that allows Author/Book metonymy but disallows the other parallel forms.
We can see a variety of cases in which entities that are related to the provenance of a work do 
not give rise to acceptable shifts. Translators make important salient contributions to translations  
they produce. Translators have individual styles and awareness of a given style might be extremely  
important to scholars working in a particular field. Yet even for philosophers studying historical  
works and discussing the translations, shifting from translators to their work seems disallowed.64
(16b) I've been reading lots of Ackrill lately.
(16c) I've been working a lot with Guyer lately65.
64 Of course many translators are authors in their own right.  Even if we can shift to work they have produced, we  
cannot shift to work they have translated.  
65 One piece of data that complicates these cases is that in certain constructions something like metonymy might be 
allowed for translators.:
(xv) I prefer the Cooper to the Ackrill.
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(16b) and  (16c) can only felicitously be used to discuss Ackrill and Guyer's philosophical works, not 
their translations.
Other similar restrictions include not using a publisher's name to refer to their books.
?(16d) I love reading Oxford University Press! I learn something new every time I 
read it.
Instead we would say:
(16e) I love reading Oxford University Press books.
Nor do we shift when discussing places that sell books.
?(16f) I've been reading lots of Barnes and Nobles lately. The store is on my way home 
from work.
These constraints still hold in contexts in which the properties of presses and bookstores are 
particularly relevant.  (16d) would still be infelicitous during a tenure review, a situation in which 
relations between books and their publishers would be extremely salient, while (16f) would still not 
be relevant during a conversation about the decline of brick and mortar bookstores, despite the fact  
that in that conversational context the relation between books and the places they are bought is  
salient. We can even imagine a particular store, called it Charlie's Mystery Shack, that only stocks  
one very particular kind of mystery novel. It still seems odd to say to a devoted mystery fan:
?(16g) I've been reading lots of Charlie's Mystery Shack lately.
Furthermore,  the  relations  that  seem  to  license  metonymic  shifting  are  not  generally 
symmetric. That is to say, we can us the name of an author to refer to a book, but we cannot  
generally use the name of a book to refer to an author. Compare the following:
(16h) If I could read any author in history I would read George Elliot.
?(16i) If I could meet any book in history I would meet Middlemarch.
(xvi) I've been working a lot with the Guyer.
Here however it seems essential to have the definite article.
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But if all that matters is that the relevant relation be salient in context, and we know that the 
relation between authors and books is salient enough to license metonymy in (16h), we would expect 
that the relation between books and authors should be enough to license metonymy in (16i).
Some readers have responded that they can easily imagine scenarios in which  (16b), (16d) 
and (16f)  are acceptable. The response goes like this: what if there was a group of editors whose 
entire job was concerned with publishing translations? Surely they could use  (16b). Or, for that 
matter, imagine there are scholars whose primary area of study is the sociology of academic presses.  
For such scholars,  (16d) might be acceptable. But those are just situations in which the relevant  
relations were made very salient and so for all I've said the salience story might work.
 I agree that we can imagine a situation in which editors of translations felicitously utter  
sentences like  (16b). However, I deny that these imagined situations provide any support for the 
salience approach. We need to distinguish claims about  currently existing  forms of language from 
the claims about possible forms of language. This distinction is essential when we are contemplating 
linguistic intuitions about possible scenarios. In such cases we must determine whether the intuition 
is about  our language as it is spoken in that scenario or whether we have implicitly changed the 
language in the possible scenario. We can, for example, imagine a possible scenario in which Fred, 
who eats lots of carrots gets assigned the nickname 'Carrots' as a result. Discussing such a situation 
tells  us  nothing  about  what  our  word  'carrots'  means—we  are  imagining  a  situation  in  which 
'carrots' has gained a new meaning or in which a new lexical item homonymous with 'carrots' has 
entered the language.
The question for us, then, is whether in imagining the above situations we are implicitly  
changing the language or not. One test is to ask whether the imagined speakers would still use the 
relevant forms of metonymy in situations in which their professional interests are not particularly  
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relevant. If speakers use the relevant forms of metonymy when their professional interests are not  
salient, then the metonymy stems from a systematic change in their lexicon. If speakers only use the  
relevant forms of metonymy when directly concerned with their profession then the metonymy is  
truly being licensed by relations made salient in particular circumstances.66 
When I imagine a group of translators felicitously using (16b), I have a strong intuition that 
they can then use Translator/Translation metonymy in any situation in which a translation is under 
discussion even if the relation between translators and their works bears absolutely no salience in that 
situation.  It  is  not  some  feature  of  a  particular  situation  they  are  in  that  seems  to  justify  the 
metonymic shift; it is a general features of their lives. If one is an editor of translators who uses 
Translator/Translation  metonymy  in  some  circumstances,  it  seems  as  if  Translator/Translation 
metonymy would be admissible in every situation. If one is not an editor specializing in translations, 
making  translations  salient  doesn't  seem  to  license  Translator/Translation  metonymy.  What  is  
relevant in these imagined scenarios is not merely some features of the particular situation but some 
general feature of the speaker's life. This strongly suggests that when we are imagining these alternate 
scenarios we are actually imagining scenarios in which translators speak a slightly different language 
than we do. We can see how, given their professional needs, it might make sense for them to modify  
their linguistic resources. Just as we can easily accept that Fred is called 'Carrots' in a situation in  
which  he  eats  a  lot  of  carrots,  we  can  imagine  that  translation  editors  might  begin  using  
Translator/Translation  metonymy;  but  such intuitions  do not  undermine  my claim that  in  our  
66 One might be concerned that this test is problematic for my treatment of “ham-sandwich” cases.  Are they not, after 
all,  cases where speakers only use metonymy in a very particular set of circumstances? I suspect that restaurant  
workers could use ham-sandwich metonymy outside their professional capacity, however there simply are not many 
other circumstances (outside of restaurants) where they interact with individuals who have ordered meals. 
Aside  from  this  response,  the  crucial  claim  for  my  argument  is  that  users  of  the  supposed  
Translator/Translation metonymy could clearly use such metonymy in situations where translators and translations 
are not salient.  It is enough for me that uses in non-salient circumstances evidence a convention. I don't require the  
further claim that when a putative form of metonymy is only used in salient circumstances there is no convention.
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language, as it is currently spoken, such metonymy is not available.67
So  far  I  have  argued  that  other  salient  Book/Individual  relations  do  not  give  rise  to 
metonymic shifts. I also want to argue that author metonymy is always acceptable, even when the 
Author/Book relationship isn't salient. 
One way in which the Author/Book relationship could fail to be salient would be in cases in 
which the fact that a given person wrote the book fails to provide any salient information about the 
book. If facts about a book's provenance are not relevant to a conversation, it is hard to see why the 
Author/Book relationship could be salient. One potential  example is  Rodney William Whitaker,  
author of the satire  The Eiger Sanction,  better known by his pen name 'Trevanian'. Trevanian's 
works were written about a number of topics, in a number of different literary genres. They were  
diverse enough that some believed that 'Trevanian' was actually a collective made up of different 
authors. In many circumstances, then, the fact that a book is by Trevanian will not provide us with  
much useful information. Still, we can always say:
(16j) I've been reading a lot of Trevanian.68 
So even when authorship is not correlated with any relevant properties of that author's work, we are  
still able to engage in author metonymy. 
Even  in  situations  in  which  authorship  is  completely  irrelevant  we  can  still  engage  in  
Author/Book metonymy. Imagine that Fred asks Sam to pick out a book at random to balance a 
67 Peter Ludlow has argued in (Ludlow 2006 and 2007) for a dynamic lexicon: the view that lexical meanings often 
change and get renegotiated in particular conversational contexts. Even if we reject the radical ubiquity of Ludlow's  
dynamism, surely something is  right in the claim that  the lexicon can change and often does  in the kinds of 
circumstances we have been discussing. Different professions have their own jargons and their own specialized uses 
for natural language terms. Given that we, as speakers, have to get around in a world in which others might use  
different common terms with very different meanings,  it  is unsurprising that when imagining groups with very  
different needs we would be liberal about modifying the meanings of expressions to suit their uses.
68 This isn't to say that Trevanian's work doesn't have any important similarities. It just isn't clear that the Trevian-
similarities are any less salient then the myriad similarities in the oeuvre of a single translator or editor. There are  
many other analogous cases: a philosopher who produces poetry on the side, unrelated to her philosophical work, or  
an author who has produced work of wildly differing quality as well as genre.
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wobbly table leg. Sam could respond:
(17) Here, take Aristotle.
There is nothing about that particular situation that makes the Author/Book relation salient to the 
conversation. There may be other aspects of the book that are more distinctly identifying; perhaps it  
has a neon pink cover. (17) is still fully acceptable despite the fact that there is absolutely nothing 
about the situation that makes the Author/Book relation (or the author) relevant. The lesson here is  
that Author/Book metonymy is available in any situation, regardless of whether or not authors are 
particularly salient.
I have so far argued that Author/Book metonymy is available, even when authorship is not 
salient. Furthermore, I have argued that other relations pertaining to the provenance of a book do 
not make metonymy available even in situations in which they are salient. As a result, I conclude  
that Author/Book metonymy is constrained: it is specifically licensed and does not depend upon 
situational salience. 
I next want to briefly go over a number of other cases in which we see similar constraints. I  
will  not  be  looking  at  them all  in  such detail.  I  am aiming to  show that  these  constraints  on 
metonymy are ubiquitous, but it would take too much space to look at every example in full detail.  
With many cases of metonymy, whether or not a shift is available requires specialized knowledge and 
cannot simply be inferred from what is salient in the situation. For example we refer to a person's  
clothes in terms of the individual or company that designed them. 
(18a) Josh is wearing Armani.
However, imagine one were to walk into a store and see a T-shirt that Josh, a unique and stylish  
dresser, often wears. One would never say:
?(18b) Josh is hanging on the rack!
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Similarly, while (18c) is fully acceptable, (18d) is not, even if Josh is an extremely distinctive dresser.
(18c) Wow, that high end consignment store is filled with Armani!
?(18d) Wow, that high end consignment store is filled with Josh!
Examples (18a-d) seem to show that in cases of clothing metonymy the lexical denotation 
must  be  the  designer  of  the  clothes.  Even then,  the  metonymy seems  better  if  the  designer  is  
particularly high end. These constraints do not simply arise out of general salience, since the fact that  
Josh wears particular clothes might be salient without making (18d) available. 
We use metonymic shifts with restaurants but not other locations where we can purchase 
food.
(19a) I've been eating lots of Burger King lately.
?(19b) I've been eating lots of Ithaca Farmer's Market lately.
?(19c) I've been eating lots of Walmart lately. It is so much cheaper than eating 
Safeway.69
Again, if metonymy depended solely on salience, we would judge (19b) and (19c) to be as good as 
(19a). Instead there seem to be constraints that are not based on salience that make (19b) and (19c) 
unavailable.
As mentioned above, while we might use metonymy to discuss food cooked by famous chefs:
(14a) I've been eating lots of Batali lately.
we would not do so with food cooked by friends, even if the food is extremely distinctive. 
?(14b) I've been eating lots of Fred lately.
Even though Fred is the producer of the food, that does not suffice to make a metonymic  
shift available. Instead the producer must apparently satisfy other conditions: perhaps she must be  
69 Though there might be some cases in which shifting to a food store is allowed.
(xvii) I've been eating lots of Whole Foods lately.
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famous,  high class  or  be  identified with a  brand.  Whichever  further constraints  turn out  to be 
needed, they go beyond the mere salience of the Chef/Food relation.
There are also interesting constraints that allow for shifts between animals and the food we 
make from them, but not plants and the food we make from them. When discussing certain kinds of  
food we can use the name of the source animal to denote the food even if we are only eating a part of  
the animal.70
(20a) I'm eating chicken.71
(20b) I'm eating lamb. 
For some animals the shift appears to be rare but available.72
(20c) I'm eating beef.
(20d) I'm eating cow.73 
However, when discussing vegetable foods we often use the name of the part of the plant being eaten 
we cannot use the name of the plant itself (when it differs from the name of the eaten part). 
(20e) I'm eating grapes.
?(20f) I'm eating vine.
?(20g) I'm eating grape vine.
(20h) I'm eating walnuts.
?(20i) I'm eating walnut tree.
70 Many of the food cases are discussed in (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992) and (Nunberg 2002).
71 One might suspect that in this case there is no metonymy. 'Chicken' is just lexically ambiguous: it has an animal  
denotation  and  a  food denotation.  However,  the  same  pattern  of  putative  denotation shifting  can  occur  with  
virtually any expression that denotes an animal. This suggest that it is the result of a general rule, rather than lexical  
ambiguity.
(xviii) Tonight I'm eating that feathered, clucking animal.
We presumably don't want to say that every complex expression that can denote an animal is somehow lexically 
ambiguous.
72 Historically, these are animals for whom English has adopted the French name of the animal, i.e. 'boeuf'', to denote  
the foodstuff, i.e. beef.
73 There seems to be a fair  amount of variation in interpreting (20d). I suspect that there may be a generational 
linguistic change, according to which younger speakers are more accepting of (20d).
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We can use metonymy in the other direction, referring to the entire plant by the name of the part  
that gets eaten.
(20j) I'm planting grapes.
(20k) I'm planting walnuts.
If metonymy was simply based on what relations happened to be salient in a given situation there 
would  be  no  explanation  for  these  general  constraints.  The  relation  between  a  chicken  and  a  
drumstick is no more salient than the relation between a grape vine and its fruit.
We also cannot shift from an animal or plant to liquids that are produced by that animal or  
plant.
(20l) I'm drinking milk.
?(20m) I'm drinking cow.74
(20n) I'm drinking orange juice.
?(20o) I'm drinking orange.75
?(20p) I'm drinking an orange. 
(20q) I'm drinking grape juice.
?(20r) I'm drinking grape.
I doubt there is anything about foods that make them more salient than drinks. The Animal/Food  
relation  is  not  automatically  more  salient  than  the  Plant/Food  or  Plant/Drink  relations.  The  
availability or lack of availability of these metonymic shifts is due to specific constraints on how 
74 There does seem to be an odd but acceptable reading of (16b). If one were to blend a steak in a blender and drink 
the resulting concoction, we might be able to describe it as in (16b). In many cases it seems like we can get a 'drink'  
reading if we blend the stuff that makes up an entity. Still, this isn't true in cases in which there is an actual drink  
that made from the stuff. So for instance even if we drank the result of blended a crate of oranges, we wouldn't say:  
“I'm drinking orange”.
75 There are some contexts in which (20o) would be acceptable. If Gus is responding to the question: “Which juice are 
you drinking?”, then (20o) is an acceptable response. In such cases, however, the question must be salient in the 
previous discourse. This suggests that some form of deletion or copying is occurring, where we either delete 'juice' or 
implicitly  copy it  from the  question into the answer.  These deletion or copying phenomena are  distinct  from  
metonymy.
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shifting can happen. Similarly, we can sometimes use metonymic shifts to refer to an entity by a  
particularly salient part.
(21a) General Washington finally arrived! (where 'General Washington' denotes an 
entire army.)
On the other hand, there are some cases in which it is extremely odd to refer to an entity by a part.
?(21b) Eddie Vedder is touring again! (where 'Eddie Vedder' denotes his band 
Pearl Jam)
The availability of the metonymic shifts is constrained. Whether or not particular shifts are available 
is not simply a matter of whether the connection between the original denotation and the shifted 
denotation is salient. 
I have argued that metonymy is constrained. I now want to move on to claim that those  
constraints  are  based on convention. There is  evidence that  patterns of  metonymy are  language 
dependent  and  hence  dependent  upon  the  conventions  of  that  language.  Apresjan writes  in 
(Apresjan 1973) that in Russian there is a common form of metonymy according to which a disease 
is referred to by expressions that denote the part of the body it affects. People will commonly say 'I  
have a heart' to mean they have heart disease or 'I have a lung' to mean they have asthma. This kind  
of metonymy is, as far as I am aware, virtually never used in English. This on its own is strong 
evidence that metonymy is highly conventional as what counts as admissible metonymy differs from 
language to language. (Nunberg 2002) reports on private correspondence with Jerrold Saddock in 
which Saddock claims that in Inuit languages metonymic shifting from animals to foods made from 
those animals is not allowed though other kinds of metonymic shifts are acceptable. Nunberg also 
points out that in French speakers use the name of fruits to denote brandies made from those fruits.  
These  kinds  of  cross-linguistic  differences  strongly  suggest  that  the  constraints  on  metonymic 
shifting are conventional. Above I discussed cases in which we can imagine patterns of metonymy 
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that are not currently available becoming available for a language. Again, if this is possible then it  
follows that metonymy must be, at least to a degree, conventional.
2.3.2. Agreement and Countability
Another  interesting  feature  of  metonymy  is  that  denotational  shifts  are  sometimes 
accompanied by shifts in how a nominal agrees with verbs and shifts in a nominal's countability – a 
property I explain below. I also aim to demonstrate in this section that these grammatical shifts are  
productive: they apply across domains of metonymy and are not restricted to individual lexical items. 
In the final sections of the paper I will make use of these facts in arguing for my approach.
To begin, I want to show that metonymy sometimes seems to involve grammatical shifts. 
Metonymic shifts are sometimes accompanied by changes in features relevant to agreement.76 In 
normal English sentences, the grammatical number of a subject governs how the sentence's main 
verb is to be inflected. For example in the following, 'Claude' is grammatically singular, and as a 
result, the verb, 'to be' is in the singular form 'is'.
(22a) Claude is smiling.
In a parallel construction with a plural subject the verb 'to be' must be in the plural form 'are'.
(22b) Claude and Esmerelda are smiling. 
Sentences  in  which  the  verb  fails  to  agree  with  the  subject  give  rise  to  strong  intuitions  of  
grammatical deviance. Most speakers of standard American English refuse to accept the following  
sentences.
*(22c) Claude are smiling.
*(22d) Claude and Esmerelda is smiling.
76 Nunberg writes about some of the interesting grammatical properties of metonymic expressions in (Nunberg 1995),  
but he goes on to draw very different conclusions from the data. He wants to argue that we should think of the 
common noun 'french fries' shifting rather than the noun phrase: 'the french fries'. However, such an account fails  
to help in the 'France' case I discuss below.
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One intriguing features of some (though not all) metonymically shifted sentences is that the verb  
does not have to agree with the number of the actual subject expression. Instead, the verb can agree 
with the number we would canonically assign to an expression that lexically denotes the metonymic  
denotation. As Nunberg has noted,77 this occurs in some of the 'ham sandwich' style cases.
(23a) The sweet potato fries is getting antsy.
?(23b) The sweet potato fries are getting antsy. (Where 'the sweet potato fries' is 
denoting a single individual)78
The verb 'is getting' in (23a) is inflected for a singular subject despite the fact that the expression 'the 
sweet potato fries' is grammatically plural. In (23a), not only does 'sweet potato fries' seem to shift to 
a new denotation, but a grammatical feature associated with the standard denotation (plurality) can 
shift to a grammatical feature associated with the new denotation (singularity). My intuitions are  
that given the restaurant context (23b) would not be acceptable, though anecdotally intuitions are 
more mixed in this case. This shows that in Meal/Orderer metonymy, at least for some speakers, a  
grammatical shift may even be required.
In some cases it appears that a singular nominal shifts to take on the properties of a singular  
collective nominal like 'team' or 'committee'. In American English singular collective subjects must 
have singular inflected verbs, but in British English singular collective subjects agree with plural  
inflected verbs. So we would expect that  in British English (24b) and (25b) are acceptable. My 
intuitions, as a speaker of Canadian English are that they are acceptable.
(24a) France is going to win. It is a great team!
(24b) France are going to win. They are a great team.
77 (Nunberg 1995)
78 Interestingly, this phenomenon appears not to work in the other direction. Imagine a group orders a pizza together  
and begins getting raucous. 
(xix) The pizza is getting raucous.
?(xx) The pizza are getting raucous.
(xix) Sounds much better than (xx) to me.
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(25a) Table five is getting raucous!
(25b) Table five are getting raucous! 
 There is evidence that these uses are common in England. For instance, the following excerpts are  
from the Guardian's live blog of the France/Spain match at the 2012 Euro Cup.:
(26a) Spain are tiki-ing and taka-ing pretty much as you'd expect.
(26b) SPAIN HAVE LUMPED IT LONG!
(26c) But guess what Spain haven't got!
(26d) France are rocking!
(26e) France are all over the shop!
(26f) Spain have locked this down brilliantly, fair play to them. France are offering 
nothing.79
When denoting a team, 'France' seems to take on the grammatical properties of a singular collective  
nominal. For American English speakers, there is no noticeable difference, but for speakers of British 
English, sentences like (24b) and (25b) become acceptable.
There are other tests for whether or not a noun is collective. For instance, collective nouns 
can be used in constructions that end in 'together'.
(27a) The team worked together.
?(27b) Claude worked together.
Since 'the team' is a collective term, (27a) is felicitous, but since Claude is not a collective term (27b) 
is judged deviant. Team metonymy appears to be admissible in these 'together' constructions.
(27c) Boston works well together during practice.
(27d) New York doesn't work well together during practice.
79 http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/jun/23/euro-2012-spain-france-live   
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This suggests that some grammatical shift is occurring, even in American English.80 
For my purposes, this shift is particularly important because theorists distinguish between 
syntactic agreement and  semantic  agreement. Syntactic agreement occurs when the inflection of a 
verb (or other expression) is controlled by the syntactic properties of another expression. In cases of  
semantic agreement, however, the inflection seems to be controlled by the semantic properties of a 
denotation rather than the syntactic properties of the denoting expression.81 My discussion here will 
rely  heavily  on  the  explanations  in  (Corbett  2006)  Corbett  provides  a  wide  variety  of  cases  of  
semantic agreement. Often in cases in which the syntactic and semantic properties come apart there  
is an option to select between more than one inflection.
The British nominal 'committee' is a paradigm of semantic agreement.  It is still syntactically  
singular, even though the fact that it denotes a group seems to make it possible to use 'committee' 
with verbs with plural inflection. 'Committee' does not just transform into a syntactically plural  
term. In some contexts the semantic agreement isn't acceptable.
*(28) These committee voted against the resolution.
If 'committee' was fully syntactically plural, we would expect it could take a plural determiner, but it  
cannot. Though there isn't semantic agreement between 'committee' and verbs in American English, 
we do see semantic agreement between 'committee'-like nouns and pronouns that must agree with 
them.
(29a) The boys swim team likes their lucky charms.
*(29b) The boy likes their lucky charms.
80 This is slightly more complicated as it is less clear that the infelicity of  (27b) is purely grammatical. It could be 
argued that (27b) is a fully grammatical sentence, and that the oddness comes from the fact that the sentence is not  
semantically interpretable.
81 “I  shall  use  the  well-established  terms  syntactic and  semantic agreement.  [emphasis  is  Corbett's]  In  the  most 
straightforward cases syntactic agreement … is agreement consistent with the form of the controller (the committee  
has  decided).  Semantic  agreement  … is  agreement  consistent  with  its  meaning  (the  committee  have  decided). 
“(Corbett 2006 155)
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Examples  like  (29a)  are  particularly  important  because  they  involve  two  different  kinds  of  
agreement. The verb 'likes,' on the one hand, agrees with the singular syntactic features of 'the team'.  
The pronoun 'their,' on the other hand, agrees with the plural semantic features of the denotation of  
'the team'. Because you can have a single nominal that agrees semantically with one part of the 
sentence, and syntactically with another, we can't posit a syntactic operator that simply changes the  
nominal's syntactic properties. If there was an implicit syntactic pluralizer acting on 'the boy's swim 
team' we would expect the plural form of 'like' rather than the singular. Instead it really seems that  
in certain situations, at least, agreement follows the properties of the denotation rather than the  
syntactic properties of the expression.82
The 'France'-style cases involve one of the paradigmatic cases of semantic agreement. While 
there is no good full explanation for how semantic agreement occurs and how to understand it at the 
syntax/semantics  interface,  there  is  substantial  cross-linguistic  evidence  that  it  is  a  genuine 
phenomenon. For my purposes, semantic agreement is  particularly  important because if  there  is  
semantic agreement based on metonymic denotations, that seems to show that the truth-conditions 
of the sentence must involve the metonymic denotation and not the lexical denotation. If their was  
only  evidence  for  syntactic  agreement,  we  might  take  that  to  be  evidence  that  there  is  a  
phonologically null operator in logical form responsible for metonymy.  Given that the agreement is  
semantic, we have solid evidence for requiring a semantic theory that in some way associates the 
metonymic denotation with the shifted expression. 
The second kind of  grammatical  property  that  shifts  in  some cases  of  metonymy is  the 
expression's  countability—the  extent  to  which  the  expression  can  grammatically  participate  in 
82 If the evidence given here isn't satisfying, one should look to (Corbett 2006) and the literature cited within. Much 
of the best evidence for semantic agreement comes from languages other than English, though I've tried to stick with  
English examples for my exposition.
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count-noun like constructions or mass-noun like constructions.83 Some nouns, such as 'lightning,' 
are wholly uncountable. By this it is meant that they can never take plural inflection and they can't 
be  used  with  certain  determiners  like  'a'  or  'two',  though  they  can  felicitously  be  used  in  
constructions with 'all'. 'Lightning' is a paradigmatic uncountable nominal.84
?(30a) Lightnings are scary.
?(30b) I saw a lightning.
?(30c) I saw two lightnings.
(30d) All lightning is scary.
Other nominals are wholly countable: they can felicitously take plural inflection and can 
be used with determiners such as 'a' or 'two' and they cannot felicitously be used with 'all'. 'Car' 
is a paradigm of a countable nominal.
(31a) Cars are scary.
(31b) I saw a car.
(31c) I saw two cars.
?(31d) All car is scary.
Many nominals can be felicitously used in some of these constructions but not in others. For  
example, 'admiration' cannot be pluralized and cannot be used with the determiner 'two', but can be 
used with the determiner 'a' and with 'all.'
?(32a) Admirations are nice to have.
(32b) I have an admiration for scary things.85
83 I take this jargon and the following examples from the classic work in (Allan 1980). 
84 That's not too say the sentences marked with a '?' are completely unusable.  There may be cases where do accept  
them, though they are far less common and sound a bit odd.  This, however, is evidence that like the semantic 
agreement of number,  countability is  not a  purely syntactic property but also depends upon the nature of the  
relevant denotations.
85 The complement  seems required.
?(xxi) I have an admiration.
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?(32c) I have two admirations.
(32d) All admiration is scary. 
 We can measure a nominal's countability by seeing in which constructions it can be felicitously  
used.
For expressions whose denotations can be shifted via Author/Book, Animal/Food and other 
related forms of  metonymy,  the  kinds  of  constructions  in  which the  expression  can  felicitously 
participate depend on whether the expression has undergone shifting. For example 'chicken' can 
lexically denote an animal, or metonymically, it can shift to denote foodstuffs produced from the 
animal. When 'chicken' denotes the animal it grammatically requires a determiner, such as 'a'. When 
'chicken' is being used to denote foodstuff produced from the animal, a determiner is not felicitous.  
In interpreting the following two sentences, let us stipulate that 'chicken' hasn't undergone shifting 
and hence denotes an animal.
(33a) I own a chicken. 
?(33b) I own chicken.86 
In cases in which 'chicken' has undergone metonymic shifting and denotes a foodstuff, the opposite 
pattern holds.
(33c) I ate chicken last night.
?(33d) I ate a chicken last night.87 
86 It has been suggested that the following is acceptable, even if 'chicken' denotes the animal and not the food.
?(xxii) I own some chicken.
I find the sentence to be extremely odd. Furthermore, even if it is acceptable, that would be do something unique  
about the word 'chicken'.  We cannot do the same with other animal names.
?(xxiii) I own some dog.
?(xxiv) I own some cow.
?(xxv) I own some lamb. 
87 While (33d) can be felicitously used, it is only in cases in which 'chicken' is denoting a specific animal, rather than 
denoting a mass of foodstuff made from chickens. For instance we could say:
(xxvi) I ate a whole chicken last night! 
But this is a use of 'chicken' according to which it is denoting a particular animal. If 'chicken' has its metonymic 
denotation, no determiner is acceptable.
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In cases of Animal/Food metonymy the denotational shift correlates with a change in whether or not  
the nominal requires a determiner.  
A similar effect occurs with Author/Book metonymy. If 'Kaplan' has its lexical denotation 
(34a) is felicitous but (34b) is not.
(34a) Kaplan is a great philosopher.
?(34b) All Kaplan is interesting.88
When 'Kaplan' has its metonymic denotation, it is felicitous to use no determiner or to use  
determiners like 'all' or 'some'. We cannot felicitously use 'a.'
(34c) Lately I've gone back to reading Kaplan.
(34d) I read some Kaplan last night.
?(34e) I read a Kaplan last night. (Where 'Kaplan' refers to Kaplan's writings)
What these examples show is that the kinds of grammatical constructions in which a nominal can 
participate depend upon whether or not the nominal has undergone metonymic shifting. Metonymy 
can involve semantic shifts, changes in the grammatical features of the metonymic expression and  
concomitant changes in the kinds of constructions within which the metonymic expression can be 
felicitously embedded. Note though, that like the case of number agreement, countability seems to  
partly  depend  upon  the  relevant  denotation  and  not  just  upon  the  syntactic  properties  of  the 
88 One might  suspect  that  Kaplan is  getting  “ground” in this case.  Grinding is  a  process  whereby mass  uses  are  
generated for nouns with count uses.  The ground use of the noun comes to denote the stuff that made up the count  
use of the noun.  For example, if Fluffy the dog accidentally found himself in the midst of an explosion we might  
describe the results as follows.
(xxvii)There is Fluffy everywhere!
 One natural thought is that grinding is part of the explanation for what is happening in sentences like (34). Still, it  
isn't clear how that natural thought should be developed. Kaplan doesn't seem to get ground in the standard way:  
we aren't referring to the 'stuff' that makes up Kaplan.  As a result, if grinding is involved there first has to be a shift 
from Kaplan the individual to a different unground entity. That intermediate entity would then be ground to  
generate the denotation: Kaplan's written work. But what would this intermediate entity be? Furthermore, why add  
the intermediate step in in the first place? We can do equally well by having a single shift: one that goes directly from 
Kaplan  the  individual  to  Kaplan's  written  work.  This  does  involve  a  shift  from denoting  a  canonically  count 
denotation to a canonically mass denotation, but that doesn't mean that grinding must be involved.
103
expression.
I now want to move on to argue that these grammatical shifts are productive. One might  
suspect that 'cow' or 'Kaplan' are just lexically ambiguous. On such a view there are two different  
lexical entries for each of 'Kaplan', 'France' and 'cow.' Each lexical entry has different denotations  
and distinct grammatical properties. What I'm calling metonymy, on such an account, is merely a  
standard kind of ambiguity. 
The  key  problem  with  the  ambiguity  proposal  is  that,  as  I  claim  above,  the  shifts  in  
grammatical properties are not tied to particular lexical items. The grammatical shifts occur for any  
example of Author/Book, Animal/Food, or Location/Team metonymy, regardless of which lexical  
items are undergoing shifting. Any country, state, county or city name that denotes a location with a  
sports team is immediately available to be used in metonymic shifting. Furthermore, country names 
can refer to many different sports teams. In the context of different sports a country name could  
potentially  denote a wide variety of  different teams:  soccer,  baseball,  fencing,  bobsled,  ballroom 
dancing,  chess,  etc.  In  order  to  build  all  this  into  the  lexicon  we  would  need  a  great  deal  of 
ambiguity. By positing productive rules for different kinds of metonymy, however, we can avoid a  
great deal of needless lexical ambiguity.
Even more importantly, it is not only country names that can undergo metonymic shifting. 
Complex expressions which denote the country can also undergo metonymic shifting. The following 
examples show metonymic shifting can apply to complex expressions in a variety of cases.
(35) The monarchy north of the English channel are going to be a force to be 
reckoned with in this tournament.
 (36) My hometown demonstrated excellent sportsmanship by shaking hands after the 
game.
(37) The new girl jumped over a pit!
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(38) Lately, I've been reading a lot of that philosopher who wrote 'Demonstratives.'
Each of these shifts is allowed because the complex expression's lexical denotation89 bears the 
right relation to the metonymic denotation. The grammatical properties of  complex nominals can 
shift if the complex nominal undergoes metonymic shifting. Since we need to explain how complex 
expressions can shift, it would be that much more helpful to be able to explain shifting in terms of  
general  rules  that  govern kinds  of  metonymic shifts  rather  than trying  to  build ambiguity  into 
virtually every expression.90 I have argued that some cases of metonymy involve grammatical as well 
as denotational shifts and that these shifts can apply to an open class of expressions: any expression  
that has a lexical denotation suitable for a particular kind of metonymy.
Furthermore, the productivity of these shifts—the fact that they are licensed by denotations 
rather than expressions—is important because it suggest that we need to be looking to the semantics  
for an explanation of agreement and countability in at least some of these cases.  
So far  I  have argued that:  (1) metonymy is constrained and conventional and, (2) some 
denotational shifts are accompanied by grammatical shifts. We can now turn to investigate several  
alternatives to my semantic approach and see how the alternatives cannot handle (1) and (2) as well  
as my approach.
2.3.3. The Naive Pragmatic Approach
What would a simple pragmatic account of metonymy look like? Here's a rough sketch: A 
person utters (10a) in a context in which Belinda is playing video games.
89 As I noted when I introduced my jargon, I'm using 'lexical denotation' in a broad sense to include the semantic  
value of a complex expression made by composing the lexical denotations of simpler expressions.
90 This doesn't fully rule out the possibility that metonymy is due to a kind of lexical ambiguity. I actually think that  
one of the most plausible alternatives to my approach is one that takes the lexicon to be fairly dynamic—to admit of  
many rapid modifications in virtue of metasemantic rules that modify the lexicon. In fact, I defend such an account 
of quotation in Chapter 1 above. Furthermore, the way I interpret Nunberg and Zaenen's appeals to lexical 'licenses'  




Everyone present is aware that Belinda herself did not jump. Furthermore, everyone present is aware  
that having an avatar jump is a central part of the video game. If (10a) is being used to express the 
truth-conditions of the sentence, the utterer would be saying something patently false. By Grice's  
maxim of quality we can assume that the speaker is trying to make an informative claim, and given 
our knowledge of the situation we can infer that she is likely intending to communicate something  
about Belinda's avatar rather than Belinda herself. According to the view under consideration, every  
instance of metonymy results from a similar communicative process. 
This  naïve  account  is  problematic.  It  fails  to  make  room  for  the  conventionality  of  
metonymy or the grammatical shifts that accompany metonymy. As I have argued in section 2.3.1., 
metonymy is conventional. The naïve pragmatic account has no explanation for why sentences like 
(16a) are unacceptable, while sentences like (16b) are acceptable.
(16a) I love reading Kaplan. I've been reading lots of him lately.
(16b) I've been reading lots of Ackrill lately.
Presumably the naïve account explains (16a) by saying that it is obvious that the speaker has not 
been reading Kaplan the person. The participants in the conversation are aware that Kaplan's written 
work is  salient and hence  understand that  the  speaker intends to make a  claim about  Kaplan's  
written work rather than his person. The problem, for the naïve account,  is  that the very same 
reasoning  could  apply  in  the  Ackrill  case.  Assume  that  Ackrill's  translations  are  salient  in  the 
utterance situation. In such a situation if a speaker utters (16b) the interlocutors know that she isn't 
speaking of eating Ackrill as a person. Furthermore, Ackrill's translations are salient. Yet for some 
reason, metonymy is disallowed. The lesson here is that a naïve pragmatic approach cannot explain 
the conventional constraints on patterns of metonymy.
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 The  naïve  pragmatic  approach  also  has  no  explanation  for  the  changes  in  grammatical 
properties that sometimes accompany metonymy. Intuitions of grammaticality are almost universally 
taken to be independent of pragmatic influences, and as a result if metonymy involves grammatical  
effects it is likely not pragmatic. As an illustration of this point, note that though the naïve pragmatic  
account can help us understand grammatically deviant sentences, it cannot remove the intuition of  
deviance. For example, imagine that Simone wants to know whether Trevor prefers the red cat or the 
purple cat, if Trevor utters.
?(39) I prefers the red cat.
We can deduce that Trevor intends to communicate that he prefers the red cat. Even though we can  
understand  and  accept  the  content  that  Trevor  intended  to  communicate  (39)  remains 
grammatically deviant. This is in contrast to the case of metonymy. In cases of metonymy we accept 
(23a) and (9a) with no intuition of grammatical deviance.
(23a) The sweet potato fries is getting antsy
(9a) I've been reading lots of Kaplan lately.
Even if the naïve pragmatic account could explain why putatively deviant sentences like (23a) and 
(9a) get assigned metonymic truth-conditions, it has no explanation for why they are not judged to 
be grammatically deviant. 
Furthermore, whether or not you can use semantic agreement in a particular situation is 
clearly  conventional.  The  British  use  verbs  that  agree  semantically  with  'committee',  while 
Americans  do not.  This  dialectical  difference  shows  that  whether  or  not  semantic  agreement  is  
available for certain constructions must itself  be marked within the grammar.  Even if  semantic  
agreement could be explained as the result of a pragmatic process like implicature there would be no  
explanation  for  the  difference  between British  and American  uses  of  'France'  with  sports  team 
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metonymy.
The naïve pragmatic approach can neither explain constraints on metonymy, nor explain the  
grammatical shifts that accompany metonymy. And for good reason. As I have argued, metonymy is  
constrained, conventional and relevant to agreement. There have to be some conventional rules that  
govern metonymy, contra the naïve pragmatist. The question that we must address is: where ought 
we to locate those rules. My answer is that we ought to locate them in the semantic rule system—  
inserted into semantic derivations via optional interpretation rules. The views I examine below all  
locate metonymic shifting rules  elsewhere.  The rest of this  paper, however, will  be dedicated to 
showing that my semantic approach is better than any of the alternative possible locations for the  
metonymic rules. 
2.3.4. The Sophisticated Pragmatic Approach
While the naïve pragmatic approach failed to provide an adequate explanation of constraints 
on metonymy perhaps a more sophisticated pragmatic approach could work. Just because metonymy 
involves conventional patterns, it doesn't follow that metonymy cannot be pragmatic.91 Recall the 
views of Recanati and Sag whereby metonymic shifting functions are added to truth-conditions by  
pragmatic processes. On such views, metonymic shifting functions are defined outside the semantic  
system by virtue of the particular situation of utterance. While I think that Sag's explicit view would  
struggle to explain the constraints on metonymy, as it does rely on contextual salience to determine 
when shifting occurs, perhaps a neoSagian could accept that  there are set conventions for when 
metonymy can occur, but claim that those are a form of pragmatic convention.
91 One  traditional  way  of  incorporating  conventional  content  into  pragmatics  is  through  Grice's  conventional 
implicatures: implicatures that depend upon the conventional  content of particular lexical items. In the case of  
metonymy, however, conventional implicature won't be of much help. Grice's conventional implicatures are not 
detachable in that they arise not simply due to the content being expressed but also upon the presence of particular 
expressions. As I have argued above, in the case of metonymy, shifting seems licensed by the lexical denotation and  
not by the presence of a particular expression. In other words metonymic shifts are detachable, and hence are not  
Gricean conventional implicatures.
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Some theorists might balk at the very idea of pragmatic conventions. However it does seem 
plausible  that  there  are  some conventions about  how we communicate  that  are  not  part  of  the 
semantic system itself.92 Let us grant this possibility to the sophisticated pragmatic account for the 
sake of argument. 
Beyond such concerns, however, there is still a key difference between my semantic account 
and a sophisticated pragmatic account. In a sense the two accounts might appear to be similar. Both  
posit  encoded  shifting  functions.  I  posit  an  optional  semantic  interpretation  rule  to  insert  
representations of the functions into derivations. The sophisticated pragmatic theorist calls  them 
'pragmatic conventions' and claims that  they are inserted by a pragmatic process. It  might even 
appear that aside from the words 'pragmatic' and 'optional semantic' the two views are identical.  
This appearance is misleading, however. The sophisticated pragmatist is arguing for an account of  
how truth-conditions are associated with utterance of sentences. Such an account, on my view, will  
necessarily involve speculating about the psycholinguistics of communication. Furthermore even if  
the  sophisticated  pragmatist  account  has  a  ready  explanation  for  how  speakers  can  understand 
metonymic utterances,  she has  no explanation for other linguistic  tasks  that  involve metonymic  
shifts: most importantly the sophisticated pragmatic account doesn't clearly address how speakers  
produce utterances that involve metonymic shifts.
My semantic account, on the other hand, is not intended to fully explain any particular kind 
of communicative act. My account is semantic in that I am trying to describe how metonymy fits  
into a series of formal rules for associating logical forms with truth-conditions. I say nothing about  
how the theory gets mobilized in order to perform particular tasks. As I claimed in section 2.1.4.,  
figuring out  the details  of  mobilization is  a psycholinguistic  task,  ill-suited to purely theoretical  
92 Below in Chapter 3 I discuss some examples of possible pragmatic conventions.
109
argumentation. For that reason I take it that there are substantive differences between my approach  
and the pragmatic approach: they are fundamentally about different things. My approach is more  
flexible in that it can be mobilized in different ways for different linguistic tasks, and unlike the  
pragmatic account it requires no psycholinguistic speculation.
2.3.5. The Metasemantic Approach
 We could take metonymy to be guided by a metasemantic convention: a convention for 
creating new lexical items. While semantics includes the study of what semantic values are associated  
with constituents of logical  form, metasemantics, following (Kaplan 1989b) is the study of  how 
lexical items get associated with semantic values. A metasemantic account of metonymy is one that  
claims that metonymy arises from metasemantic rules (or conventions) that govern modifications to 
the lexicon. (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992) argues that metonymy is the result of applying what they 
call 'lexical licenses'—conventions for producing new lexical items on the fly. “What licenses do, 
rather, is to index specific types of correspondences... as available for exploitation to produce new  
lexical  items.”  (Nunberg  and Zaenen 1992) On their  view,  for  instance,  there  is  a  license  that 
indexes the Meal/Orderer correspondence which can be exploited to create a new lexical item that  
has the orthography and phonology of the meal-denoting expression but that denotes the orderer.  
(Nunberg 1995). In the first paper in this dissertation I argue for a similar approach to quotation. 
Still, I am less convinced that metasemantic conventions can apply effectively in cases of metonymy. 
There are many situations in which we might want to create lexical items on the fly. Quotation  
might  be  one  possible  example.  We  can,  for  example,  introduce  quote  names  for  nonsense 
expressions.
(40)Juliette screamed, “Blllrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrgggggggggggggggggggggggg”
In cases of quotation we form a new expression on the basis of a displayed expression. In the case of 
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metonymy, however, we are assigning a metonymic denotation on the basis of a previous denotation. 
Metonymic shifts are made available by whether the previous denotation is of the right kind to  
support a shift.
(41a) Belinda jumped over the pit with style.
(41b) The girl with the brown hair that I told you about the other day jumped over 
the pit with style.
The metonymic shift is just as available in the case of (41b) as it is in the case of (41a). Many 
different expressions  that  denote  Belinda  can  undergo  metonymic  shifting.  According  to  the 
metasemantic account in using (41b) we create a new lexical item: the expression “the girl with the 
brown hair that I told you about the other day” which denotes Belinda's avatar. According to a 
semantic account, at some stage of the derivation after the semantic values of the constituents of 'the  
girl...”  have been composed,  the resulting denotation is  shifted to Belinda's  avatar.  How do we 
choose between these views?
I want to highlight two ways in which the semantic account is preferable to the metasemantic 
account.  Firstly,  the  semantic  account  involves  less  computational  complexity.  Secondly,  the 
semantic account allows us to justify inferences that are lost on the metasemantic account.
The metasemantic account requires that we have already assigned a semantic value to the 
complex expression prior to determining whether it is a candidate for metonymic shifting. Note that  
the  expression  'the  girl  with the  brown hair  that  I  told you about  the  other  day'  contains  the  
indexical 'I'. So in order to verify that the expression satisfies the condition required for applying a  
lexical license we need to have assigned it a value relative to a formal context. If the license does  
apply we would then have to introduce a new lexical item and begin a new semantic derivation. My 
semantic account, however, only requires that a metonymic derivation has one additional step: the 
application of an optional rule. The metasemantic account introduces added complexity that we can 
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do without.
 Secondly, on the metasemantic account we would lose the semantic and syntactic structure  
of the complex expression when the new lexical item is created. We can test whether or not the 
structure is really there by looking at inferences that depend upon it.
(42a) I enjoy reading the philosopher who both works at UCLA and wrote 
'Demonstratives.'
(42b) I enjoy reading the philosopher who both wrote 'Demonstratives' and works at 
UCLA.
It seems to me that (42b) is entailed by (42a). Such an entailment cannot be accommodated by the 
lexical license approach, which would treat the apparent definite descriptions in (42a) and (42b) as 
distinct  lexical  atoms.  Though “the philosopher who both wrote 'Demonstratives'  and works at  
UCLA” and “the philosopher who both works at UCLA and wrote 'Demonstratives' ” appear to 
have structure that makes them equivalent, on the metasemantic approach, that structure is  lost  
when we make them into novel atomic lexical items. O semantic account could presumably show 
the entailment as follows (letting 'Work()' be a term denoting a metonymic shifting function that  
takes an author to their work):
The unsimplified truth-condition derived for (42a) is (43a):
(43a) λw.Last night I read work((ιx.Philosopher(x) & UCLA(x) & WroteDem(x)) in 
w
Furthermore, we know that the following is true:
(43b) (ιx.Philosopher(x) & UCLA(x) & WroteDem(x)) ↔ (ιx.Philosopher(x) & 
WroteDem(x) & UCLA(x))
By substitution of co-referential terms we can derive (43c) from (43a).
(43c) λw.Last night I read work((ιx.Philosopher(x) & WroteDem(x) & UCLA(x)) in 
w
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These kinds of inferences require that we preserve the inner structure of the complex expression 
during semantic interpretation.  It is  only after we have simplified the complex term, late in the 
derivation, that the structure is lost. These inferences, however, only turn out to be valid on the  
semantic approach. This provides us with some evidence that the semantic structure of the lexical  
denotation plays an important role in the derivation of truth-conditions and hence that we should 
prefer the semantic approach to the metasemantic.
2.3.6. Phonologically Null Optional Syntactic Structure
The final approach to metonymy that I want to discuss is also the one that is most similar to 
my own view. Recall the way that theorists like Luisa Marti and Josef Stern sought to make use of  
syntactic optionality. They claim that certain phenomena (metaphorical meanings for Stern, implicit 
locations for Marti) can be explained by positing phonologically null—that is invisible and soundless
—constituents in logical  forms. Such an approach could be extended to account for metonymy. 
According to this approach, English is even more like Metonenglish than I have suggested.  English 
actually contains operators like 'av' and 'ord', and those operators are part of the normal lexicon.  
These expressions are, however, aphonic. There is an interpretation of sentence (44a) that assigns it 
the syntactic structure (44b) though there is no phonological or orthographic realization of the 'av' 
constituent. The non-metonymic sentence has a syntactic structure like (44c).
(44a) Belinda jumped.
(44b) [[[av]dp [Belinda]np ]np[jumped]vp]s
(44c) [[Belinda]np [jumped]vp]s
Such an approach makes use of syntactic optionality. It is simply part of the syntactic rules for our  
language that  we can optionally  insert phonologically null  metonymic syntactic operators into a  
derivation.
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When comparing my approach to the metasemantic approach the key issue was to determine 
whether  or  not  complex  metonymic  expressions  seemed  to  have  semantic  structure.  When 
comparing my approach to the phonologically null variable approach the key question is whether or  
not we have reason to believe that metonymy is tied to existing syntactic structure or whether it  
introduces  sui  generis  semantic  content.  The  debate  here  is  tricky.  As  these  putative  syntactic 
operators are not present in the phonology, we cannot observe them directly and instead we must 
infer their presence indirectly.93
The burden, I believe, is on the proponent of phonologically null syntactic structure to show 
that such structures exist. There are initial reasons to be skeptical. For instance, we might think that 
the metonymy operators could be determiners like 'the', 'a', or 'every'. But there is reason to believe  
metonymy operators are not determiners. In English we normally cannot stack determiners—we 
cannot have multiple determiners immediately before a nominal.94
*(45a) Some my friends are mean. 
(45b) I read some Kaplan last night.
93 This approach is similar (and maybe even identical) to an ellipsis account, according to which there is a normal  
expression in sentences like (xxviii) which is then deleted from the phonology by a process of ellipsis.
(xxviii) Belinda's avatar jumped.
(xxix) Belinda jumped.
Such an account, though, would have to explain why ellipsis is allowed in some cases, but not in others, i.e. it would 
need to have an explanation for the constraints on metonymy.
94 There are exceptions, especially with 'the'.  Still the point here is that these are the kinds of structural relations that  
need to be taken seriously when positing syntactic structure.  One might also think that the 'determiner' proposal is 
so implausible that it ought not be considered at all.  I think it's interesting for two main reasons.  Firstly, the 
phonologically null  syntactic structure,  in the case of metonymy, would seem to be heading the entire  phrase.  
Compare possessive phrases:
(xxx) Belinda's avatar jumped.
In such sentences the head seems to be 'avatar' while “Belinda's” is telling us something about which avatar is at  
issue. Similarly, we might think that in cases of metonymy the shifting function is the head of the sentence.  The  
determiner would then be a natural place for it to go.
A second reason for  discussing this  determiner  proposal,  is  that  aside from its  intrinsic  plausibility,  it  
provides a particularly graphic demonstration of how a proposal about phonologically null syntactic structure has 
syntactic consequences. When one makes a proposal about syntactic structure, that proposal must be in line with 
what we know about syntax.  Being phonologically null does not change the syntactic interactions a constituent is 
capable of. The determiner proposal lets us see this point because we immediately see how it is inconsistent with a  
plausible but non-obvious claim about syntax: that we do not generally stack determiners.
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(45c) I read some av Kaplan last night.
If  metonymy  operators  were  determiners,  logical  forms  of  sentences  like  (45b)  would  require 
stacking  determiners  which is  disallowed in  English.  Perhaps,  then,  the  shifting  function  has  a  
different syntactic structure. The problem is that there are a wide variety of different proposals, each 
of which will have its own benefits and raise its own puzzles. It is up to a defender of the syntactic  
approach to develop a worked out argument presenting evidence that there is such structure. In the 
absence of a worked-out syntactic alternative, I see no reason to doubt the semantic approach.
One putative reason we might doubt my semantic approach pertains to the grammatical 
shifts that I described in section 2.3.2. But as I argued there, the kind of agreement that was relevant  
was semantic agreement.  My argument doesn't show that there is no underlying syntactic operator, 
but it does show agreement is partially determined by the denotations. My view will require that at  
least some aspects of agreement and countability turn on properties of denotations. I recognize that 
one who thinks that all aspects of agreement and countability are determined prior to the assignment 
of truth-conditions to logical form might take this to be evidence that in some cases there is hidden 
syntactic structure that underwrites the differences in grammatical properties, but such an account 
will have a general problem with accounting for the evidence for semantic agreement.
Even in that  worst-case-scenario, however, we must remember that shifts in grammatical  
properties do not occur in all cases of metonymy. In Player/Avatar metonymy, even if Belinda and  
Cynthia are controlling a single avatar together we still use verbs inflected for the plural.
(46) Belinda and Cynthia are jumping!
Given that there is no shift in agreement in such cases, they provide no extra reason to suppose that 
there is hidden syntactic structure. What's needed is an account of metonymy that has the flexibility  
to explain cases of grammatical shifts when they occur, but that doesn't over-generate and posit 
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grammatical shifts in every possible case. The syntactic account seems less flexible then the semantic  
account: if there is additional syntactic structure in every case of metonymy we would expect there to 
be syntactic effects in every case of metonymy. On the other hand, the semantic account seems more 
flexible. Part of the reason for the literature on count and mass terms, for instance, is that at times  
the syntactic properties of countability seem to map onto properties of denotations and at times the 
two seem to come apart.  A semantic account of  metonymy can have the  flexibility  to generate  
grammatical shifts in some cases but not in others.
2.4. Conclusion
I turned my attention to metonymy because metonymy seemed like a plausible candidate for 
explanation in terms of substantive optionality. Metonymy is arguably a sui generis semantic shift—
a shift that isn't based on syntax. In the first part of this paper I aimed to show that we can accept  
substantive optionality in semantic theory and that at least one reason for restricting it was based on  
the  unreasonable  desire  to  have  a  semantic  theory  that  immediately  gives  rise  to  an  intuition-
generating procedure. Once we have rejected that motivation we can see that optionality is to be 
expected and presents no challenges to systematicity. In the second section I sketched an account of  
metonymy that relied on substantive optionality. In this final section I discussed two interesting 
features  of  metonymy:  conventional  constraints  and grammatical  shifts.  I  then  compared  my 
semantic account to a naïve pragmatic account, a sophisticated pragmatic account, a metasemantic 
account, and an account that posits optional phonologically null syntactic structure. I have tried to  
make clear what substantive issues distinguish these different approaches to metonymy and to argue  
that in the end, my semantic approach, embracing substantive optionality, is out best option.
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Chapter 3 - Underspecification, Specification, Overspecification
A great deal of recent discussion in philosophy of language has concerned the frequency of 
context-sensitivity. Some theorists, the minimalists, argue that the only a small number of indexicals 
and demonstratives are context-sensitive.1 Others, radical contextualists, argue that virtually every 
lexical item is context-sensitive.2 Still others, moderate contextualists, take a position in the middle.3 
This emphasis on the frequency of context-sensitivity has sometimes occluded issues about what 
context-sensitivity means for accounts of lexical knowledge. The lexical knowledge associated with a 
lexical item is the knowledge that competent speakers have about that lexical item's meaning in  
virtue of being a competent speaker of the language.4 When a theorist accepts that a lexical item is 
context-sensitive, she accepts that a language user's lexical knowledge does not suffice to specify the  
lexical  item's  denotation in many utterance  situations.   If  lexical  knowledge  does  not  suffice  to 
specify a denotation in an utterance situation then non-linguistic beliefs (NLBs) and topic-neutral  
reasoning abilities (TNRAs) will play an essential role in specifying the lexical item's denotation in  
that utterance situation.
I want to highlight an under-appreciated distinction between two distinct ways in which 
lexical knowledge can work with both NLBs and TNRAs to specify a denotation in an utterance  
situation. This distinction is subtle and I will say much more to formulate it precisely below.  For  
now I will make do with a brief gloss. According to the first way, what I call  underspecification, a 
language user has limited, impoverished or schematic lexical knowledge. NLBs and TNRAs serve to 
supplement  the  impoverished  lexical  knowledge—filling  in  gaps  and thickening  the  thin  lexical  
1    (Cappelen and Lepore 2004) and (Borg 2007) are notable examples.
2    For examples see (Recanati 2004, 2010), (Sperber and Wilson 1986), (Carston 2002) and the papers in (Travis 
      2008).
3 (Stanley 2007) contains papers that defend this position. 
4 Language users  have syntactic lexical  knowledge and phonological  lexical  knowledge as  well  as semantic lexical  
knowledge. For this paper, however, I will be restricting my attention to semantic lexical knowledge.  For this reason 
I will generally write 'lexical knowledge' though I only intend to denote semantic lexical knowledge.
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knowledge. According to the second way, what I call  overspecification, a language user has rich, 
detailed  lexical  knowledge.  NLBs  and  TNRAs  serve  to  select  which  pieces  of  that  rich  lexical 
knowledge are relevant in a particular utterance situation. 
Theorists who accept context-sensitivity for a lexical item l, that is, theorists who deny that 
the lexical knowledge associated with l specifies a denotation in many utterance situations, have for 
the most part adopted underspecification and ignored overspecification.5 My goal in this paper is 
twofold.  First,  I  want  to  clearly  formulate  the  distinction  between  underspecification  and 
overspecification. Second, I argue that if commonly used verbs are context-sensitive then we should  
adopt overspecification for them.
In 3.1.1. I explain lexical knowledge, NLBs and TNRAs in more detail. In 3.1.2. I explicate  
and formulate underspecification and overspecification. In 3.1.3. I describe a toy model of lexical  
meaning to help concretize the more abstract discussion in 3.1.2.. In 3.1.4. I look at three accounts  
of underspecification that have been prominent in the literature.  In 3.2.1. I say more about the 
commonly  used  verbs  that  feature  in  my  argument.  In  3.2.2.  I  present  my  argument  for 
overspecification in schematic form. In 3.2.3.-3.2.5. I defend the premises of the argument.
3.1. Specification, Underspecification, Overspecification
3.1.1. Lexical knowledge, NLBs and TNRAs
According to standard approaches to linguistics, all competent language users have a store of 
linguistic knowledge that contributes to explaining their linguistic abilities. Some of this linguistic 
knowledge  is  knowledge  of  the  syntactic  rules  that  generate  phrase  structures.  This  syntactic  
knowledge constitutes a language user's syntactic competence. Some of the linguistic knowledge is  
knowledge  about  what  lexical  items—words  and  morphemes—mean.  Some  of  the  linguistic 
5 One notable exception is (Recanati 2004) which adopts a hybrid view with elements of underspecification and 
overspecification.
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knowledge is knowledge of how we combine the denotations of simpler expressions to form the  
denotations of  complex expressions.6 These latter  two kinds of  knowledge constitute  a language 
user's semantic competence. The first part of semantic competence—the knowledge of what lexical  
items mean—can also be called 'lexical knowledge'. The second part of semantic competence—the 
knowledge of how to combine denotations—can be called 'compositional knowledge'.7
For  the  last  35  years,  much  work  in  semantics  has  centered  around  what  is  called 
'compositional  semantics.'  Compositional  semantics  is  the  study  of  compositional  knowledge. 
Semanticists  have  developed  theories  that  describe  how  different  kinds  of  denotations  can  be 
combined  to  form  complex  denotations  for  complex  phrases.  If  compositional  knowledge  is 
constituted by knowledge of rules for combining denotations then to use compositional knowledge 
one  must  know the  denotations  associated with  the  relevant  lexical  items.  One  doctrine  which 
follows naturally from this account of compositional knowledge is the doctrine that a language user's 
lexical knowledge is knowledge of rules for associating lexical items with denotations. Putting aside  
indexicals, this doctrine holds that lexical knowledge suffices to specify a lexical item's denotation  
independently of the utterance situation.8 Let us call this doctrine specification since it requires that 
any language user who is competent with a (non-indexical) lexical item has knowledge of the lexical 
6 Different approaches to semantics will characterize this “combination” in different ways. A theorist who takes the 
denotations of sentences to be Russellian propositions would say that we combine individuals and properties to form 
propositions. A theorist who adopts a standard formal semantic theory might take names to denote individuals and  
predicates to denote functions from individuals to truth-values. According to such a view we combine the individual  
and the function using function application. I'm not presupposing any particular account of sentential denotations 
so I won't be explicitly discussing these issues.
7 Linguistic knowledge is  tacit,  not explicit.  Language  users  do not have the  ability  to  describe their  knowledge 
systematically, though they behave in ways that are explained by positing the linguistic knowledge. As linguists well  
know, having tacit syntactic knowledge does not grant one the ability to systematically articulate a syntactic theory 
which describes that knowledge. Throughout this paper I will be using 'knowledge' to denote this tacit knowledge 
commonly invoked in linguistics, rather than the propositional knowledge more commonly discussed in philosophy. 
8 Indexicals, lexical items such as 'I', 'here' and 'now', present a counter-example to this generalization. Our lexical  
knowledge does not suffice to fix an indexical's denotation independently of every utterance situation. Indexicals  
only have a denotation relative to a context determined by the utterance situation. I take indexicals to be an example  
of a case where what I will call 'underspecification' is relatively successful. Specificationists are generally happy with  
indexicals so long as the number of indexicals is fairly limited. I discuss indexicals in more detail in the following 
section after introducing underspecification and overspecification. 
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item's context invariant denotation. We can formulate specification as follows:
(Specification for a Lexical Item l): The lexical knowledge competent speakers 
associate with l specifies l 's denotation independently of utterance situations.9 
A  growing  number  of  theorists  reject  specification.10 These  theorists  hold  that  lexical 
knowledge does not suffice to specify a context-invariant denotation for a lexical item. Specifying a  
denotation in an utterance situation requires cognitive states and abilities that go beyond the lexical  
knowledge  that  all  competent  speakers  have  qua  competent  speaker.  We can  call  this  doctrine 
underdetermination. 
(Underdetermination for a Lexical Item l): The lexical knowledge competent speakers 
associate with l does not specify l's denotation independently of most utterance 
situations.11 12
Underdetermination raises interesting theoretical issues. For theorists who accept specification, there 
is no big mystery about what lexical knowledge consists in. Lexical knowledge, for specificationists, is  
knowledge  of  rules  that  associate  lexical  items  with  denotations.  For  a  theorist  who  rejects  
specification characterizing lexical  knowledge is  trickier. Furthermore, in rejecting specification a  
theorist  is  accepting  that  something beyond lexical  knowledge  is  needed to  specify  denotations. 
9 Specification is formulated as a claim that is defined for individual lexical items. We can derivatively talk about  
specification for a class of lexical items such as commonly used verbs. Specification for a class of lexical items is true  
if for any lexical item  l in that class, specification is true for  l. We can also derivatively talk about specification 
simpliciter.  Specification  is  true  if  for  most  lexical  items  l,  specification  for  l is  true.  I  will  formulate 
underdetermination, underspecification and overspecification primarily in terms of a particular lexical  item, but  
these claims will have derivative versions parallel to the derivative versions of specification.
10 Some of the theorists who reject specification include Charles Ruhl, Dan Sperber,  Deirdre Wilson, Kent Bach,  
Francois Recanati, Robyn Carston, Stephen Neale, Peter Ludlow, and Agustin Rayo. In this paper I will be looking  
in particular at Ruhl, Bach, Ludlow and Rayo.
11 'Underdetermination' is used in the literature to denote two distinct claims (a) the claim that the denotation of an  
expression is underdetermined by the lexical knowledge associated with that expression (b) the claim that the truth-
conditions of a sentence in an utterance situation are underdetermined by the semantic content assigned to that  
sentence. While much of the discussion in the literature pertains to (b) I am here exclusively concerned with (a).
12 'Overdetermination' has occasionally been used to denote the claim that a lexical item is ambiguous, i.e. in (Recanati 
2004),  though  I  find  it  is  misleading  in  that  usage.  A  paradigm  case  of  overdetermination,  such  as  causal 
overdetermination, is a case where we have a single effect and multiple potential causes which would each suffice to 
cause the effect. By analogy we might expect overdetermination' to require multiple collections of lexical knowledge,  
any of which would suffice to determine that denotation. Part of my reason for using 'overspecification' is to avoid  
this connotation.
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NLBs and TNRAs are taken to constitute the “something beyond” that contributes to specifying  
denotations. How does the lexical knowledge interact with these other cognitive states and abilities 
in specifying denotations? In general underdeterminists have paid much more attention to describing 
the ways in which NLBs and TNRAs contribute to specifying denotations, and less attention to 
describing what lexical knowledge consists in. 
One might wonder what exactly specifying a denotation amounts to. Given that specifying a 
denotation  involves  the  interaction  of  lexical  knowledge  and  other  cognitive  states,  I  will  be 
assuming that specifying is a cognitive process. I leave open whether specifying is a process that  
occurs  within  the  producers  of  utterances,  the  interpreters  of  utterances,  both  producers  and 
interpreters, or even idealized interlocutors. There are many different ways one might characterize  
the respective  contributions  of  producers  and interpreters  in  communicative  exchanges,  and my 
discussion is meant to apply to theorists who have different approaches to communication. For this  
reason I am using 'specifying' in a theoretically  neutral  way.  My discussion should, with minor 
modifications, apply to whatever account of communication a theorist ends up adopting, regardless  
of who (or what) does the specifying.
Characterizing lexical knowledge (and contrasting it with NLBs) is a particular challenge for  
any project concerned with the lexicon. There are many different conceptions of lexical meaning in 
the  literature,  and  different  conceptions  of  lexical  meaning  bring  with  them  correspondingly  
different conceptions of lexical knowledge. Since I mean my discussion to apply to theorists who 
have a wide variety of different conceptions of lexical meaning, I cannot provide a single determinate  
account  of  what  lexical  knowledge  consists  in.  Still  everyone  will  accept  that  we  have  some 
specialized lexical knowledge. After all, language is difficult to learn. Even young children, who have  
brains optimized for language learning, still require years to develop a lexicon. For adults, learning  
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vocabulary can be a difficult, time-consuming task. If speaking a language required  no specialized 
lexical knowledge we wouldn't need to learn very much about lexical meaning when learning a new 
language. Different theorists differ on what the knowledge will consist in: knowledge of necessary  
and sufficient conditions for applications, knowledge of sets of conditions, knowledge of prototypes,  
knowledge of exemplars, knowledge of theories, and so on. Still, everyone recognizes that we must  
have some specialized lexical knowledge.
On some views lexical knowledge is distinguished from NLBs in terms of content. For the 
specificationist, lexical knowledge consists in knowledge of rules for assigning denotations to lexical 
items. NLBs cannot have that kind of content else they would be linguistic beliefs. On other views, 
lexical  knowledge does not have its  own kind of  content.  Agustin Rayo's  view, which I  discuss  
below, is one such view that takes lexical knowledge to consist in a set of beliefs which needn't have a  
distinct  kind  of  content  from  NLBs.  One  person's  NLB  might  be  another  person's  lexical 
knowledge. On such accounts, lexical knowledge is distinguished from NLBs by the role it plays in 
the  specifying  denotations.  Roughly,  lexical  knowledge  will  be  the  knowledge  necessary  for 
competent use of a term. Though precisifying exactly what lexical knowledge amounts to would 
require  an  account  of  lexical  meaning,  everyone  recognizes  that  there  must  be  some  class  of  
privileged knowledge, though they disagree on how it is to be characterized.
TNRAs are easier to characterize. They are reasoning abilities that can apply across different 
cognitive domains. For instance, there are certain reasoning patterns that will be useful in solving-
crimes, choosing fast-food restaurants or deciding what to watch on television. TNRAs are to be  
distinguished  from topic-specific  inference  rules.  Syntactic  theories,  for  instance,  posit  rules  for  
manipulating syntactic representations. These rules are topic-specific in that they are only used when 
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processing syntactic structures.13
3.1.2. Underspecification and Overspecification
There are two distinct ways to be an underdeterminist. In my view theorists have almost 
exclusively opted for one way of being an underdeterminist despite the fact that the other way is  
often more plausible. The widely-adopted way is underspecification while the often-ignored way is 
overspecification.
The primary difference between underspecification and overspecification concerns the role 
that they assign to lexical knowledge in the specification of denotations. Underspecificationists aim 
to minimize the explanatory role of lexical knowledge, while overspecificationists do not. We can  
characterize the differences between specificationists, underspecificationists and overspecificationists 
in terms of their answers to two questions.
(A) Does the lexical knowledge associated with a lexical item fail to specify that 
lexical item's denotation independently of utterance situations?
(B) Can we shift the burden of explaining a language user's ability to use a lexical 
item with a denotation in an utterance situation from lexical knowledge to NLBs and 
TNRAs?
Question (A) is  a  question about the limits  of  what lexical  knowledge can do on its  own.  (B),  
however,  is  a  question  about  how  to  balance  lexical  knowledge  against  NLBs  and  TNRAs  in 
explaining a language user's ability to use a lexical item with a given denotation. The specificationist  
will answer 'no' to (A) and 'no' to (B). She will say that lexical knowledge does suffice to specify a 
denotation independently of utterance situations and as a result we do not need to worry about (B).  
The underspecificationist will answer 'yes' to (A) and 'yes' to (B). The underspecificationist believes  
that we can reduce the explanatory significance of lexical knowledge by increasing the explanatory 
13 I don't mean to imply that there are no topic-specific reasoning abilities relevant to restaurants or crime-solving.  
Regardless of whether or not there are, I am simply saying that TNRAs are those reasoning abilities that can be 
applied in a variety of different domains.
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significance of NLBs and TNRAs.  The overspecificationist can split  the difference between the 
previous views: answering 'yes' to (A) and 'no' to (B). The overspecificationist recognizes that NLBs 
and  TNRAs  are  essential  for  specifying  denotations,  but  she  claims  those  beliefs  and  abilities  
supplement  the  explanatory  role  of  lexical  knowledge  rather  than  replacing  it.   Note  that  the 
overspecificationist does not need to say that NLBs and TNRAs are unimportant or that it is  a  
mistake to assign them an important role.  In denying that we can shift the burden to NLBs and  
TNRAs, the overspecificationist  is  saying that  all  of  NLBs,  TNRAs and lexical  knowledge have 
essential contributions to make to specifying a denotation.  
Agustin Rayo's  metaphorical  description of  specification and underspecification  can help 
characterize the intuitive idea.14 Rayo claims that for the specificationist words are like sextants and 
using a word is like using a sextant in navigation. Not just anyone can pick up a sextant and use it  
successfully for navigation. You need to have substantial specialized knowledge about sextants in 
order to be able to use them. For the underspecificationist, words are like rocks, and using a word is  
like using a rock to weigh down a piece of paper. There is no special knowledge people have about  
rocks that allows them to use rocks to weigh down paper. Instead non-rock beliefs about the world 
suffice to tell an individual how a rock can be used. To extend Rayo's metaphor, we can say that for 
the overspecificationist a word is like a bag containing a bunch of mixed up parts from different  
make-your-own-sextant  kits.  Using  a  word  is  like  constructing  the  appropriate  sextant  for  the 
circumstances and then using it for navigation. Specialized knowledge is important for constructing  
a sextant from parts and for using the sextant. For the overspecificationist specialized knowledge is as  
important as it is for the specificationist. However, specialized knowledge won't suffice to tell you 
how to construct the appropriate sextant for the circumstances. Beliefs about the circumstances and 
14 Rayo doesn't use the terms 'specificationist' or 'overspecificationist' though as I argue below, he is discussing those  
views.
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the use of TNRAs will be essential for getting a working circumstance-appropriate sextant out of the 
bag  of  parts.  The  overspecificationist  recognizes  that  NLBs  and  TNRAs  are  essential  to  the 
specification  of  denotations,  while  still  recognizing  the  essential  role  played  by  specialized  
knowledge.  
This characterization is sketchy and metaphorical and it would be nice to have more precise  
formulations  of  both  underspecification  and  overspecification,  beyond  saying  that  the 
underspecificationist  minimizes  the  explanatory  role  of  lexical  knowledge,  while  the 
overspecificationist  does  not.  To  this  end  it  is  helpful  to  look  at  other  ways  in  which 
underspecificationists describe and defend their position. They say that the meanings known via 
lexical knowledge are 'thin',15 'general',16 'abstract',17  and 'schematic'.18  The reliance on NLBs and 
TNRAs arises because of the impoverished nature of lexical knowledge, with NLBs and TNRAs 
filling out the schema or helping to concretize the abstract meaning. 
What  moves  theorists  to  adopt  underspecification?  The  following  paragraph  recreates  a 
potential motivation.
The  specificationist  thought  that  lexical  knowledge  sufficed  to  specify  denotations.  We  
underdeterminists do not think that is true. Instead we recognize that NLBs and TNRAs also play a  
role  in  specifying denotations.  But  once we have  NLBs and TNRAs contributing to specifying  
denotations, we no longer need the kind of lexical knowledge that the specificationist believed in.  
The burden of explaining the specification of denotations has shifted from lexical knowledge to  
NLBs and TNRAs. The more explanatory work done by NLBs and TNRAs, the less there is for  
lexical knowledge to do.
15 (Ludlow 2006, 2007)




One way to respond to this motivation—and to help distinguish the two views—would be to 
point out a role NLBs and TNRAs might play that does not lessen the explanatory role of lexical  
knowledge. The role I will be focusing on can be drawn out from the way that I extended Rayo's 
metaphor. I claim that we associate too much lexical knowledge with a given lexical item to specify a 
denotation in many utterance situations. Various pieces of that lexical knowledge suffice to specify a  
denotation. But the totality of the lexical knowledge is unable to specify any denotation. On such an  
account the role of NLBs and TNRAs would be to select which pieces of the lexical knowledge  
associated with the lexical item are relevant in a particular utterance situation. Once those pieces of  
lexical knowledge are selected, however, they suffice to specify a denotation.  We can formulate the  
distinction  between underspecification  and  overspecification  in  terms  of  that  particular  role  for 
NLBs and TNRAs. 
(Underspecification for a Lexical Item l) The lexical knowledge associated with l does 
not specify l''s denotation in utterance situations. Many of l''s denotations in 
utterance situations are not specified by pieces of lexical knowledge associated with l.
(Overspecification for a Lexical Item l) The lexical knowledge associated with l does 
not specify l''s denotation in utterance situations. Many of l''s denotations in 
utterance situations are specified by pieces of the lexical knowledge associated with l'.
If some pieces of the lexical knowledge associated with l suffice to specify l's denotation, then the 
lexical knowledge associated with l has to contain at least enough lexical knowledge to explain the 
specifying. These formulations of underspecification and overspecification provide us with one way 
of characterizing why the overspecificationist thinks that we need to continue to have rich lexical 
knowledge while the underspecificationist thinks that impoverished lexical knowledge, no matter 
how it is divided up, will not suffice to specify l's denotation in many utterance situations. For the 
underspecificationist NLBs and TNRAs will provide novel information essential for specifying a 
denotation, information that is not already present in any of the lexical knowledge associated with 
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the lexical item.
This characterization of overspecification is not without its faults. Perhaps there are other 
explanatory roles for NLBs and TNRAs that don't undermine the need for lexical knowledge. If so, 
the above characterization seems as though it would classify an account that gave those roles to NLBs 
and TNRAs as an underspecificationist account, even though in some ways it might appear to be an 
overspecificationist account. 
Pure indexicals such as 'I' are an interesting example of this issue. The above characterization 
would label a standard account of indexicals as a form of underspecification. This is because there is  
no lexical knowledge associated with 'I' that suffices to specify 'I' s denotation in particular utterance  
situations. Still, indexicals like 'I' don't seem to fit with the spirit of underspecification. The lexical  
knowledge associated with 'I'  is  usually  taken to be a  specialized rule,  a rule  that  can specify  a 
denotation relative to a set of contextual parameters. So while pure indexicals like 'I' would satisfy  
the letter of underspecification as I've characterized it, they do not seem to cohere with the spirit of  
underspecification.  Pure  indexicals  have  not  shifted  much  of  the  burden  of  explaining  the  
specification of denotations away from lexical knowledge.19 20
Indexicals show us that the logical space is more complicated than the binary distinction 
suggested by specification and overspecification. I suspect that there is a continuum of positions:  
from those where the lexical knowledge associated with a lexical item can fully specify a denotation,  
to those where specification is almost completely done by NLBs and TNRAs. When faced with a  
continuum of positions there is often something arbitrary in where we draw theoretical lines. Since I  
19 Interestingly, it is this very property of pure indexicals—the fact that substantial lexical knowledge is required for 
their  use—that  has  made  it  easy  for  specificationists  to  accept  indexicals  as  an  exception  to  the  generalized 
specificationist doctrine. The fact that lexical knowledge is important for interpreting indexicals is what makes them 
well-behaved, and hence they are sometimes thought to exist easily in the overall specificationist picture.
20 There  are  other  examples  of  context-sensitivity  that  might  pattern  with  indexicals.  Some  accounts  of  gradable  
adjectives like 'tall' hold that these adjectives are relativized to a contextually provided degree or comparison class. As 
with indexicals it seems like the primary work is still being done by specialized lexical knowledge.
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am  defending  overspecification,  I  have  tried  to  err  on  the  side  of  caution—characterizing  
overspecification  in  strong  terms.  If  I  can  make  a  case  for  this  more  extreme  form  of  
overspecification, then it would clearly also hold for less extreme ways of drawing the theoretical  
lines. Providing a more granulated approach would involve looking at all the different ways that  
NLBs and TNRAs can contribute to specification, a task that would require more space than I have 
here. With that caveat,  we will  see a couple of different ways by which NLBs and TNRAs can 
contribute to specification when we look at actual underspecificationist views below. That way, we  
can get a taste for the ways in which NLBs and TNRAs might be thought to take over the burden of  
specifying denotations.
One might  suspect  that  overspecification is  just  lexical  ambiguity  by  another name.  My 
response  is  that  it  depends  upon how one conceives  of  lexical  ambiguity.  Standardly,  there  are  
thought  to  be  two kinds  of  lexical  ambiguity:  homonymy and polysemy.  Homonymy is  lexical 
ambiguity that occurs when two distinct lexical items share a phonological form or orthographic  
form. Polysemy is lexical ambiguity that occurs when a single lexical item has multiple meanings. In  
practice, polysemy is distinguished from homonymy by whether the multiple meanings associated 
with a given phonological or orthographic form seem similar or connected. If the multiple meanings 
are similar or connected then they are taken to be associated with a single lexical item. If the multiple  
meanings have nothing to do with each other, then they are taken to be associated with different  
lexical items. For example, 'mouth' can be used to denote a body part and it can be used to denote  
the  entrance  to  a  cave.  Body-mouths  and  cave-mouths  have  interesting  similarities.  Both  are 
entrances.  The  use  of  'mouth'  to  denote  cave-mouths  likely  began as  a  metaphorical  use.  This  
metaphorical use was eventually frozen and hence became part of lexical knowledge. As a result, 
'mouth' is polysemous. 'Bank' can be used to denote a financial institution or the side of a river. As  
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these two denotations seem to bear no interesting similarities or connections, 'bank' is homonymous. 
Lexicographers generally recognize this distinction in the construction of dictionaries. Homonymous  
orthographic forms are given distinct entries for each use. Polysemous lexical items are usually only 
given a single entry which then has a list of numbered definitions corresponding to the different 
polysemous meanings.
The lexicographer's method of describing polysemous lexical items is part of a tradition in 
lexical  semantics  of  taking  the  meanings  of  a  polysemous  lexical  item to  be  distinct  and  non-
overlapping.21 Such models of lexical meaning are called 'sense-enumeration lexicons'. Though sense 
enumeration lexicons recognize polysemy, they treat the meanings of polysemous lexical items as  
wholly non-overlapping.22 
Polysemy in a  sense-enumeration lexicon would count as  overspecification provided that 
knowledge of each enumerated meaning can specify a denotation. Overspecification, though, does 
not require anything like a sense-enumeration lexicon. Overspecification in no way requires that  
different denotations are specified by non-overlapping pieces of  lexical  knowledge. There can be 
overlap within the lexical knowledge that specifies different denotations for a lexical item in different  
utterance situations. For instance, let us imagine a lexical item l with which we associate four pieces 
of lexical knowledge: A, B, C and D. L can denote one of four entities in utterance situations. Those 
four entities are: 1, 2, 3 and 4. Pieces of lexical knowledge associated with l can specify denotations 
as follows.
21 One might wonder how two meanings can overlap.  On the kinds of views under consideration, meanings are not 
atoms.  They have some kind of structure and are composed of more basic constituents. Roughly, we can say that 
two meanings overlap if they share a constituent.  If we take meaning A and B to be clusters of properties, for  
instance, two meanings would overlap if there is at least one property that is in both A and B.
22 (Pustejovsky 1995) claims,  for instance,  that  sense-enumeration lexicons are the standard model  of  polysemous 
meanings.  He cites  (Chomsky  1965)  as  positing  a  sense-enumeration lexicon for  explaining how verbs  change 
meaning  depending  upon  their  complements.  Pustejovsky  spends  a  chapter  arguing  explicitly  against  sense-
enumeration lexicons. In the end, however, it is not obvious to me that Pustejovsky's own account avoids being a  
kind of complex sense-enumeration lexicon. 
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(i) A, B, C specifies 1
(ii) A, C, D specifies 2
(iii) A, B, D specifies 3
(iv) B, C, D specifies 4
No individual piece of knowledge is necessary or sufficient for specifying a denotation. The 
totality of the lexical knowledge associated with l does not itself specify any denotation. We need to 
remove one piece of lexical knowledge from the totality to specify a denotation. The role of NLBs  
and TNRAs would then be to select one piece of lexical knowledge to filter out.
We can therefore have overspecification without non-overlapping enumerated meanings.23 
Some theorists would still want to call  l 'polysemous'.24 Polysemy isn't always thought to require 
non-overlapping lexical knowledge. If so, I have no beef with understanding overspecification as  
polysemy. I just want to make it clear that we can accept overspecification without needing to have 
non-overlapping lexical knowledge specifying each potential denotation.25
3.1.3. The Conditions-Based Model of Lexical Meaning
So far I've discussed lexical knowledge in fairly abstract terms. Theorists in the literature I'm 
23 This is not to say that we couldn't construct a sense-enumeration lexicon based on the example. We could imagine a 
lexicon that represents l's meanings as four discrete pieces of knowledge: (i) through (iv). My point is that we do not 
need to do so. The lexical knowledge associated with l can be the single set {A, B, C, D}. NLBs and TNRAs would 
be responsible for removing one element from the set in order to specify a denotation.
24 I'm thinking in particular of computational linguists such as Pustejovsky, Briscoe, Copestake, Lascarides and others,  
who have worked on generative approaches to lexical meanings.  Such theorists have tended to adopt models of word 
meaning that aim to explain polysemy in terms of generative procedures applied to lexical meanings.
25 Importantly, standard arguments given against lexical ambiguity don't seem to apply to this more sophisticated 
account. For instance, one classic argument against ambiguity is the claim that it requires massive reduplication of  
information in the lexicon, since we fail to factor-out the common part of the meaning of polysemous terms. Given 
that the relevant lexical knowledge overlaps, however, we do not need any such reduplication of lexical knowledge.  
Similarly, theorists argue that ambiguity places too much stress on limited cognitive resources. While the kind of 
view sketched above does place more requirements on memory than an underspecification view (which is in line  
with what language acquisition actually requires) given overlapping lexical knowledge and lack of reduplication these  
requirements  may  not  be  unrealistic.  Finally  many  theorists  claim  that  ambiguity  accounts  fail  to  recognizes  
similarities between lexical items. This is a trickier issue, but I want to note that there is nothing in overspecification  
that rules out general rules that act upon a variety of lexical items in similar ways. The overspecificationist claims 
that these rules need to be part of lexical knowledge, but she presumably has resources to answer the objection.
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engaging with are not always explicit about what lexical meaning or lexical knowledge consist in. 
There is  a  wide range of  different potential  approaches to lexical  meaning consistent with both 
underspecification and overspecification.  For that  reason I have formulated overspecification and 
underspecification in abstract, theory-neutral terms. Still, the abstract nature of the debate can make 
it hard to get a handle on the issues. In this section I will sketch a toy model of lexical meaning and  
lexical knowledge. I am describing this model for purely expository purposes. I will therefore not be  
particularly concerned with the metaphysics underlying the model or its empirical adequacy. I don't 
want to commit myself to this model or say that any of the theorists I'm discussing are committed to 
it. I am presenting it purely as an expository aid: as a concrete example of how we might formulate  
underspecification and overspecification in the context of an explicit account of lexical knowledge.  
Underspecification  does  not  itself  depend  upon  this  model  and  we  will  see  versions  of 
underspecification that characterize the thinness of underspecified lexical meanings in other ways.
In our toy model of lexical meaning, the constituents of lexical meanings are conditions. An 
atomic condition is a property that an entity can satisfy. Here are some examples:  being crumbly, 
being extravagant, watching TV at 8PM Sunday, being a ceiling fan, being admirable. We can form 
more complex conditions by making a set containing conditions as members. An entity satisfies the 
complex condition if it satisfies all of the member conditions. Here are some examples of complex 
conditions:{being crumbly, being a ceiling fan,  being admirable}, {watching TV at 8 PM,  being 
admirable, {being extravagant, being a ceiling fan}}. 
We can also characterize what lexical knowledge would look like given a conditions-based 
model  of  lexical  meaning.  Since  lexical  meanings  are  sets  of  conditions,  presumably  lexical 
knowledge would be knowledge of the conditions that are members of the set. A specificationist 
would  say  that  lexical  knowledge  suffices  to  specify  a  denotation  because  it  is  knowledge  of  
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conditions that are satisfied by (and only by) the lexical item's denotation. 
We  can  also  characterize  underspecification  given  a  condition-based  model  of  lexical 
meaning. One way that lexical knowledge can be thin or schematic is if it is knowledge of conditions  
that are either too few in number or too general to be able to specify the lexical item's denotations in  
most utterance situations. Imagine that an underspecificationist took the lexical meaning of 'coffee'  
to be the following complex condition: {being brown, being liquid, being drinkable}.  Most coffee 
will satisfy all three conditions in this set. However, these conditions will also be satisfied by many  
other things: tea, prune juice, root bear, etc. Knowledge of the member conditions is not specific  
enough to specify the denotation of 'coffee' in most utterance situations. One way to “thicken” the  
lexical  knowledge  associated  with  'coffee'  would  be  to  use  NLBs  and  TNRAs  to  add  further  
conditions to the ones known via lexical knowledge. The members of the resulting set of conditions 
would  only  be  satisfied  by  what  counts  as  coffee  in  that  utterance  situation.  Imagine  that  the 
utterance situation for a token of 'coffee' is a very cold day with a speaker who is clearly interested  
only in warm drinks. The interpreter's NLBs and TNRAs might add  being hot to the previously 
given set of conditions. Thus the underspecificationist is shifting some of the work of explaining a 
language user's ability to use lexical items from lexical  knowledge to NLBs and TNRAs. Lexical 
knowledge cannot contribute all of the conditions necessary for specifying a denotation. Instead, we 
need NLBs and TNRAs to contribute conditions as well.26 
26 One might object that on this model underspecified lexical items are no different than general lexical items such as  
'thing'. There are two responses that could be made. 
One is to accept the similarity. Ludlow, as I mention below, uses 'thing-a-ma-jigger' as an example of a 
lexical item with a thin meaning. The difference between 'thing' and an underspecified lexical item is that 'thing' is  
used  with  its  general  denotation  while  for  the  underspecified  lexical  item must  be  supplemented  in  utterance 
situations.  The  underspecificationist  then  owes  us  an  explanation  for  why  'thing'  is  used  generally,  while  
underspecified lexical  items are  not.  While  I  won't  try  to provide  such an explanation on her  behalf,  such an 
explanation could plausibly be given in terms of facts about language use. 
The second response would be to accept that there is a genuine problem, but claim that it  is really a  
limitation  of  the  conditions-based  model  of  lexical  meaning.  Bach,  for  instance,  discusses  the  completion  of 
incomplete meanings. The conditions-based model cannot obviously accommodate this, since even the most general 
condition is still in a sense complete. Again, I think that a more sophisticated account of lexical meaning could 
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We can also see what overspecification might look like given the condition-based model.  For 
the underspecificationist, lexical knowledge, for a particular lexical item, consists in knowledge of a  
set of conditions such that there are more things that satisfy every member of the set than are ever 
denoted by the lexical item. For the overspecificationist the lexical knowledge is knowledge of  too 
many conditions  such  that  there  is  virtually  nothing  that  could  satisfy  all  of  them.  For  the 
underspecificationist, lexical knowledge requires supplementation in order to specify a denotation in 
an utterance situation. For the overspecificationist, some pieces of our lexical knowledge needs to be  
selected in order to specify a denotation in an utterance situation.
For example, take the lexical item 'newspaper.' 'Newspaper' can denote different entities in 
different utterance situations. 'Newspaper' can denote a physical object, the information contained 
within the physical newspaper, or the company that publishes the newspaper. The following three 
sentences are examples of these uses.
(1d) Shawn ripped up the newspaper.
(1e) The newspaper was fascinating this morning.
(1f) The newspaper went out of business.
(1d)  exemplifies  a  physical-object-use,  (1e)  exemplifies  an  information-structure-use  and  (1f) 
exemplifies  a  publishing-business-use.  The  overspecificationist  could  say  that  the  meaning  of 
'newspaper'  is  the following complex condition: {presenting news to people, being made out of  
paper,  being  an  information structure,  being  a  publishing company}.  No entity  satisfies  all  the 
members of this set. However, the different potential denotations do satisfy members of subsets of  
the complex condition.  For instance, knowledge of the first two conditions,  presenting news to  
people and being made out of paper, could specify the physical-object denotation. Knowledge of the 
plausibly accommodate incomplete meanings, but to formulate such an account here, goes far beyond my aim. 
Remember, I'm just using the conditions-based model as a tool for explicating the view, not as a fully worked out  
account of lexical meaning.
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first  and third conditions,  presenting news to people  and  being an information structure, could 
specify  the  information-structure  denotation.  Knowledge  of  the  first  and  fourth  conditions,  
presenting news to people  and being a publishing company,  could specify the publishing-business 
denotation.27 The role of NLBs and TNRAs, for the overspecificationist, is to select what linguistic  
knowledge is relevant in the utterance situation. In a sense, for the overspecificationist, a competent  
speaker already has all of the lexical knowledge that explains her ability to use the lexical item with a  
given  denotation.  The  problem is  that  she  has  too  much  lexical  knowledge  associated  with  a  
particular lexical item for that knowledge to suffice for specifying a denotation in many utterance  
situations.28
Now that we have seen a model of lexical  meaning and concretized some of the abstract 
discussion that came before, we can turn to investigating several versions of underspecification that 
have been proposed in the literature. 
3.1.4. Varieties of Underspecification
I want to look more closely at accounts of underspecification provided by: (1) Ruhl and Bach 
(2) Ludlow (3) Rayo 
3.1.4.1. Ruhl and Bach on Abstract Meanings29
27 Obviously the conditions I've provided don't  come close to actually specifying the denotation. Remember, I'm 
explaining the  structure  of  overspecification.  I'm not  trying  to  provide  a  complete  analysis  of  the  meaning of  
'newspaper'.
28 One might think that  the overspecificationist  has  a  problem analogous to the one mentioned in  ft.  26. What 
distinguishes an overspecified expression from a self-contradictory expression like 'the round square'? The responses I 
describe  on  behalf  of  the  underspecificationist  are  equally  available  to  the  overspecificationist.  The 
overspecificationist also has a third potential response. She could claim that self-contradictory lexical items have a  
single inconsistent atomic condition while for overspecified lexical items the apparent contradiction only arises if we 
consider multiple atomic conditions. For instance, the lexical knowledge of the self contradictory 'the round square'  
could be knowledge of the single-membered complex condition: {being round and being square}, while the lexical 
knowledge  for  a  similar,  but  overspecified  lexical  item  would  be  knowledge  of  the  dual-membered  complex 
condition:  {being  round,  being  square}.  Thus  NLBs  and  TNRAs  could  make  the  overspecified  lexical  item 
consistent by selecting a single atomic constituent. There is no way to select members of that set {being round and 
being square} that would provide us with a consistent set of conditions.
29 Above I characterize underspecification in terms of lexical knowledge. Ruhl and Bach do not describe their views in 
these terms. They talk of abstract and schematic lexical meanings. Still, we can reformulate their views in terms of  
lexical knowledge. We can say that lexical knowledge is schematic if it is knowledge of schematic meanings. This  
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Charles  Ruhl  was  an influential  early  underspecificationist.  In his  1989 monograph 'On 
Monosemy,' Ruhl argues against so-called 'meaning maximalists' who believe that a great deal of 
lexical knowledge is associated with each lexical item. Ruhl argues for the methodological principle  
that  we should assume that  lexical  items are  not polysemous and that  competent speakers  have 
limited lexical knowledge.30 In order to specify a denotation we engage in a process that Ruhl labels 
'modulation.' The expression 'modulation' is used because modulation is a process that modifies and 
changes the meaning known via lexical knowledge in order to generate an output that can specify a 
denotation in an utterance situation. NLBs and TNRAs are used to modulate the contents of lexical 
knowledge.
“I claim that  a considerable  part of  alleged lexical  meaning is  actually supplied by other  
means;  words  are  highly abstract  in inherent  meaning,  often too much so for conscious  
understanding. It follows that all use of language is heavily modulated. The more diversely 
useful  a  language,  the  more  it  would  have  to  be  heavily  modulated  by  other  means  to 
differing situations.” (Ruhl 1989 86)
Here Ruhl explicitly adopts underspecification and not mere underdetermination. Lexical 
items, for Ruhl, are not just context-sensitive. Lexical meanings (what Ruhl calls 'inherent meaning')  
are 'highly abstract.' A large part of what the specificationist would take to be lexical knowledge is  
not,  for  Ruhl,  lexical  knowledge.31 That  missing  lexical  knowledge  is  replaced  by  modulation 
processes which modify lexical meanings in ways determined by NLBs about the utterance situation 
difficulty arises from a genuine divergence in the literature I  am engaging with.  Some theorists,  such as Rayo, 
primarily describe their views in terms of lexical knowledge, while others such as Bach describe their views in terms 
of lexical meaning. When possible I try and put the point in terms of knowledge, but for the sake of accuracy I will  
sometimes use 'lexical meaning'
30 Ruhl's argument is primarily prosecuted by looking at case studies of particular verbs and trying to argue that there 
are general patterns that underlie the apparent diversity of uses. Ruhl then claims that though the lexical meaning of  
these verbs are abstract and that pragmatic rules that can be used to determine a denotation relative to an utterance  
situation. Ruhl's book is filled with massive amounts of data. While I find the attempt to find underlying patterns 
fascinating, as I argue later in the paper, I suspect that pragmatic rules will not suffice to explain the specification of  
denotations if lexical meanings are as abstract as Ruhl would have it. My concern here is more with articulating 
Ruhl's position, then describing the arguments for it. 
31 “I am working closer to the lexical bone, claiming that meaning almost universally ceded to be semantic should be 
considered pragmatic.” (Ruhl 1989 ix)
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(“heavily  modulated  by  other  means  to  differing  situations”).  Knowledge  of  the  highly  abstract  
lexical meaning never specifies a denotation in an utterance situation. Only lexical knowledge and 
modulation together are capable of specifying a denotation.
Ruhl's ideas have entered into the more recent debate through the work of Kent Bach. Bach 
is  an  influential  defender  of  underspecification  who  has  relied  explicitly  on  Ruhl's  work.  In 
“Conversational  Impliciture”  Bach follows  Ruhl  in  defending  an  underspecification  account  for  
verbs like 'get' and 'take'.32 Bach describes Ruhl in terms that suggest underspecification. However, 
the evidence that Bach relies on is evidence only for underdetermination.
“[Ruhl] suggests that with many commonly used, multi-purpose words, like the verbs get,  
hit, put, and take and the prepositions at, in, on, to, and with, linguistic meaning is ‘highly 
abstract [i.e., schematic [[insert is Bach's]]] and remote from practical usefulness’ (p. 7), so 
that  when we  hear  any  of  the  above  words  in  a  particular  linguistic  environment  and  
conversational context, we import extralinguistic information into our understanding of the 
utterance. Compare the occurrences of put and on in (1) and (2), for example.
(1) Al put the beer on the table
(2) Al put the burden on the lawyer.
We invoke extralinguistic knowledge, about beer and tables and about burdens and lawyers, 
to interpret (1) and (2) in the way we do. It is not a semantic fact that one is not likely to 
mean with (2), for example, that Al physically placed something on someone.” (Bach 1994)
Bach notes Ruhl's suggestion that lexical meanings are highly abstract or schematic. Bach is 
claiming that the lexical knowledge associated with 'put' does not include the beliefs about beer,  
tables, burdens and lawyers that seem to be playing a role in the specification of a denotation for  
'put' relative to situations where Bach's (1) and (2) have been uttered. Let us grant that 'put' has  
different denotations relative to situations where Bach's (1) is uttered and situations where Bach's (2)  
is  uttered.  Let  us  grant  that  NLBs  about  beer,  tables,  burdens  and  lawyers  are  relevant  to  the 
specification of these denotations. The fact that “[w]e invoke extralinguistic knowledge, about beer  
32 “The  illustrations  of  impliciture  in  sections  2  and  3  required  completion  of  utterances  of  semantically 
underdeterminate sentences or expansion of sentence-nonliteral utterances. It appears that similar phenomena can  
occur at the lexical and at the phrasal level. We will focus on the lexical case, which has been investigated in depth by 
Ruhl (1989).” (Bach 1994)
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and tables...” to interpret his examples does not demonstrate underspecification for 'put' or 'on'.  
Overspecification for 'put'  and 'on' also requires the invocation of  NLBs.  The role  of the non-
linguistic  “knowledge”  (I  would  say  belief)  could  be  to  help  determine  which  pieces  of  lexical  
knowledge associated with 'put' and 'on' are relevant for specifying a denotation in that utterance 
situation. Bach claims that NLBs are relevant to specifying denotations, but that claim is compatible  
with both underspecification and overspecification, and hence provides no direct evidence for taking 
lexical meanings to be abstract or schematic.33 
Bach never provides a model of lexical meaning. This makes it hard to understand how he 
would cash out 'lexical knowledge'. Ruhl does say more about what lexical meanings are. However,  
Ruhl thinks that the constituents of lexical meanings are so abstract as to be nearly impossible to  
describe or conceptualize.34 As a result, it is rather hard to discuss them. 
Bach says  more  about  how NLBs and TNRAs contribute  to specifying  denotations.  He 
describes two processes:  completion and expansion. Completion occurs when a lexical meaning is 
33 To be fair to Bach, he does recognize the possibility of some overspecification, which he identifies with ambiguity. 
“What is required here may be called local completion. Also, even if words like get and with are not, as 
Ruhl suggests, really monosemous, they could still be semantically underdeterminate with respect to each of 
their senses. In that case once a sense is selected, a more specific construal of the word is needed before a 
determinate proposition is reached. In any event, it seems that we should include local completion, along 
with  disambiguation  and  reference  assignment,   among  the  pragmatic  processes  that  enter  into  the  
determination of the explicit content of an utterance.” (Bach 1994)
Still his argument for underspecification primarily is just an argument for underdetermination, so if we provide an  
explanation of underdetermination in terms of overspecification, we would need further evidence for positing local  
completions. Bach suggests that one strong argument for avoiding ambiguity is that there are often generalizations 
that hold across lexical items. That is to say, many lexical items have both a 'concrete' and 'abstract' sense, and it 
would be redundant to build these all independently into the lexicon. I agree with Bach that lexical redundancy is  
problematic, which is the reason I provide a distinct account of metonymy in Chapter 2 above, but I doubt these  
considerations  apply  equally  to  commonly  used  verbs.  In  the  case  of  commonly  used  verbs  there  is  far  less  
redundancy among which uses particular verbs have, and hence less reason to believe that different uses of different 
commonly used verbs are generated by the same function. Secondly, Bach seems to be assuming an account of  
ambiguity that requires full encoding of discrete senses. If we have a more sophisticated overspecification account,  
redundancy will be less of a problem. 
34 As Ruhl writes:
“I  am arguing that  we cannot discover the sense(s)  of  a  word without fully gauging its  applications.  
Dictionary definitions, especially of common words, highlight a few applications, which implicitly deny a 
unified  sense,  and  thus  underestimate  the  full  range  of  applications.  This  typically,  even  inexorably,  
happens because stereotypical applications suggest discrete senses, and because the unified sense is too  
abstract, inexpressible, and practically (i.e., consciously) useless.” (Ruhl 1989 173)
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missing a constituent required for specifying a denotation. Completion takes this kind of lexical  
meaning as  an  input  and completes  it  by  contributing  a  constituent.  Expansion takes  a  lexical  
meaning that  is  already complete  as  an input.  Expansion then outputs  a meaning that  has  had 
further constituents added. Both of these processes are, according to Bach, Gricean in nature. A 
speaker utters a sentence that contains a lexical item with an incomplete (or unexpanded) lexical 
meaning. In uttering that sentence the speaker intends to communicate a complex meaning that  
results from composing the denotation specified by the completed (or expanded) lexical meaning.  
The listener recognizes the speaker's intention. In virtue of recognizing the speaker's intention she 
takes  the  speaker  to have  both said and communicated the  complex  meaning that  results  from 
composing the denotation specified by the completed (or expanded) lexical meaning. The listener  
reconstructs  the speaker's  intention in a manner analogous to how listeners  understand Gricean 
implicatures. The listener uses NLBs and TNRAs to figure out what completions and/or expansions 
the speaker intended. 
“... impliciture can be a matter of either filling in or fleshing out what is said. … I agree with 
Grice’s critics that neither is a case of implicature, although both involve basically the same 
sort of pragmatic process as in implicature proper...” (Bach 1994)
The difference between impliciture and implicature is subtle. According to Bach, in the case 
of standard implicature, a speaker says one thing and thereby communicates what she has said. She 
then also communicates further content that is implicated by the content of what is said. In the case 
of impliciture, the speaker does not communicate the initial content. What she says is not 
communicated. What she says has to undergo completion (or expansion) before it can form a 
communicated content. In both cases, implicature and impliciture, similar TNRAs are used to 
determine what the speaker intended to communicate. In implicature the speaker communicates 
implicatures in virtue of communicating an initial content. In impliciture, however, the speaker 
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communicates implicitures despite not having communicated an initial content.35
For Bach, many lexical meanings are schematic or abstract. He claims we use a “Gricean” 
process to supplement lexical meanings.36 Knowledge of the supplemented meanings then specifies a 
denotation. As there is no specific model of lexical meaning in play it still isn't obvious what an 
'abstract' lexical meaning is.
3.1.4.2. Ludlow's Common Coins
In “The Myth of  Human Language”  and “Contextualism on the  Cheap”  Peter  Ludlow 
argues against the claim that we have a great deal of lexical knowledge. Ludlow believes, like Bach, 
that much of what has been taken to be lexical knowledge is in fact contributed situationally by  
NLBs and TNRAs.  For Ludlow, we are wrong to think that lexical items have fixed meanings. Any  
fixed lexical meaning, for Ludlow, is thin. Lexical items regularly change their meanings to suit the  
need of a conversation. He calls his account 'the dynamic lexicon' because of these constant lexical  
changes.
Accepting  a  dynamic  lexicon  does  not  by  itself  entail  either  underspecification  or 
overspecification.  We  can  accept  overspecification  and  hold  that  lexical  meanings  are  regularly 
tweaked based on conversational needs. We can also imagine meanings that are thickened in ways 
that depend on conversational needs. Still, Ludlow is clearly an underspecificationist.
“It  seems  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  broad  class  of  phenomena that  we  call  
“linguistic” or think of as having to do with “language” are supported by a combination of 
narrow  mechanisms  of  the  mind/brain  (what  Chomsky  calls  the  FLN,  for  “faculty  of  
language narrowly construed”) and at the same time an entirely different set of abilities that 
are  underwritten  by  world  knowledge  and  various  coordination  strategies  that  we  
deploy.”(Ludlow 2006 388)
35 “Impliciture is to be distinguished from Grice’s (1967a) conversational  implicature. In implicature one says and 
communicates one thing and thereby communicates something else in addition. Impliciture, however, is a matter of 
saying something but communicating something else instead, something closely related to what is said.” (Bach 1994)
36 Bach claims the process is Gricean, but I don't want to enter into the debate over whether the process is correctly  
characterized as Gricean.
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Ludlow goes on to argue that our TNRAs do most of the work in constructing meanings for uttered 
lexical items. He is particularly interested in coordination strategies, as he holds that language users  
are regularly trying to coordinate their uses of lexical items on the basis of situational needs. Ludlow  
believes that language users negotiate and coordinate, both implicitly and explicitly, over the course  
of conversations (and longer term interactions) to modify lexical meanings. Specifying a denotation 
requires coordinating with other speakers in order to flesh out the thin lexical knowledge and specify  
a denotation.
“Common coins are thin. Linguistic common coins, whether in circulation frequently  or  
rarely, are “thin.” By that I mean that the shared part of the lexicon consists of just hints and 
clues (like one finds in dictionary entries) that may help us to deploy cognitive resources  
to flesh out the word meanings, and the way we flesh them out will  vary according to  
contexts  and  social  settings.  A  classic  illustration  would  be  the  dummy  terms  like  
'whatchamacallit’ and ‘thingamajigger’, which are reissued often but typically with different 
denotations each time they are reissued.” (Ludlow 2006 391)
It is not Ludlow's appeal to coordination strategies that makes him an underspecificationist.  
Specifying  denotations  based  on  coordination  of  language  users  are  compatible  with 
overspecification. Ludlow is an underspecificationist because he claims that most lexical items have 
'thin' meanings that need to be fleshed out. Even though Ludlow makes a nod to overspecification, 37 
he thinks that typically lexical items are thin and need to be fleshed out.
 Other than saying that lexical knowledge consists in hints and clues, Ludlow does not say  
much about what lexical knowledge is or how we flesh it out.38 The lexical knowledge associated 
37 Ludlow writes:
“The headline  idea  is  that  the  common coin  view of  language  is  badly  mistaken and that  discourse  
participants routinely mint new linguistic items and also that what common coins there are are typically 
“thin”—in the sense that their meanings are underdetermined and fleshed out on a case-by-case basis.  
Likewise in some instances we come into conversations with fleshed out word meanings that need to be 
thinned out for purposes of the conversational context.” (Ludlow 2007 115) 
Note  that  Ludlow  emphasizes  that  lexical  items  are  typically  thin  and  it  is  only  in  some  situations  that  
overspecification might occur. He later gives examples of 'clipping' and 'trimming' words: situations where speakers 
come to a conversation with incompatible definitions of words like 'torture', and have to pick out a shared content 
in order to converse productively.
38 Ludlow describes the mechanisms whereby we coordinate meanings, but not what exactly happens to the meaning. 
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with common coins is extremely limited. Fleshing out lexical knowledge amounts to adding new 
information on the basis of NLBs and TNRAs.39 
3.1.4.4. Rayo's Grab Bags
A sophisticated  form of  underspecification  is  defended by  Agustin  Rayo  in  “A  Plea  for 
Semantic Localism”. He claims that the lexical knowledge associated with a lexical item is just a  
“grab bag” of different mental entities that are related to the lexical item. This lexical knowledge  
might include images, instructions, memories, minor factoids and personal associations.
“The grab bag Model
With each expression of the basic lexicon, the subject associates a ‘grab bag’ of mental items: 
memories,  mental  images,  pieces  of  encyclopedic  information,  pieces  of  anecdotal  
information, mental maps, and so forth. With the expression ‘blue’, for example, a subject 
might associate two or three particular shades of blue, the information that a paradigmatic 
instance of  ‘blue’ is  the sky on a clear  day, a memory of a blue sweater, and so forth.  
Different speakers might associate different grab bags with the same lexical item.
A grab bag will typically not be enough to determine a range of application or the relevant 
lexical  item independently  of  the  subject’s  general-purpose  abilities.  But,  by  exercising  
sensitivity to context and common sense, the right kind of subject in the right kind of  
context might be in a position to use the grab bag to come to a sensible decision about what 
to treat as the expression’s range of application for the purposes at hand.” (Rayo 2011 2)
 According to Rayo's account, lexical knowledge (which he calls' the semantic information 
associated with a lexical item') is not a distinctive kind of knowledge. What for some people might 
be NLBs (anecdotal associations and encyclopedia entries) might be part of some language user's 
grab bags. Rayo's account is clearly an underspecificationist account: even though in rare cases a  
member of the grab bag might suffice to determine a denotation, for the most part the grab bag will  
“This is also a good example of a case where fleshing out the meaning of the term is up to us and our communicative 
partners. So, even when we are deploying a common coin term (like ‘athlete’, for example) the extension of the term 
(i.e. the set of all athletes) within a given context may be up for grabs and may require some form of coordination  
strategy – in the sports talk radio case the coordination took the form of a debate where discourse participants 
argued their respective cases.” (Ludlow 2007 118)
39 Below we will see Agustin Rayo's version of underspecification, which explicitly describes lexical meanings as mere 
hints. Given Ludlow's use of similarly terminology, we could potentially interpret him as presupposing a model of  
lexical meaning analogous to Rayo's account.
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fail to do so.40 Rayo repeatedly makes clear his intention of replacing lexical knowledge with NLBs 
and TNRAs. What makes Rayo an underspecificationist is notably not his grab-bag model of lexical  
meaning. Instead, Rayo is an underspecificationist because he attempts to minimize role played by 
lexical knowledge. One could in principle adopt a grab-bag overspecification, but it seems like Rayo 
would be unhappy with such a view.
“Later in the paper I will discuss some advantages of embracing the Grab Bag Model instead 
of the Specialized-Knowledge Model, but one advantage is immediate. On the Specialized-
Knowledge Model, a huge amount of specialized semantic information must be somehow 
stored in a subject’s cognitive system before she will count as mastering the language. For  
the subject must know semantic rules corresponding to every basic expression in the lexicon, 
and each semantic rule determines the full range of application of a given lexical item across 
possible worlds, relative to a large range of contexts of utterance. In contrast,  the Grab  
Bag Model  is  relatively  frugal  when it  comes  to  specialized  semantic  information.  The  
subject must associate a set of mental items with each basic expression of the lexicon. But 
nothing more is required as far as the lexicon is concerned. The rest of the work is done by 
the subject’s grasp of grammar, and by her general-purpose abilities” (Rayo 2011 4)
 How does Rayo think that denotations are specified? We engage in what he labels 'the hermeneutic 
procedure'. Rayo adopts a dynamic model of meaning where each conversation is associated with a 
context set. A context-set is a set of possible worlds that could be actual, as far as the conversation is  
concerned. The point of an assertion is to update the context-set. The context-set is updated by 
ruling out worlds that were previously in the context-set. Using the hermeneutic procedure a hearer 
determines how a speaker intended to update the context set by uttering a sentence. Given our NLBs 
together with our syntactic knowledge and knowledge of the relevant lexical grab bags, we select a  
range of potential denotations salient in the utterance situation. We then use our TNRAs to select 
the member of that range which best fits the utterance situation. After we have specified denotations 
for all of the lexical items, we compose them to arrive at an update for the context-set.41
40 A grab bag model of lexical meaning does not necessarily have to be underspecificationist. As I discuss below, we  
could potentially adopt an overspecificationist grab bag model: one where the grab bag is filled with a tremendous 
amount of lexical knowledge and different sub-sets of the grab bag are capable of specifying denotations. However 
Rayo is explicit (as I describe below) in wanting to limit the role of lexical knowledge. 
41 Rayo provides and example of the hermeneutic procedure:
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Rayo's hermeneutic procedure is  interestingly different from the other proposals we have  
seen  so  far.  For  both  Bach  and  Ludlow  denotations  were  specified  by  supplementing  lexical  
knowledge  with further  NLBs.  For  Rayo,  lexical  knowledge  is  even more  minimal.  The lexical 
knowledge associated with a lexical item merely provides us with hints about what salient entities  
could be potential denotations for that lexical item. Most of the pieces of information in the grab 
bag may have little to do with the lexical item's denotation. An anecdote associated with a lexical  
item may be completely irrelevant to specifying that lexical item's denotation for many utterance 
situations.  For Rayo, then, not only is  lexical  knowledge minimal,  but much of  the knowledge 
associated with a lexical item will be irrelevant to determining the lexical item's denotation in many  
utterance situations. The items in the grab bag may bear only a very loose connection with the  
eventual  denotation—they merely need to help the denotation achieve  salience in the utterance 
situation. 
Rayo is also admirably clear about the motivations for his account. One motivation is the  
defense of semantic localism. The semantic globalist (the opposite of the localist) believes that the 
denotation of a lexical item relative to an utterance situation can contain entities that are relevant to 
the utterance situation and entities that are not relevant to the utterance situation. Take a predicate  
p. For the globalist, any entity is included in the denotation of p in that utterance situation or is not 
included in the denotation of p in that utterance situation. Furthermore, there is no indeterminacy, 
“When your companion asserts ‘The party is at the blue house’ it is a bit as if she handed you a grab bag 
containing a sample of some particular shade of paradigmatic blue. You know that your companion is using 
the color sample to send you a message. You also know that the issue under discussion is the location of the  
party, and that your companion is being fully cooperative. So a good guess is that she is trying to use the 
color sample to indicate the location of the party.
There are two salient possibilities: (i) that the party is at the house to the left, and (ii) that the 
party is at the house to the right. So you try to determine whether one of these possibilities is rendered 
salient by the color sample. In Case 1, the house to the left is gray and the house to the right is blueish gray.  
Neither of the houses is very close in color to your sample, but the blueish gray house is a significantly  
better fit than the gray house, and this is enough to render the relevant possibility salient. So you conclude 
that the party is at the blueish gray house.” (Rayo 2011 3-4)
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for the globalist, in whether  p  applies to any particular entity in a given utterance situation.  The 
semantic  localist  believes  that  the  denotation of  a  lexical  item in an  utterance  situation  is  only  
defined for the entities that are relevant to that utterance situation. Once again, take the predicate p. 
The localist believes that we can only say whether entities relevant to the utterance situation are 
included in p's denotation or not included in p's denotation. For entities that are not relevant to the 
utterance situation, there is no fact of the matter whether or not they are in p's denotation in that 
utterance situation.
 Localism doesn't obviously entail underspecification. One could adopt an overspecificationist 
localism.42 Rayo's primary motivation for underspecification is the explicit desire to minimize the 
amount of specialized lexical knowledge that speakers must have and replace that lexical knowledge  
with appeals to NLBs and TNRAs.
“It  is  certainly  true  that  one  can’t  master  a  language  unless  one  has  some  specialized  
knowledge: one needs information about the language’s grammar, and about how particular 
lexical items are used. But I have argued that the role of specialized knowledge is much  
more limited than one might think. When it comes to the usage of particular lexical items, 
the lion’s share of the work is done by sensitivity to context and common sense. Mastering a 
language is more like knowing how to use a rock to keep things from being blown away by 
the wind than like knowing how to use a sextant to establish one’s latitude at sea.” (Rayo 
2011 33)
3.2. Overspecification For Commonly Used Verbs
3.2.1. Commonly Used Verbs
I now want to move on to my argument for overspecification. The argument focuses on what 
I call 'commonly used verbs'. These are verbs like 'have,' 'make,' 'do,' 'use,' 'get,' and 'open,' that  
occur with high frequency in normal English speech and writing. Commonly used verbs are often  
taken to be context-sensitive.43 For example, there are lots of very different kinds of events that can 
42 Overspecificationist localism is the view that a proper constituent of the lexical meaning of a lexical item will specify  
a denotation relative to an utterance situation, though that denotation would only be defined for entities relevant to  
the utterance situation. The overspecificationist localist could adopt a similar hermeneutic procedure to Rayo's. 
43 Some examples are (Bach 1994), (Pustejovsky 1995), (Cappelen and Lepore 2004) and (Carston and Wilson 2007).
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be denoted by 'have'.
(2a) Henry had a publishing deal.
(2b) Henry had two children.
(2c) Henry had diabetes.
(2d) Henry had a boat.
(2e) Henry had a nasty temper.
(2f) Henry had a good meal.
(2g) Henry had a good time.
(2h) Henry had a good cry.
What it is to have a publishing deal is very different from what it is to have a boat or a chronic  
illness. In each case the relation between the haver and the havee can be spelled out in very different 
ways.  One reason that these verbs are often taken to be context-sensitive is that it is difficult to  
articulate  a  clear  context-invariant  meaning  for  such  verbs.  If  we  don't  know what  nominal  is  
associated with a use of the verb it is especially hard to articulate what the verb means.
(3a) What did Juliette have?
(3b) Juliette's got something.
If commonly used verbs are context-sensitive then 'have' and 'got' have different denotations  
relative to different utterances of (3a) and (3b). 
3.2.2. The Argument in Schematic Form
I am going to be focusing on the verb 'open'. Let's start by looking at a variety of uses of  
'open'.
(4a) Carleton opened the store.
(4b) Carleton opened the door.
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(4c) Carleton opened the box.
(4d) Carleton opened the present.
(4e) Carleton opened the game with a quick goal.
(4f) Carleton opened up the game with a Grand Slam in the 7th.
(4g) Carleton opened up to Clifford.
As with 'have' it seems like different kinds of events are being denoted by different uses of (4a-g) in 
normal utterance situations. In (4a) the opening involves either making a business ready for 
customers or starting a new business. In (4b) the opening is a characteristic physical action. (4c) 
describes a different kind of physical action. (4e) describes an action that occurs at the very 
beginning of a hockey or soccer game, while (4f) describes a situation in which one team has 
obtained a substantial advantage that will be extremely difficult to overcome. (4g) is used to describe 
one person's honest relaying of feelings to another.
What about the following sentences?
(5a) Carleton opened the television.
(5b) Carleton opened the lights.
Many English speakers find (5a) and (5b) extremely deviant and perhaps even uninterpretable. 
Others assume that (5a) and (5b) can only be used by repairmen removing components from a 
television or lighting apparatus. Some well-educated English speakers have even told me in personal 
communication, “It just seems logically wrong to think of opening a television” and “I can't help it, 
but those sentences make me angry.”
For a small segment of English speakers, including myself, (5a) and (5b) are completely 
acceptable, normal sentences. They mean the same as (6a) and (6b) respectively.
(6a) Carleton turned on the television.
146
(6b) Carleton turned on the lights.
Anglophones from Montreal, Quebec, even those that speak no French, regularly use sentences such 
as (5a) and (5b). My parents are from Montreal, and I picked it up from them. I suspect that this 
usage arises out of interaction between Montreal English, and French. In Quebecois French one can 
say:
(7a) Carleton a ouvri la television!
(7b) Carleton a ouvri la lumiere!
(7a) and (7b) are literally translated as (5a) and (5b). 
What we have on display is a systematic difference in usage between speakers of Montreal 
English (ME) and speakers of Other Varieties of English (OVE).44 In order to make it easier to talk 
about these differences, let us engage in a little fiction. Let us assume that 'open' as used by ME 
speakers is really spelled with a silent 'M' and 'E' on the end. That is, we can write the Montreal 
'open' as 'openME'. Similarly, the standard English 'open' is spelled 'openOVE'. I claim that there is 
a semantic difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE'. I also claim that recognizing this semantic 
difference compels us to adopt overspecification for 'open'. My argument will be as follows:
P1. There is a semantic difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE'.
P2. If there is a semantic difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE' then the 
lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' includes knowledge which specifies a 
denotation that includes light-turning-ons and knowledge that specifies a denotation 
that includes TV-turning-ons.
P3. If the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' includes knowledge which 
specifies a denotation that includes light-turning-ons and knowledge that specifies a 
denotation that includes TV-turning-ons then we should adopt overspecification for 
'openME' and 'openOVE.'
C. We should adopt overspecification for 'openME' and 'openOVE.'
44 I don't mean to make any substantive assumptions about the nature of dialects. I'm not trying to say that OVE is a  
theoretically interesting kind. I'm simply using the expression 'OVE' as shorthand to make it easier to discuss the  
case.
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Let us begin with the first premise.45
3.2.3. P1. There is a semantic difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE'.
My argument for P1 will consist in an argument by exclusion. I will present what I take to be 
the three most plausible candidates for a non-semantic difference between 'openME' and 
'openOVE', and claim that none of them suffice to explain the difference. 
3.2.3.1. The Standard Account of Pragmatics
A standard account of pragmatics holds that pragmatic processes are processes that take 
semantic content and NLBs as inputs.46 These processes make use of TNRAs to output 
communicated content. Some cognitive capacities involve the application of domain specific rules. 
Syntactic competence, for example, is often taken to have special rules that act upon syntactic 
representations. Pragmatic processes, on the standard account, involve the application of TNRAs to 
mental representations from a variety of different domains. Pragmatic processes, on the standard 
account, are not language-specific.
On the standard account of pragmatics, there are three potential sources of non-linguistic 
input that go into pragmatic processes. The first source of non-linguistic input is constituted by 
TNRAs. The second source of non-linguistic input is constituted by NLBs about the utterance 
situation. The third source of non-linguistic input is constituted by NLBs that are not about the 
45 The reason for putting the argument in terms of differences in dialect is that by attending to both 'openME' and 
'openOVE' we can see that there need be no difference in NLBs that undergirds the difference in use of 'openME'. 
I'm trying to find a way to distinguish the lexical knowledge and the NLBs that are relevant to explaining linguistic  
abilities. If we only look at one lexical item it can be hard to determine where to draw the line between lexical  
knowledge and NLBs. By attending to two similar though slightly different lexical items such as 'openOVE' and 
'openME' we can get a better grasp on what has to be lexical knowledge. I argue that since OVE and ME speakers 
needn't differ in NLBs any difference in linguistic abilities will  have to be due to differences in linguistic (and  
specifically lexical) knowledge.
46 A pragmatic process is a cognitive process that takes semantic content as an input along with NLBs and outputs 
communicated content that goes beyond semantic content. This expression is commonly used in the literature, 
though it is not always obvious whether pragmatic processes occur in the speaker, the interpreter or in an idealized  
reconstruction of communication. I will be bracketing these issues as they are complex and not of central importance 
for my project.
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utterance situation. Pragmatic processes proceed by applying the TNRAs on the basis of the latter 
two groups of beliefs together with the relevant linguistic knowledge.
If the difference between ME and OVE speakers is to be explained in terms of standard 
pragmatic processes then there has to be a difference between ME and OVE speakers in terms of 
their TNRAs, their NLBs about the utterance situation or their NLBs that are not about the 
utterance situation. We don't want to say that ME and OVE speakers have different TNRAs. The 
dialect you speak does not affect your general reasoning capacities. So explaining the difference 
between ME and OVE speakers in terms of the standard account of pragmatics requires that ME 
and OVE speakers have different NLBs. These beliefs must either pertain to the utterance situation 
or not pertain to the utterance situation.
We can describe two utterance situations, s1 and s2, so that s1 is identical to s2 in every way 
except for its speaker. The speaker in s1 is Carleton, a speaker of ME. The speaker in s2 is Carleton* 
a person identical to Carleton in every way other than the fact that Carleton* speaks OVE. Carleton 
can use 'open' to denote TV-turning-ons in s1 while Carleton* cannot use 'open' to denote TV-
turning-ons in s2.47 Given this description of s1 and s2, we have a contrast between uses of 'open' in 
situations where the relevant speakers do not have any different beliefs about the utterance 
situation.48 Since ME and OVE speakers do not seem to differ in terms of TNRAs or NLBs about 
the utterance situation, the only possible source for a pragmatic explanation of the difference 
between ME and OVE uses of 'open' is a difference in NLBs that are not about the utterance 
47 I use 'TV-turning-ons' as shorthand for denoting events in which TVs are turned on. Similarly, light-turning-ons are 
events where lights are turned on, and so on.
48 One might object that Carleton believes he speaks ME in the utterance situation while Carleton* believes that he  
speaks OVE in the utterance situation. This isn't obvious. If, for example, we imagine that Carleton's world is one in 
which every speaker speaks ME and Carleton*'s world is one in which every speaker speaks OVE they might not  
have any beliefs, explicit or implicit about what languages they are speaking in the utterance situation. Or perhaps 
Carleton and Carleton* share a strange neurological disorder that prevents them from having explicit beliefs which 
dialect  they are using.  Surely even in such bizarre circumstances  there would still  be a  difference in how both 
speakers can use 'open.' 
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situation.
One might suspect that ME speakers and OVE speakers have different beliefs about 
openings. Perhaps ME speakers believe that turning-ons can be openings while OVE speakers believe 
that turning-ons cannot be openings. It is not plausible, however to suppose that ME speakers and 
OVE speakers have inconsistent beliefs. After all, if they have inconsistent beliefs then one of the 
beliefs has to be false. But which one? There doesn't appear to be any independent fact of the matter 
about whether turning-ons are openings. 
Perhaps instead of positing inconsistent beliefs, we should claim that Carleton or Carleton* 
has a belief that the other lacks. Perhaps Carleton, the ME speaker, has a belief that licenses his use 
of 'open,' to denote TV-turning-ons while Carleton*, the OVE speaker, lacks this belief. There are 
several problems with this proposal. 
A speaker can switch between dialects and languages at will.  Imagine a speaker who is a 
member of two linguistic communities. She is a member of both the community of ME speakers and 
the community of OVE speakers. She might change her use of 'open' depending upon with whom 
she is communicating. If the ability to use 'open' to denote TV-turning-ons is explained in terms of 
whether she has a given belief, then it seems like she would be gaining or losing beliefs when she 
switches dialects. Changing dialects should not require any modification in her epistemic state.49
One might respond that the beliefs that explain the difference between 'openME' and 
'openOVE' are linguistic beliefs. In a sense, I agree with this. Given that I believe that 'openME' and 
'openOVE' are semantically different, I believe that ME speakers and OVE speakers will differ in 
their lexical knowledge pertaining to 'open'. It will follow that competent ME speakers will differ in 
49 One might say that the speaker is not actually gaining or losing beliefs, but instead is acting as if she is gaining or  
losing beliefs. I don't see any motivation for this view. If these are genuine beliefs, what could be the justification for  
not-believing in something sometimes when speaking in one language and believing in it while speaking other  
languages. 
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their linguistic knowledge from competent OVE speakers. The objector might reply that the 
difference is a difference in linguistic knowledge, though it isn't a difference in lexical knowledge. 
Perhaps the ME speaker knows that ME speakers use 'open' to refer to TV-turning-ons while the 
OVE speaker knows that OVE speakers don't use 'open' to refer to TV-turning-ons.50 Below I 
consider the possibility that there is a pragmatically grounded difference between ME speakers and 
OVE speakers grounded in different conditions for appropriate use of 'open' or lexical metadata 
associated with 'open'. First, I want to consider a different kind of pragmatic explanation.
3.2.3.2. Pragmatic Conventions
In the previous section I looked at the standard account of pragmatics according to which 
pragmatic processes involve applying TNRAs on the basis of both linguistic knowledge and NLBs in 
order to determine what is communicated in an utterance situation. This account of pragmatics is 
likely untenable. There seem to be examples of  pragmatic processes  that  are driven by domain-
specific pragmatic rules. That is to say, there are pragmatic processes that cannot be explained purely 
in terms of TNRAs applied to linguistic knowledge and NLBs. For example, on many accounts of 
semantics,  semantics  involves  associating truth-conditions with sentences.  On such accounts  any 
communicated  content  that  is  not  part  of  a  sentence's  truth-conditions  will  be  the  result  of  
pragmatic processes. There are arguably domain-specific conventions that govern how we extract  
communicated information that is not part of the uttered sentence's truth-conditions.51
A putative pragmatic convention appears in certain dialects of English as they are spoken in  
India. This convention is normally used in various Indian languages and presumably got imported 
50 I suspect that any such beliefs would be part of lexical knowledge but at this point I assume for the sake of argument  
that they need not be part of lexical knowledge.
51 If one thinks that emphasis can be semantic, so much the better for me. Recall that I, in the end, want to reject the  
claim that pragmatic conventions can explain the difference between ME and OVE uses of 'open'. I am here trying  
to make the best possible case for pragmatic conventions to explain why some thinkers might be drawn to them. If 
one is not convinced that we can make a case for pragmatic conventions, then so much the better for my argument.
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into  English.  According  to  this  convention,  the  repetition  of  an  expression  is  used  to  suggest  
emphasis. In OVE this can be done with some adverbs:
(8) Simon was very very very very happy.
But in Indian English we can use other expressions to achieve the same effect:
(9) Have you checked the power power power?
This convention has apparently caused a fair amount of difficulty for technical support companies 
who have outsourced work to India. Most North Americans react with affront when asked (9) when 
calling for computer technical support. The Indian support officer simply wanted to emphasize the 
importance of checking the power.52 
The repetition has an effect on what is communicated by this sentence, though it arguably 
has no effect on the sentence's literal content. The repetition serves to emphasize something though 
this emphasis does not change the content of the question itself. (9) Has the same content as (10).
(10) Have you checked the power?
There  appears  to  be  a  domain-specific  pragmatic  convention in some dialects  of  Indian 
English that says that repetition marks emphasis. This convention applies to utterances and gives rise  
to differences in what is communicated.53 This rule seems to be a convention that is not determined 
by  TNRAs  based  on  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  knowledge.  We  could  imagine  a  competing  
convention  that  says  that  repetition  deemphasizes a  word.  TNRAs  have  no  reason  to  choose 
emphasis over deemphasis. The fact that repetition, in these Indian dialects of English, is always 
52 (Abley 2008 57) The information comes from Sarah Power, a language and accent coach at a Microsoft facility in 
Bangalore.
53 Some concerns about this example, both pro and con: The 'pragmatic' difference under discussion seems to be  
driven (at least partially) by syntactic differences in Indian English and North American English. One might think  
that  if  there  are  syntactic  differences,  that  suggests  that  what's  going  on  isn't  essentially  pragmatic.  Though 
conversely, one might think that on the other hand if what's going on is that syntactic differences have pragmatic  
effects but no semantic effects, all the more reason to believe in domain specific pragmatic rules.
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associated with emphasis must be due to convention.54 This convention might therefore be taken to 
be a domain-specific pragmatic rule.
Another  example  of  a  putative  pragmatic  convention  is  what  is  sometimes  called 
'narrowing.'55 When uttering sentences involving certain nominals we often leave out a quantitative  
measure and via a pragmatic process use the bare nominal to communicate an implicit 'a lot of'.56
(11a) Gus has money.
(11b) Gus has courage.
(11c) Gus has looks.
These three sentences are normally used to communicate:
(12a) Gus has lots of money.
(12b) Gus has lots of courage.
(12c) Gus has really good looks.
There is no a priori reason why we should always use this pragmatic process to communicate 'a lot  
of'  rather  than  'very  few  of'.  If  as  (Carston  and  Wilson  2007)  suggests,  we  arrive  at  the 
communicated content using TNRAs applied to linguistic knowledge and NLBs, we should be able 
to communicate 'very few of' when it is more relevant to the context.
(13) A: Shawn is so poor! He's living in a guesthouse and barely making the rent. I 
heard he's about to go bankrupt again!
B: I know. Shawn has money.
The process that communicates 'a lot' when we utter a bare nominal must be driven by a  
54 An alternative that I won't be considering here is that rather than a convention, there is an innate topic-specific 
pragmatic rule. While such a view would give a different metaphysics for the rule in question, it agrees that the rule 
must be domain-specific and isn't reducible to TNRAs. Note also that if topic-specific pragmatic rules are innate, it  
is harder to appeal to them to explain differences in the OVE and ME uses of 'open'.
55 (Recanati 2004) and (Carston and Wilson 2007) discuss these cases.
56 As with the previous example, I want to emphasize that I am trying to discuss cases that appear to me to be plausible  
candidates for pragmatic convention. If one objects that in this case there is a better non-pragmatic explanation for  
communicated content or that pragmatic processes couldn't be responsible for communicating 'a lot of', so much  
the better for me. 
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domain-specific rule that goes beyond TNRAs that use linguistic knowledge and NLBs.
A theorist trying to resist my argument could claim that the difference between uses of 'open' 
in ME and OVE are due to there being different pragmatic conventions associated with 'open' in 
ME and OVE. While this claim might pose a problem for my argument for overspecification, this 
claim is not available for the underspecificationist. Recall her answer to question (B) back in section 
3.1.2.. The underspecificationist wants to shift the work of explaining linguistic abilities away from 
specialized linguistic knowledge. The underspecificationist wants the bulk of the explanation of the 
specification of denotations to involve TNRAs and NLBs. Positing pragmatic conventions might 
allow us to avoid positing specialized lexical knowledge, but it still involves positing specialized 
linguistic knowledge of the kind that the underspecificationist wanted to avoid. Calling this 
knowledge 'pragmatic' doesn't obviate the fact that it is specific knowledge about the range of 
application of a lexical item that must be learned by all competent language users. Therefore, it isn't 
open to underspecificationists to reject P1 on the grounds that the difference between ME and OVE 
uses of 'open' is due to ME and OVE associating different pragmatic conventions with 'open.' 
Furthermore,  even  if  the  pragmatic  conventions  response  were  open  to  the 
underspecificationist, the response still has a crucial problem. The putative 'pragmatic conventions'  
that  influence  the  use  of  commonly  used  verbs  differ  fundamentally  from  the  other  cases  of  
pragmatic conventions described above. Even if we accept the examples of pragmatic conventions 
described above this difference will give us reason to doubt that the putative pragmatic conventions  
that  would influence  the  use  of  commonly  used verbs  are  genuine  pragmatic  conventions.  The  
emphasis convention is a single convention that can be applied to an utterance of virtually any lexical  
item. The narrowing convention similarly can be used with utterances including a wide variety of  
bare  nominals.  The  putative  pragmatic  conventions  that  are  supposed  to  influence  the  use  of  
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commonly used verbs would influence the use of a single lexical item.57 Furthermore, the putative 
pragmatic convention that would influence the use of 'open' would only be relevant in a very limited  
number of situations. As a result the putative pragmatic convention that would influence the use of  
'open'  is  less  plausibly  a  genuine  pragmatic  convention  then  the  emphasis  convention  or  the 
narrowing convention. Part of the reason for taking those latter conventions to be pragmatic is that  
despite  involving  domain-specific  rules,  those  conventions  apply  to  utterances  of  sentences  that 
include a wide variety of lexical items. If the putative pragmatic conventions that would influence 
'open' are specific  to 'open' it  is  more plausible to consider them part of  the lexical  knowledge  
associated with 'open'. Even if there are pragmatic conventions, pragmatic conventions seem like a  
poor choice to explain minor differences in the use of particular lexical items. 
3.2.3.3. Appropriateness Conditions/Lexical Metadata
The final possibility I want to explore is that ME and OVE speakers differ in their 
metalinguistic beliefs. According to this account, ME and OVE speakers represent the meaning of 
'open' to themselves differently, but that difference is not constitutive of the known lexical meaning. 
Though ME and OVE speakers have the same lexical knowledge, they differ in their metalinguistic 
knowledge, That way of representing the lexical meaning plays a role in her interpretation of 
sentences including that lexical item. One way to make sense of this account, would be to claim that 
along with a lexical item's lexical meaning, competent speakers must also know under which 
conditions the lexical item's use is appropriate. Distinct lexical items might have identical lexical 
meanings though they might be appropriate under different conditions.
One example might be the lexical items: 'dead', and 'deceased'. Arguably, these lexical items 
57 Perhaps it could be said that there is a single convention that influences the use of a small class of lexical items. For  
instance, perhaps the putative pragmatic convention that would allow 'open' to denote TV-turning-ons would also 
allow 'close' to denote TV-turning-offs. Still, such a pragmatic convention would at best govern a very small class of  
closely related lexical items.
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are identical in lexical meaning, though they have very different uses. If lexical knowledge only 
specifies a denotation then knowledge of the conditions under which 'dead' or 'deceased' are 
appropriate goes beyond lexical knowledge.
Not all of the relevant ways of representing lexical meaning might be correctly characterized 
as  being about appropriateness  conditions.  Perhaps facts  about  the appropriate  distribution of  a  
lexical item might be what is sometimes called 'lexical  metadata'.  Lexical  metadata is knowledge 
about the use of a lexical item that isn't part of the lexical item's lexical meaning.58 I'm going to 
present two arguments  that  no such metalinguistic  account correctly  characterizes  the difference 
between speakers  of ME and OVE. Before looking at  these two arguments,  I  want to note the 
dialectical point I raised in relation to pragmatic conventions also holds here. While appropriateness 
conditions and lexical metadata might be ways of avoiding my argument, they are not available to 
the underspecificationist.  Positing a rich store of lexical  metadata might not amount to positing 
specialized  knowledge  of  lexical  meanings,  but  it  still  amounts  to  positing  specialized  linguistic 
knowledge.  The  lexical  metadata  response  fails  to  honour  the  underspecificationist  answer  to 
question (B) in 3.1.2. The underspecificationist wants to shift the explanation of linguistic abilities  
away from specialized linguistic knowledge and towards TNRAs and NLBs. Still, though the lexical  
metadata response may not be available to the underspecificationist, it seems to me to be a major  
way of blocking my argument.  I will therefore argue against the lexical metadata account in some  
detail.
Argument 1: Comprehension
If  the  use  of  'openOVE'  to  denote  TV-turning-ons  is  ruled  out  by  lexical  metadata  or 
appropriateness  conditions  we  would  expect  that  (5a)  should  be  fully  comprehensible  to  OVE 
58 The term 'lexical metadata' comes from jargon concerning computer databases where engineers distinguish between 
the data stored at a location in the database and the metadata that tells us something about the data that is stored 
there.
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speakers. Lexical knowledge associated with 'openOVE' specifies a denotation which includes TV-
turning-ons, though OVE speakers would also know that the use of 'openOVE' to denote TV-
turning-ons is not normally allowed. OVE speakers would be capable of understanding (5a) though 
they would judge (5a) to be inappropriate. I claim, as an empirical fact, that this is not always true. 
Many  English  speakers  are  not  capable  of  understanding  (5a)  without  explicit  instruction.  As 
reported above, speakers have responded to (5a) with attitudes ranging from blank incomprehension, 
to the feeling that there is something 'logically' wrong with (5a). This attitude can remain even after 
the dialectal and cross-linguistic variation has been explained. Since these individuals are not able to 
understand utterances of sentences like (5a) without explicit instruction, it doesn't seem like the 
lexical knowledge they associate with 'open' can specify a denotation that includes TV-turning-ons59 
I'm not denying that some OVE speakers might be able to reason their way to the correct 
interpretation of sentences like (5a) in an utterance situation. While an inability to understand a 
sentence (in the absence of any linguistic flaw in the sentence) strongly suggests that a language user 
lacks lexical knowledge, being able to understand does not by itself entail that a language user has  
lexical knowledge. Language users are regularly able to understand sentences that we take to be ill-
formed in many ways. Even syntactically ill-formed sentences can be understood given adequate 
background information. 
Imagine  a  group of  people  is  waiting  for  their  friend  Juliette  to  return  from the  store. 
Someone enters the room and utters (14).
(14) Return store from, Juliette? 
In this utterance situation, many language users could reason their way to the intended message. 
59 A brief anecdote: the first time my wife met my parents, she was politely asked to close the television at the end of a 
movie. She got up nervously and started looking for hidden shutters or a secret door that she could close. Given the 
relevance of turning off the TV in the context and the fact that the situation was relatively “high stakes” we might  
expect that if the lexical meaning she associated with open specified a denotation that included television-turning-
offs she would have been able to arrive at the correct interpretation.
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They can understand that the new entrant to the room intended to ask “Has Juliette returned from 
the store?” Just because (14) can be understood, however, it doesn't follow that the semantic content 
of (14) is the same as the semantic content of “Has Juliette returned from the store?” If a given 
sentence of a language L is not comprehensible to a competent speaker of L, then we have evidence 
that the sentence contains some linguistic flaw. If the sentence is syntactically well formed then the 
flaw is likely semantic.60
OVE speakers are regularly incapable of understanding (5a). They are not able to access the 
semantic value associated with (5a) without explicit guidance.  For such OVE speakers, the lexical 
knowledge associated with 'open' cannot specify a denotation that includes TV-turning-ons or light-
turning-ons.
The phenomenology of these cases provides supplementary evidence for my claim that the 
lexical knowledge associated with 'openOVE' cannot specify a denotation that includes TV-turning-
ons  and  light-turning-ons.  Though  language  users  might  be  able  to  reason  their  way  to  an 
interpretation of a syntactically ill-formed sentence, the sentence itself remains marked as deviant. 
Grasping the intended message does not remove the deviance. This continued deviance is evidence  
that  whatever  a  language  user  does  in  order  to  grasp  the  sentence's  message  goes  beyond  the  
application  of  linguistic  knowledge.  The  reaction  of  OVE  speakers  to  (5a)  involves  a  similar 
intuition of deviance. Once the ME use of 'open' has been explained to an OVE speaker she will be 
able to understand the message that an ME speaker intends to convey with (5a), though for the 
OVE speaker (5a) is still marked as deviant. The continued deviance of (5a) strongly suggests that 
the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' is not able to specify a denotation that includes TV-
60 There are situations in which a well-formed sentence might be difficult to comprehend. If, for instance, it conveys a  
message  that  seems  irrelevant  or  false  in  the  circumstances,  a  competent  language  user  might  not  be  able  to  
understand it. If the sentence is well-formed but extremely long it might prove too taxing for a listener's memory. In 
the case I'm focusing on, none of these flaws are present. The TV-turning-on reading is sensible and relevant given  
the utterance situation. (5a) is well formed and succinct.
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turning-ons. The difference between OVE and ME uses of 'open' must therefore be explained by  
differences in lexical knowledge and not by appropriateness conditions or metadata associated with 
the a lexical meaning.61 
Argument 2: Second Language Learning
Learning the proper uses of commonly used verbs presents one of the greatest challenges for 
second language learners. Even highly fluent second language speakers often struggle with the proper  
use of commonly used verbs.62 In order to be a fully competent user of commonly used verbs, one 
must be aware of when they apply and when they do not apply. A speaker is not judged to be fully 
competent with a commonly used verb unless she has learned when that verb must be used or when 
a different commonly used verb must be used. As this knowledge is necessary for competence with  
commonly  used  verbs,  I  claim  it  should  be  included  in  the  lexical  knowledge  associated  with 
commonly used verbs. 
I  began section 3.2.3.3.  by suggesting (on behalf  of  my opponents)  that  appropriateness 
conditions and lexical metadata might be metalinguistic knowledge and not lexical knowledge. Some 
of our intuitions about meaning seem to speak against this suggestion. Consider slurs that differ  
radically  in their  emotive force such as  'Yid' and 'Kike.'  The latter has  a far stronger, far  more 
61 When appropriateness conditions determine whether a lexical item is appropriate, language users are able to flout the 
appropriateness  conditions with comedic or dramatic effect.  Socially awkward characters are  often portrayed as  
regularly using lexical items that are inappropriate for the utterance situation. Both the comedic contrast and the  
portrayal  of  social  awkwardness  require  that  observers  be  capable  of  recognizing  an  inappropriate  use  as 
inappropriate. Observers must be aware of the inappropriateness in order to find the use funny.
In the case of 'open' we fail to see any flouting of appropriateness conditions. The lack of flouting is tied to 
the comprehensibility issue. If flouting the appropriateness conditions leads to a sentence that is uninterpretable for  
many speakers there will be no comedic effect. The lack of flouting in cases like 'open' provide us with a contrast  
between the kind of deviance that accompanies failures of appropriateness conditions and the kind of deviance that  
accompanies failures of comprehensibility. 
Furthermore,  it  is  extremely  rare  for  a  sentence  to  violate  appropriateness  conditions relative  to every 
utterance  situation.  Generally  we  can  come  up  with  an  utterance  situation  in  which  the  sentence  could  be 
appropriately used. However, here is no situation where OVE speakers are able to accept the ME interpretation of  
(5a). This  strongly  suggests  that  OVE  speakers  find  the  sentence  (5a) linguistically  deviant  and  not  merely 
inappropriate.
62 See for instance (Altenberg and Grainger 2001)
159
negative effect. Whether this effect is truth-conditional in nature, or whether it is due to Fregean  
colouring, or conventional implicature, this emotive force is part of what we would intuitively say is  
the meaning of the slur. A speaker who failed to recognize the substantial differences in tone between 
'yid' and 'kike' would without a doubt not be competent with the slurs.63 
We can recast a similar argument with commonly used verbs though the effect is not quite as  
dramatic. Imagine a speaker who talks about separating her dinner with a knife and tells her boss she 
thinks the company can separate costs. She also talks about cutting her laundry before doing it and  
talks about being sad that her brother and his wife have recently cut. Such a speaker, I take it, will  
not be judged a fully competent user of 'cut' and 'separate'. She lacks crucial knowledge about the 
meaning of 'cut' and 'separate'. Given dictionary entries for 'cut' and 'separate' she would not be  
able to reliably assign the correct lexical item to the correct entry. Knowledge of when to use a given 
commonly used verb therefore ought to be considered part of lexical knowledge.
3.2.3.4. Summary of the Case for a Semantic Difference
I have argued that the difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE' is a semantic difference. 
First  I  argued  that  the  difference  between  'openME'  and  'openOVE'  is  part  of  the  linguistic 
knowledge  associated with the  expressions—that  it  doesn't  result  from differences  in  NLBs and 
TNRAs. I then looked at plausible examples of different kinds of non-semantic linguistic knowledge  
and argued that the knowledge underlying the difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE' would 
be fundamentally different from the less controversial examples of pragmatic conventions. This, of  
course, does not amount to a demonstration that the difference is semantic. The knowledge at issue  
could still be knowledge of pragmatic conventions of a novel kind. Still, I think there is ample reason 
63 There has been a great deal of literature recently devoted to explaining the emotive effects of slur words. See for  
instance (Potts 2007),  (Hom 2008) and (Richard 2008). My concern here isn't with promoting any particular  
theory of slur words, just to point out that knowledge of the emotive force seems essential to competence (even if it 
isn't truth-conditionally relevant).
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to deny that  the  knowledge  at  issue  is  pragmatic.  Instead  of  worrying directly  about  the  labels 
'semantic' and 'pragmatic' we can ask what kind of theoretical work the relevant knowledge has to 
perform. 
Firstly,  the  knowledge  is  relevant  to  specifying  the  denotation  of  a  lexical  item.  Since 
specifying denotations for a lexical item is part of specifying truth-conditions for sentences which 
contain  that  lexical  item,  these  conventions  are  relevant  to  specifying  the  truth-conditions  of 
sentences. As the discussion in 3.2.3.2. showed, the knowledge does not concern general conventions 
about how we use a variety of lexical items. Instead, the relevant knowledge is specific to a single  
lexical item (or a small set of lexical items). It is specialized knowledge tied specifically to a lexical  
item.  As  the  discussion  in  3.2.3.3.  showed,  this  specialized  knowledge  is  often  necessary  for 
comprehending sentences involving the lexical item and is required in order to be a competent user  
of the expression.  Finally, though the relevance of the knowledge might depend upon an utterance 
situation, the knowledge itself doesn't seem to change with the utterance situation. In every TV-
turning-on situation, the same knowledge is relevant.
Could we call this knowledge, knowledge of a pragmatic convention? I suppose so. But in 
doing so we would owe an explanation of the semantics/pragmatics distinction that would back up  
this classification. The lexical knowledge that distinguishes 'openME' and 'openOVE' seems to hit  
all the marks of semantic lexical knowledge, and aside from the fact that it is not relevant in every 
utterance situation, it does not follow the patterns of paradigmatic pragmatic knowledge. So while I  
don't take myself to have shown categorically that the difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE' 
must be semantic, I think that absent an account of the semantics/pragmatics distinction that could 
justify a different classification, we have solid reason to consider the relevant specialized knowledge  
to be part of the semantic knowledge that all competent speakers have about the lexical items they  
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master.64
We can move on to the second premise. 
3.2.4.  P2.  If  there  is  a  semantic  difference  between 'openME' and 'openOVE'  then the  lexical  
knowledge associated with 'openME' includes knowledge which specifies a denotation that includes  
light-turning-ons and knowledge that specifies a denotation that includes TV-turning-ons.65
3.2.4.1. Arguing for Premise 2
According to the antecedent of P2, there is a semantic difference between 'openME' and 
'openOVE'. The (semantic) lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' differs from the (semantic)  
lexical knowledge associated with 'openOVE'. In the previous section I argued that we cannot accept 
any of the putative non-semantic differences between ME and OVE uses of 'open'. Therefore, there  
are  two possibilities:  (i)  The lexical  knowledge associated with 'openME' includes all  the lexical 
knowledge associated with 'openOVE' and then also includes further knowledge that contributes to 
specifying a denotation that includes TV-turning-ons. (ii)  The lexical  knowledge associated with 
'openOVE' includes all of the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' and also includes further 
knowledge that functions to rule out the specification of denotations including TV-turning-ons.
The  underspecificationist  cannot  accept  either  of  these  possibilities.  (i),  I  argue  below, 
amounts to an admission of overspecification. If the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' 
includes knowledge that contributes to specifying a denotation including TV-turning-ons then it 
seems P2 would follow. Interestingly, the underspecificationist also cannot accept (ii). According to 
(ii)  the  lexical  knowledge  associated  with  'openOVE'  includes  knowledge  that  rules  out  the  
specification of a denotation that only includes events of a particular kind—TV-turning-ons. But  
there are lots of other events that cannot be included in the denotation of 'openOVE'. If the lexical  
64 One might worry that there is still something else going on. In particular there might appear to be an important  
connection between the various different meanings of 'open' that is getting ignored by my approach. I respond to 
this objection in more detail below in section 3.2.4.2..
65 In this  section  I  will  only  be  discussing  TV-turning-ons and not  light-turning-ons,  though  an  exactly  parallel  
argument is available for light-turning-ons.
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knowledge associated with 'open' must include specific pieces of knowledge that rule events of a 
particular kind from being in a specified denotation, a great deal of lexical knowledge will have to be 
associated with 'open'.  ME speakers  cannot use 'open' to denote just any electrical-device-turning 
on.
?(15a) Carleton opened the space-heater.
?(15b) Carleton opened the coffee-maker.
?(15c) Carleton opened the car. 
?(15d) Carleton opened the video camera.
On the other hand, there are some further uses that do seem acceptable.
(15e) Carleton opened the radio.
(15f) Carleton opened the computer.66
Other examples seem borderline, such as:
(15g) Carleton opened his phone. (Not a flip-phone)
If we needed lexical knowledge to rule out each case like (15a-d) language users would have 
to associate even more  lexical knowledge with 'open' than in case (i). Such an account should be 
highly unappealing to the underspecificationist. By their own criterion, we would want to adopt an 
account where we have positive lexical knowledge—lexical knowledge that specifies the denotation
—rather than an account where we have massive negative  lexical  knowledge—lexical knowledge 
which rules out all potential denotations.
One might object that what I've shown falls short of overspecification. I've shown that there 
must  be  some  lexical  knowledge  associated  with  'openME'  that  allows  'openME'  to  specify  a 
denotation including TV-turning-ons. I haven't shown that this lexical knowledge (in combination 
66 (15f) seems better for some OVE speakers, even if we aren't talking explicitly of laptops. Perhaps the use of 'open' 
that denotes laptop-openings somehow was transferred to traditional computers. Another possibility is that talk of  
opening computer programs was extended to the machine as a whole. 
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with  other  lexical  knowledge  associated  with  'openME')  if  selected  from the  totality  of  lexical 
knowledge associated with 'open', suffices to specify a denotation. But overspecification requires the 
sufficiency claim. So I haven't fully demonstrated overspecification.
My response to this objection is that while I haven't demonstrated that the lexical knowledge  
associated with 'openME'  suffices  to  determine  a  denotation,  I  have  shown that  (a)  the  lexical  
knowledge associated with 'open' must play a role in specifying a denotation including 'open' and 
(b) that there is no further role for NLBs and TNRAs beyond selecting the relevant knowledge in a 
particular utterance situation. Unless we have reason to think that NLBs and TNRAs are playing  
some further role in the specification of denotations, we have no reason to accept underspecification. 
Why think there is no role for NLBs and TNRAs beyond the selection of relevant lexical  
knowledge? Again, we must see that the differences among the potential denotations of 'openME' 
and 'openOVE' are fairly limited. The potential denotations of 'openME' include TV-turning-ons, 
light-turning-ons and perhaps several other turning-ons that are not denoted by 'openOVE.' That  
said, for the most part 'openME' and 'openOVE' have the same range of potential denotations.  
There is no generalization we can use to predict whether or not 'open' will denote a turning-on for a 
particular  kind  of  object,  even  for  electrical  devices.  Instead  we  only  have  a  small  number  of  
arbitrarily chosen devices whose turning-ons can be denoted by 'openME'. 
This suggests that once we have selected the lexical knowledge that allows the specification of 
a denotation including TV-turning-ons there is no further role for NLBs and TNRAs. If there was a  
further role for NLBs and TNRAs in extending or narrowing denotations, we would expect to see 
more flexibility in this particular use. It isn't enough that the new lexical knowledge makes salient 
TV-turning-ons. It has to be able to make TV-turning-ons salient without making space-heater-
turning-ons salient and without making car-engine-turning-ons salient. If we left it up to TNRAs to  
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determine what counted as similar to a hint-like piece of lexical knowledge (as Rayo and Ludlow  
might  have  it)  we  would  have  no  grounds  for  ruling  out  car-engine-turnings-ons,  spaceheater-
turnings-ons, and so on. It really seems like it is the specialized knowledge that is doing the real work 
of specifying how 'open' can be used and that NLBs and TNRAs are simply being used to determine 
what specialized knowledge is relevant in the utterance situation.
Moreover,  we  can  look  at  the  kinds  of  roles  ascribed  to  NLBs  and  TNRAs  by 
underspecificationists.  Bach  and Ruhl  thought  that  NLBs  and TNRAs provided  supplementary 
content  not  included  in  lexical  knowledge.  Ludlow  thought  that  we  needed  to  provide  
supplementary  content  by  engaging  in  negotiation  and  coordination.  Rayo  thought  that  lexical  
knowledge only provided hints that could be applied in many ways in many different circumstances.  
Once we see that the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' has to be able to highlight TV-
turning-ons without highlighting anything further, we no longer need to posit the kinds of processes 
that the underspecificationists posited. Though I may not have provided a knock-down argument  
showing that NLBs and TNRAs only contribute by selecting relevant pieces of lexical knowledge, I  
have argued that at least in the case of 'open' we have undermined the need for assigning a further  
explanatory role to NLBs and TNRAs. We have no further justification to posit further effects of 
NLBs and TNRAs and hence we have no reason to deny overspecification.
3.2.4.2. Conventions and Naturalness
One might grant that I have shown that there is something conventional going on when we 
compare the differences in dialect, but hold that this is only a part of the story. It's true that there are  
cross-dialectal  and cross-linguistic differences in how speakers  use  verbs like 'open'.  And it  does  
seem, in the case that I've discussed, that those differences don't arise from NLBs and TNRAs. Still, 
despite  these  differences  between  'openME'  and  'openOVE',  there  are  also  obvious  similarities 
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between  the  two.  As  I've  just  highlighted,  'openME'  and  'openOVE'  are  highly  similar,  only  
differing in whether they can denote events of a few kinds. One might even say there is something  
natural about the way the various denotations of 'open' hang together. Even if some particular uses  
seem to be conventional and exhibit cross-linguistic variation, there might even appear to be a core 
that is consistent across languages.67 
As a result, we have two contrasting pieces of data that we need to account for. On the one  
hand we need to explain the apparent conventionality of particular uses of 'open'. On the other hand 
we also need an explanation for why many of the denotations of 'open' seem to naturally hang 
together.  Overspecification  can  account  for  the  former  datum—the  conventionality.  But  can 
overspecification  also  account  for  the  cross-linguistic  similarities  and  the  fact  that  the  various 
denotations of 'open' seem to hang together?
I think that  overspecification,  at  least  in its more sophisticated guises,  can accommodate  
these “natural” similarities. If overspecification was committed to what I called a 'sense-enumeration 
lexicon' in 3.1.2., where each denotation was specified by non-overlapping lexical knowledge, then it  
would be a mystery how the various denotations of a lexical item cohere together. We might expect 
that  different  languages  (especially  those  from different  language-families)  would  have  radically 
different patterns of denotations. However, I don't see why a sophisticated overspecificationist would 
tie themselves to a sense-enumeration lexicon. Instead, an overspecificationist can adopt an account,  
like the one sketched in 3.1.2. where the no individual piece of lexical knowledge associated with a  
lexical item is necessary or sufficient for specifying a denotation. Instead, specifying a denotation  
requires the combination of  various pieces of  lexical  knowledge. Some of that lexical  knowledge  
67 Interestingly something similar seems to hold for many of the pragmatic conventions I discuss above. Though there 
is nothing in NLBs or TNRAs that suggests that repetition should invoke emphasis (as opposed to deemphasis)  
cross-linguistically repetition tends to be used to emphasize, even though the scope of those uses might differ from 
one language to another.
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might be more abstract. And some pieces of lexical knowledge might be relevant for specifying many  
of the denotations that a lexical item can have in different utterance situations. However, contra-the 
underspecificationist, any supplement to the abstract pieces of lexical knowledge would already be 
part of the totality of lexical knowledge associated with the expression. One possibility is that the  
more abstract components of the lexical  knowledge could be shared across uses, while the more  
concrete components would be selected based upon the utterance situation. Since pieces of abstract  
lexical knowledge would be relevant to specifying many different denotations, they can explain why  
the different denotations seem to hang together.
Such an account squares well with a pretheoretical description of the differences between 
'openME' and 'openOVE'. An untutored description of the situation may claim that 'openME' and 
'openOVE'  almost  have  the  same  meanings—their  meanings  just  differ  in  one  part.  The 
overspecificationist can explain the veracity of this description. While the pieces of lexical knowledge 
associated with 'openME' and 'openOVE' are almost the same, they have a slight difference. There is 
simply  a  little  more  lexical  knowledge  associated  with  'openME'  that  isn't  associated  with  
'openOVE'. But for the most part they are associated with the same lexical knowledge.68  
Let us move on to the final premise of my argument.
3.2.5. P3. If the lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' includes knowledge which specifies a  
denotation that includes light-turning-ons and knowledge that specifies a denotation that includes  
TV-turning-ons then we should adopt overspecification for 'openME' and 'openOVE.'
68 Even if one doesn't want to explain naturalness in terms of overlap in the pieces of lexical knowledge that specify 
denotations there are other plausible explanations, familiar from standard discussions of cross-linguistic similarities,  
that are fully compatible with overspecification. There could presumably be innate constraints on the acquisition of 
a lexicon. If so, the fact that certain pieces of lexical knowledge seems to pattern together might be a result of innate 
constraints. On the other hand, there could be similarities in the environments within which speakers of languages 
are embedded, resulting in similar conventions developing in different environments. Given that even speakers from 
very different cultures and living in different climes share a psychology, aspects of that shared psychology will affect 
the environment in which lexical knowledge is acquired.
Either innate constraints, or environmental similarities could provide a metasemantic explanation for why  
certain groupings of lexical knowledge seem “natural” without in any way undermining the claim that those lexical  
items are overspecified. 
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So far my argument has had a limited scope. I have argued that the difference in use between 
'openME' and 'openOVE' is due to a semantic difference between 'openME' and 'openOVE.' I have 
also argued that some pieces of lexical knowledge associated with 'openME' specify a denotation that  
includes TV-turning-ons. To argue for overspecification for 'openME and 'openOVE', let alone for 
commonly used verbs in general, I need to claim that my point generalizes. If the difference between 
'openME' and 'openOVE' is an idiosyncratic detail of one use of one verb then it could still follow 
that by and large underspecification holds.
I have focused my attention on one particular example because I wanted to work rigorously 
through the details of one particular lexical item to really show how denotations must be specified by 
lexical knowledge associated with the lexical item. That said, differences in the use of commonly  
used verbs go far beyond this case and far beyond 'open'. The full scope of the differences in the use  
of commonly used verbs becomes clear if we look at cross-linguistic variation in how commonly used  
verbs are  used.  As I  discussed above in section 3.2.3.3.,  anyone who has  spent  time learning a 
language post-childhood or who has spent significant time with non-native speakers of  her own 
language will likely have noticed how many mistakes come from the use of an improper commonly  
used verb. Learning the proper distribution of commonly used verbs is one of the most difficult tasks  
in learning a new language. Even speakers who are otherwise fluent often struggle with using the  
correct commonly used verb for a given situation.69 According to (Altenberg and Grainger 2001) not 
only are ESL speakers more likely than first language English speakers to err in using 'make', they are 
also far more reluctant to use 'make' in many utterance situations. 
If learning commonly used verbs only required learning a small amount of lexical knowledge 
or learning a thin or schematic meaning or putting a couple of bits of information in a grab bag, it  
69 See (Altenberg and Granger 2001) for a corpus study quantifying the kinds of difficulties that highly fluent ESL  
speakers have with the verb 'make'. 
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wouldn't be nearly so hard for non-native speakers to use commonly used verbs correctly. If the  
specification of denotations was primarily done by TNRAs using NLBs, it should be easy to acquire  
the minimal specialized linguistic knowledge required for learning a new language. The widespread  
difficulty  in  correctly  using  commonly  used  verbs  provides  evidence  that  the  kind  of  precisely 
targeted  uses  that  we  saw above  are  normal  for  commonly  used  verbs.  Variation  in the  use  of  
commonly used verbs is not a small quirk of one dialect. Variation in the use of commonly used  
verbs is ubiquitous. In order to capture the way that commonly used verbs are actually used, we need 
adopt overspecification. Pieces of the lexical knowledge associated with commonly used verbs can 
specify  highly  specific  denotations.70 We  cannot  expect  to  shift  the  burden  of  explaining  the 
specification of denotations away from lexical  knowledge. TNRAs and NLBs are not enough to 
explain the ability to use commonly used verbs without rich lexical knowledge. Contra Ruhl, Bach,  
Ludlow, and Rayo, we can only allow room for context-sensitivity if we accept that specialized lexical  
knowledge plays a major role in dictating strict limits on that context-sensitivity. TNRAs simply  
cannot explain the strict and arbitrary constraints on how we can use commonly used verbs. 
3.3. Conclusions
Semanticists  have often focused on compositional  semantics rather than attending to the 
details of lexical meanings, generally assuming a specificationist account. While a wide variety of 
thinkers have reacted against specification and embraced widespread context-sensitivity, for the most  
part they have done so at the expense of lexical knowledge. These underspecificationists hold that  
lexical knowledge is impoverished and that the work of specifying denotations should be offloaded to 
70 This isn't to say that relative to some utterance situations some light verbs might have more general denotations.  
Relative to some utterance situations light verbs might have denotations that include a variety of events of many  
different  kinds.  For  instance,  the  events  denoted  by  'open'  as  specified  to  denote  door-openings  and  cabinet  
-openings might denote a wide variety of events. However it is a mistake to think that most denotations result from 
adding further conditions to a lexical meaning that specifies the door-opening denotation. The more general use  
would simply be one among many potential uses. The denotation of 'open' on the general use still must be specified  
using NLBs and TNRAs to select pieces of lexical knowledge associated with 'open.'
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NLBs and TNRAs. I have argued, in contrast, that if we want to accept context-sensitivity, we are 
better off with overspecification. Pieces of the lexical knowledge associated with a lexical item suffice 
to  specify  their  denotations  in  many  utterance  situations.  Instead  of  shying  away  from lexical  
knowledge, if we want to understand the details of the constraints on specifying denotations, we are 
better served by working to develop explicit accounts of lexical knowledge.
My strategy here has been to take a particular case and argue it in detail. I think there is 
something important to be learned in thinking through exactly why the differences between the ME 
and OVE uses of 'open' are due to differences in lexical knowledge. By being more careful about 
what must be in lexical knowledge we can hopefully get a start on developing adequate models of  
lexical meaning. A major difficulty in lexical semantics is determining what is in lexical knowledge  
and what is a NLB. My argument shows that despite the claims of the underspecificationists, we  
need substantial lexical knowledge. 
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